The West in the Balkans

Interview with Serbianna

http://www.serbianna.com/columns/mb/024.shtml



May 9, 2004

(Interviewing: Mickey Bozinovich)

Sam Vaknin is an Israeli who has been living in the Balkans, the Czech
Republic and Russia since 1991. He worked in Yugoslavia as advisor to
various industries and companies in the manufacturing and finance sectors
(1991-1994). In 1996, he moved to Macedonia and served there as advisor to
the Agency of Privatization and the Stock Exchange (1996-7) and Economic
dvisor to the Government of Macedonia (1999-2002). During that period he
wrote economic and political columns for Central Europe Review. He then
joined United Press International (UPI) as a Senior Business Correspondent
covering central and eastern Europe (2001-2003). Many of his articles and
essays were reprinted by Serbianna.




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In both Croatia and Bosnia Western response has been to stay on the
sidelines to a certain escalation point of the warfare, then demand that
their troops enter the conflict zone. Agreements always followed their
military presence. Kosovo was no different. If Milosevic could not have
foreseen this pattern, as you recently made a statement, what then does this
say about his leadership of Serbia?

SV: Kosovo cannot be compared to Croatia or Bosnia. Kosovo was (and,
technically, is) an integral part of Serbia, an autonomous province, not a
republic-constituent of the former Federal Yugoslavia. During the initial
phases of KLA activity (1993-6), Kosovars did not overtly wish to secede
from (the truncated) Yugoslavia. As I said in my interview to "Balkanalysis"
earlier this year:

"(Milosevic) had (no) 'plan' as far as Kosovo is concerned. He simply wanted
to eradicate what he regarded as criminals in cahoots with terrorists - and
many Kosovars considered as freedom fighters. A typical Balkan policing
operation was labeled 'Ethnic Cleansing' by the West (mainly by the
Americans) and treated as genocide by the emerging system of supranational
courts. Milosevic could not have foreseen these surrealistic turns of
events. He reacted as any besieged self-respecting politician would have. He
fought back."

In the last decade, many have been puzzled over persistently wrong policies
the West implemented in the Balkans, especially its support of separatist
agendas. Do you think that the West was more interested in stationing their
armies throughout the Balkans and has thus supported these separatists as an
excuse to enter the region on an excuse of conflict resolution? As a result
of the Kosovo conflict, for example, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have
become military stations.

SV: The war in Iraq has exposed the deep fissures in the monolithic facade
so painstakingly cultivated by Western leaders during the Clinton decade.
The truth is that, in the Balkans, the West spoke in (at least) two voices
during the 1990s. Germany, out to reestablish its hinterland, encouraged (at
first surreptitiously and then openly) the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The
United States, France, and other European countries were against.

In 1989, the West was utterly uninterested in the Balkans. It is an
impoverished, backward, crime-ridden, crumbling, institutionally
dysfunctional corner of Europe. With the exception of Greece and Bulgaria it
has little geopolitical or military merit. The West - namely, NATO and the
USA - was reluctantly dragged against its will and judgment into the Balkan
quagmire, coerced by the emerging doctrine of "humanitarian intervention"
and by the EU's military impotence.

The USA would love to get its tortured forces out of here and hand this
benighted and insignificant region over to the inapt, understaffed and
under-equipped European Union. America's interests elsewhere - in the oil
rich Middle East and Caucasus, for instance - are far more vital. But the EU
- aware of its shortcomings and limitations - seeks to prolong America's
involvement in the region.

As to separatist movements - this is a classic pattern of American global
(mis)behavior.

The United States is a kind of Dr. Frankenstein, spawning mutated monsters
in its wake. Its "drain and dump" policies consistently boomerang to haunt
it.

Both Saddam Hussein and Manuel Noriega - two acknowledged monsters - were
aided and abetted by the CIA and the US military. America had to invade
Panama to depose the latter and plans to invade Iraq for the second time to
force the removal of the former.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), an American anti-Milosevic pet, provoked a
civil war in Macedonia three years ago. Osama bin-Laden, another CIA golem,
restored to the USA, on September 11, 2001 some of the materiel it so
generously bestowed on him in his anti-Russian days.

Normally the outcomes of expedience, the Ugly American's alliances and
allegiances shift kaleidoscopically. Pakistan and Libya were transmuted from
foes to allies in the fortnight prior to the Afghan campaign. Milosevic has
metamorphosed from staunch ally to rabid foe in days.

This capricious inconsistency casts in grave doubt America's sincerity - and
in sharp relief its unreliability and disloyalty, its short term thinking,
truncated attention span, soundbite mentality, and dangerous, "black and
white", simplism.

