"At some point we may be the only one left. That is okay with me. We are America." -President George W. Bush, 2002
The Roman Empire (27 BC-180 AD), established by Augustus, brought about comparative peace and security over the Mediterranean region, and that period of Roman peace is known in history as Pax Romana.
In the 21st century the sole superpower, through its national security strategy, called the Bush doctrine, seeks to acquire a universal presence and accomplish on a global scale what the Romans could achieve on a regional basis only.
Pax Americana envisions a world in which the United States will enjoy permanent military dominance over all countries, allies and potential foes alike.
It espouses, in a way, the Monroe Doctrine on a global scale as it asserts the right of the United States to intervene wherever and whenever it perceives that a threat of terrorism or mass destruction exists.
With imperialist overtones, it gives the United States the right to not only decide who is a terrorist and which state is supporting terrorist activities, but also the right to launch unilateral preventive strikes without even waiting for the go-ahead from the UN Security Council.
In a recent interview in the NBC's "Meet the Press" programme, President Bush conceded that weapons of mass destruction had not been found in Iraq. He, however, justified his invasion of Iraq as a "war of necessity". Defending his decision, the US president said Saddam Hussein had the capacity to develop unconventional arms, if not the actual weapons.
It may be recalled that, before going to war against Iraq last March, President Bush told the American people and the rest of the world that he was certain that the Iraqi dictator was not only in possession of chemical and biological weapons but also long-range missiles to deliver them and was actively seeking an atomic bomb. That was said to be the justification for the invasion of Iraq.
But ten months after the invasion and despite interrogation of hundreds of captured Iraqi officials, none of these weapons has been recovered. The non-recovery of these weapons raises the question whether there was any justification for the invasion of Iraq and whether the war was fought on a false premise.
Before the invasion Saddam Hussein was virtually told: show us the weapons of mass destruction we think you have, or prove definitively you do not have them (and it is up to us to tell you what constitutes definitive proof)) or you will be destroyed.
Pax Americana seeks to legitimize the right of the stronger, who also claims to be morally superior, to intimidate the weaker, who is deemed morally inferior. This in fact is the Law of the Jungle rationalized.
Even if there has been a massive failure of intelligence, as is now admitted by the Bush administration, the all-important question is whether Mr Bush allowed his conviction to distort the evidence he put before his people.
He conjured up a link between Iraq, Al-Qaeda and September 11 that does not seem to have existed. The fact is that an impression of a threat to the United States was created that the available intelligence does not seem to justify. The seemingly unwarranted Iraq war has caused the deaths of 55,000 Iraqis, including 9,600 civilians and over 500 Americans.
After the former chief US weapons hunter, David Kay, has reported that the weapons of mass destruction at the core of Bush's case for Iraq war did not exist on the eve of US-led March 2003 invasion, Mr Bush's credibility, under increasing attacks from his likely Democratic rival Senator John Kerry, has become an election issue.
Whether Kerry succeeds in beating Bush or not, his most valuable contribution is that he has already stimulated a much needed debate on America's role in the world.
The Bush administration seems to be obsessed with the idea of "rogue states" as the primary source of threats to the US and firmly believes that if America has the military power to contain them, it should use it.
It was obviously this frame of mind that produced President Bush's famous phrase about the "axis of evil", describing Iraq, Iran and North Korea in one breath.
At the moment the American focus is on Iran and North Korea supposedly seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. What about those who have already got them by the back door - India, Israel and Pakistan.
As they are identified as friends of the United States, they have so far suffered no consequences for acquiring nuclear weapons. But the problem is that the countries that are friends today may become foes in the future and vice versa.
There is no excuse at all for the unpatriotic conduct and gross delinquency of those Pakistanis who have committed nuclear proliferation. But the world-wide media campaign against Pakistan is ominous.
Was such a hue and cry raised against Israel when it was discovered to have cooperated closely with the apartheid regime of South Africa in the latter's secret nuclear programme in the late 1970s and early 1980s?
Mr Rafi Raza, in a recent perceptive piece in this newspaper, has rightly drawn attention to the dangers that Pakistan's nuclear programme now faces. It will be naivete of the highest degree if our policy makers act on the assumption that American approval of or unconcern with our nuclear capability will continue even after our utility diminishes or ceases for Washington.
Even a cursory look at recent history should make us more cautious and watchful. Who first sold nuclear plants to Iran? America, of course. But those were the days when Iran was seen as a close ally.
Who sold chemical reagents to Saddam Hussein in Iraq for use in chemical weapons to be used against Iran because by that time Iran had become an enemy? And who backed Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan? Both Republicans as well as Democrats supported him because he was anti-Soviet.
Coming back to Pax Americana, the problems of post-war Iraq clearly demonstrate the severe limitations of the sole superpower in enforcing its new order.
Going it alone without the support of the UN Security Council has undermined the entire re-building effort. Iraq has clearly shown that solo action by one country can make reconstruction a lot more difficult and complex.
Speaking at Royal Institute for International Affairs in London some time back, Strobe Talbott, US deputy secretary of state in Clinton administration warned of a world where American power was seen by others as a problem "to be managed and contained".
According to him, the key was "whether the US recommits itself to the utility of collaborative institutions and consensual arrangements." Or will America continue to act on Machiavelli's advice (in The Prince): "It is better to be feared than loved".
The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan.
http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/14/op.htm#1