In its heartland, America is isolationist. Its denizens erroneously believe
that the Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave is an economically
self-sufficient and self-contained continent. Yet, it is not what Americans
trust or wish that matters to others. It is what they do. And what they do
is meddle, often unilaterally, always ignorantly, sometimes forcefully.

Elsewhere, inevitable unilateralism is mitigated by inclusive
cosmopolitanism. It is exacerbated by provincialism - and American
decision-makers are mostly provincials, popularly elected by provincials. As
opposed to Rome, or Great Britain, America is ill-suited and ill-equipped to
micromanage the world. It is puerile and ignorant, haughty and overly
narcissistic.

Granting independence to Kosovo would require Belgrade's acquiescence to
that. How do you see that the West could engineer the acquiescence - through
another bombing of the country as advised by Holbrook, or bribes as Soros
and the International Crisis Group would support for an opener?

SV: I disagree with the premise. Cosmetic and face-saving alterations to its
borders aside, Kosovo, in one piece, will end up being an independent state.
The Serbs and even the West have no say in this. It is entirely the
Albanians' call. The Serbs don't need to be bribed - or bombed. They no
longer exist as a meaningful (let alone powerful) political piece on the
Balkans chessboard. The Serbs - after much grumbling and gnashing of teeth -
will do as they are told by the USA. Recent history teaches us as much.

In your earlier writing you stated that "Serbia is in an excellent position
to emerge as an important, nay, indispensable regional player." after the
crisis. Is it inconsistency or a matter that Serbia has, perhaps made a
wrong turn somewhere on the road of a regional game? If so, where?

SV: I repeat my words: Serbia is in an excellent position to emerge as an
important, nay, indispensable regional player. It is geographically pivotal,
has an unparalleled fund of human resources, rich natural endowments, and
culture and history to match. Its people are entrepreneurial, generous, and
forward looking.

Serbia's problem is its political class. The West's collusion with the local
mafias (as represented, for instance, by the late Zoran Djindjic and by the
long-serving Montenegrin President, Milo Djukanovic) only exacerbates it.

In Serbia, precious time (and an inestimable amount of goodwill) were wasted
on pursuing and purging minions of the ancien regime (Milosevic apart), on
imposing the notorious Washington Consensus (a surefire recipe for economic
decline), and on aiding and abetting an assortment of indigenous crime lords
and murky power brokers.

"After the crisis". This is the key proviso. Serbia has not yet emerged from
its crisis. Witness the murder of Djindjic, the stalemate in the
presidential elections, the economic under-performance, the unresolved
problem of Kosovo, the resurgence of the rabid sort of nationalism, the
poverty, the despair.

On several occasions you invoke inevitability - independence of Kosovo and
breakup of Macedonia? What makes these two events inevitable, why and who
benefits?

SV: The breakup of Macedonia is not inevitable - but Kosovo's independence
is. What makes it unavoidable is history. Kosovo is an ethnically
homogeneous, clearly demarcated, territory whose denizens fervently aspire
to be independent - and are willing to fight for it. Moreover, they have the
support of large parts of the international community. Serbia is
dilapidated, subjugated, weak, and divided.

If East Timor succeeded to secede and become an independent polity against
much bigger odds - so will Kosovo which is practically more than half way
there. In truth, Kosovo is already independent in everything but name. It
has its own travel documents, currency, flag, and institutions. Kosovo as a
part of Serbia is currently unimaginable.

Why do we have a resilient Western demand that democratic standards get
established before status talks on Kosovo begin?

SV: It buys the West some time, on the one hand - and guarantees future
stability, on the other hand. The West, as it is unwisely wont to do,
procrastinates in Kosovo and tries to defer the inevitable outcome of
Kosovar independence. It is a typical "not on my watch" mentality of
pusillanimous Eurocrats. By demanding in Kosovo what it failed to secure
elsewhere, the West hopes to drive the weary denizens of Kosovo and Serbia
into a compromise.

Additionally, democracies are considered to be more peaceful than
authoritarian, crime-infested regimes. A democratic Kosovo is less likely to
become the kernel of a "Greater Albania" and to foment unrest among its
neighbors (southern Serbia and Macedonia).

For 100 years, Hong Kong's status has been, at best, undefined. Taiwan's
status is also a dispute, yet both of these countries have managed to
control bigoted nationalism and reorient it towards capital formation and
sustained growth. Given that the ruling Kosovo Albanians seem most vocal
about the status as a defining concept of their nationalism, do you think
that the dismal economic situation in Kosovo is being wrongfully blamed on
the West? In other words, is the West responsible for Kosovo Albanian
economic dysfunction?

SV: It is important not to get it backwards. Economic dysfunction breeds
virulent nationalism which, in turn, exacerbates the economic malaise.

Additionally, we must not forget that, by itself, Kosovo is not a viable
economic entity, despite the fact that it has privileged access to the
markets of Albania and Western Macedonia. As an autonomous unit within the
Federated Yugoslavia, Kosovo survived on massive handouts from the center.
The West has now replaced Belgrade as Kosovo's (and Macedonia's and Serbia's
and Bosnia's) sugar-daddy.

The Kosovar leadership is guilty for having delegated and relegated all
economic decision-making to the inapt and corrupt bureaucracy of UNMIK. The
results?

Vertiginous unemployment and moribund manufacturing and agricultural bases.
Only the construction and criminal sectors are thriving.

Inevitably, this translates into frustration and aggression. The specter of
independence attains the mantle of a panacea and Serbs (and increasingly
Westerners) are viewed as obstinate and infuriating hurdles on the way to
happiness and prosperity.

Why did Albanian violence in Macedonia occur after securing Kosovo and not
the other way around especially since Macedonia's military is extremely weak
and could have been defeated by Albanian guerillas any time before 1999?

SV: Violent clashes between Albanians and the Macedonian security forces
occurred in 1997. This was the culmination of a historical process which
commenced decades ago.

Macedonia never really succeeded to integrate its Albanian citizens. They
boycotted the 1991 referendum on independence and the attendant census. In
January 1992 they held a plebiscite of their own in which they opted for
autonomy. They publicly and recurrently rejected the results of the 1994
internationally monitored census (according to which Albanians made up 23%
of the population).

Many Albanians in western Macedonia feel closer to their kin and kith in
Kosovo than to the Macedonian state. In both 1968 and 1981 they demonstrated
in solidarity with the bloody outbursts in Kosovo against the former
Yugoslavia. The demand to be annexed to the autonomous Kosovo were often
heard between 1969 and 1989. Albanians from Macedonia attended Pristina
University where they interacted with radical Maoist students from both
Kosovo and Albania. In  1992 the Albanians briefly declared an "Autonomous
Republic of Illirida" in a series of demonstrations in Struga.

Macedonians intermittently accused the Albanians of illegal construction,
purchases of real estate at inflated prices, mass immigration from Kosovo,
re-population of Macedonian villages abandoned by their inhabitants, ethnic
cleansing by intimidation of urban neighborhoods, nationalist indoctrination
under the guise of religious instruction, pressuring other Moslems to
declare themselves as Albanians, and irredentism.

Albanians intermittently accused the Macedonians of discrimination in the
labour market, in secondary, and higher education, in outlays on
infrastructure (many Albanian villages still lack proper roads and are not
connected to the national grids of water and electricity), and in the public
administration. Albanians claim that police brutality, discriminatory
legislation, and the exclusive use of the Macedonian language violate their
human and civil rights. They lost faith in the Macedonian's will to
accommodate their demands, however legitimate.
Macedonia's intelligence services were unequivocal in their warnings of
gathering trouble in 1998. Inter-ethnic tensions reached fever pitch during
the Presidential elections at the end of 1999 when the late president
Trajkovski's win was attributed by the opposition - and not only by the
opposition - to mass electoral fraud among Albanian voters. There were hints
of a collusion at the highest levels involving a web of business interests
and meddling Western diplomats.

Their experiences in Kosovo (1999) and Macedonia (2001) taught the Albanians
a valuable lesson: terrorism pays. Following the recent spate of violence,
Macedonians have come around to accepting many long standing Albanian
demands. Terrorism also proved to be a surefire catalyst of social upward
mobility: former terrorists are now ministers and high government officials
in both territories.


Yet, it is not clear whether the demands made by the Albanians are in
preparation for an inevitable breakup of Macedonia, or because they so
deeply distrust the goodwill of the Macedonians. If the latter,
international monitoring of the implementation of an eventual agreement
would go a long way towards assuaging Albanian fears. If the former, no
extent of NATO involvement will be able to prevent a ferocious and Balkan
wide war.
In summary, the crowning achievement of the Albanians - and a repeat of the
1999 Kosovo scenario - was their success in internationalizing the conflict.
In this they were aided by a panic stricken Macedonian establishment. The
wise men of West - the same people who brought you Dayton and Operation
Allied Force - were called in to mediate. The result is the Ohrid Framework
Agreement, Macedonia's Sudeten-like settlement.

When Solana demands that Kosovo leadership gets "purged" what kind of
biographies exist among Kosovo Albanians that could possibly replace the
current ones that are packed with criminal and often violent records of
murder and slave trade? Would the current, violent pack peacefully
relinquish its power?

SV: There isn't a single country in the Balkan - Serbia included - whose
political elite, past and present, is not thoroughly criminalized. Crime,
business, and politics are inextricable in this part of the world. Kosovo is
no different. But people's past lives are less important than their future
actions. The early histories of many nations - perhaps all nations - are
studded with rogues, terrorists, criminals, slave traders, eccentrics, and
worse. Robber barons, gunslingers, outcasts, slavers, and criminals
established both the United States and Australia, for instance.

Suppose KFOR pulls out of Kosovo and Albanian guerillas fill in the vacuum
by violently cleansing the remaining Serbs out of there. Do you think that
Serbian paramilitaries, vastly superior to the Albanian ones, would sit idly
by and watch the military vacuum get filled in by Albanians?

SV: Yes, I do. Serbia has sold its soul to the "liberal-capitalistic" dream
of Western-style prosperity and "civil society" (which is, in reality,
uncivil and asocial). It is now a de facto economic protectorate of the
United States and its long arms, the IMF and the World Bank. Militarily, it
is completely defanged. And its corrupt politicians and businessmen are
addicted to Western payouts and handouts. The population is fatigued, bombed
into submission, and "pacified" by the twin drugs of American "culture" and
rampant consumerism and materialism. Serbia has been atomized and suffers
from malignant individualism. Patriotism is a four letter word and national
solidarity is taboo.

Why is the West so interested in accepting Serbia into NATO's Partnership
for Peace (PfP)?

SV: Club membership is the most thorough form of control. NATO's numerous
"partnerships" and "programs" go hand in hand with the EU's equally
multitudinous "associations", "stabilizations", "agreements", and
"candidacies". The aim is to micromanage the unruly nation-states of the
wild southeast by dragging them through interminable and resource-guzzling
processes of applications and reviews.

Do you see Serbia's PfP support in any related context with the recent
Belgrade's plan for 'decentralization' of Kosovo?

SV: Both Belgrade and the Euro-Atlantic structures are self-delusional when
they pretend to have a say in the future of Kosovo. The province is lost to
Serbia (at this stage of history, at least). This deranged game of Euro
inanity goes like this: Belgrade makes a "concession", suggests a
"compromise", or comes up with a "plan". The Europeans reward Belgrade by
luring it into yet another of their pointless plans, programs, and
partnerships. The Kosovars - amused and enraged in equal measure - go on
doing their thing: intimidating the remaining Serbs and preparing for
independence.

Why is West so critical of Kostunica, a mild nationalist with no track
record but supportive of Vuk Draskovic with a long and, at best,
controversial nationalist past?

SV: After Milosevic, the West is terrified by even the slightest and most
innocuous whiff of Serb nationalism. The West confuses national pride and
true patriotism (essential to rebuilding a devastated Serbia) with virulent,
belligerent, xenophobic, and exclusionary nationalism. Kostunica's earlier
pronouncement and Arkan-like snapshots taken in Kosovo and elsewhere do not
help his case either.

What are at least 3 high-impact, pro-growth economic policies that Balkan
states could quickly implement but are not? And why not?

SV: The most urgent economic measure would be to lock two dozens grubby
politicians behind bars and throw away the key. Actual corruption and the
perception of ubiquitous venality are the biggest single obstacles to
investment - both domestic and foreign - and to job creation.

Second step:

Establish a separate judiciary for foreign investors. Lethargic and crooked
judges deter outsiders from plunging their money, time, knowledge, and
technology into the local economies.

Third step:

Immediately and utterly disengage from the IMF's disastrous recipes for
economic "revival" and "stability". What is known as "The Washington
Consensus" has proved to be an unmitigated failure in dozens of countries
throughout the world. Those who defied the IMF and yet implemented prudent
expansionary policies - such as Malaysia - fared far better than their
IMF-addicted brethren.

Why are these steps not taken? No prizes for the guessers. Vested -
interlocking and colluding - interests: local politicians, local
"businessmen", American interests in keeping as many countries under its
thumb as possible.

More about this topic here:

http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com

http://samvak.tripod.com/briefs.html

http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/vaknin_archive/vaknin_main.html

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/conflictransition/messages/

AUTHOR BIO:

Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and
After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He served as a columnist for
Central Europe Review, PopMatters, and eBookWeb , a United Press
International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental
health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory Bellaonline,
and Suite101 .

Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of
Macedonia.

Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com




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