COMMENTARY EXPECTS KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE TO NEGATIVELY AFFECT MACEDONIA BBC Monitoring International Reports - February 2, 2005
Text of commentary by Emil Sterjevski: "International Crisis Group's fairy tale" by Macedonian newspaper Vecer on 29 January No matter how Kosovo's independence is achieved; no matter what the International Crisis Group thinks; and despite "the changed sentiment in Macedonia", there is no dilemma that resolving the status of Kosovo will cause certain reflexes on the part of Kosovo's neighbours: Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro and Albania. Perhaps it will not happen immediately or drastically, but it will happen in the long run. In discussing Macedonia directly, there are a number of reasons that lead us to this conclusion. There are many similarities between how the military conflicts in Kosovo in 1998 and in Macedonia in 2001 "evolved" and were organized, as well as how the international community reacted to them. Once upon a time In February 1998 a senior US official said in Pristina that the United States believed that the Kosovo Liberation Army (OVK (UCK in Albanian)) was undoubtedly a terrorist organization and that the United States bitterly condemned the terrorist activities in Kosovo. Following the Kosovo model, the National Liberation Army (ONA (UCK in Albanian)) appeared in Macedonia at the beginning of 2001. With its terrorist operations the ONA provoked a logical response from the Macedonian security forces. At the beginning of the military conflict in Macedonia the US State Department assessed the ONA as a terrorist organization, while Macedonian officials received US support in dealing with the terrorists. But this is just the beginning of the stories. With the escalation of the clashes in Macedonia, the proclaiming of independent Albanian territories, and the response by the Macedonian Army and police, the "international factor" and its refined sense of right and wrong stepped on the scene. It started to threaten sanctions and other forms of blackmail in order to secure an artificial balance between the warring sides. A similar thing happened in Kosovo in the summer of 1998, when Washington tried to establish a similar balance and preserve the OVK structure by imposing itself as some sort of guarantor of peace. With these "manoeuvres" the international community bought time for certain structures. In other words, it put the terrorist groups at the same level as the legitimate security forces of a state. Thus, in both cases the warring sides received equal treatment in the peace negotiations. The rest is history and translated into two agreements: the Kumanovo agreement and the Ohrid agreement. The essence of this is that, as a result of the mechanisms that were applied (even in Croatia), it is illusionary to believe that the military conflict broke out as a result of the human rights situation of the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. These examples of "controlled war" give us the indisputable fact that by deploying its troops in Kosovo the United States became a factor that decides on war and peace in the Balkans. These events are all related to the undefined status of Kosovo. In other words, this is a way to hold Macedonia, Serbia, and Albania in one's hand and direct their policies. Whether or not people want to admit this, the Kosovo model functioned in Macedonia as well but in a much more perfidious manner. Now Today the international community believes that there is no alternative to an independent Kosovo. Once again it is using methods and rhetoric aimed at threatening the future neighbours of an independent Kosovo. So, if the status of Kosovo is not resolved soon it could have negative consequences on regional security. Or if Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj is extradited to The Hague, this could further damage the fragile peace in this region. In its report the International Crisis Group presented some analyses that indicate how things might turn out. Their solution is an independent Kosovo, and Kosovo would sign bilateral agreements with its neighbours to the effect that Pristina would not demand unification with some other territories populated by Albanians in Macedonia, Albania, and Serbia-Montenegro. The International Crisis Group believes that the most dangerous resolution for this problem would be the division of Kosovo, that is, (and this is a curiosity) if someone wants to secede from Kosovo. They say that this would provoke divisions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. On the other hand, a completely independent Kosovo would be a guarantee for stability in the region, and everyone would be happy and satisfied till the end of their lives. Meanwhile the border with Macedonia will be demarcated, the Macedonian authorities and people will be relaxed, the illegal weapons will disappear from this region, and the extremists will fall into depression and conduct mass suicide seeing as they would no longer see any prospects in the region - despite the foreign investment that will come to this new El Dorado like a bunch of headless chickens. This is the International Crisis Group's fairy tale. But unfortunately the two sad stories from 1998 and 2001, when the scenarios were the same, are still fresh in our minds. Even though the West claims that no matter what the Albanians might try to achieve by force, they would not have the support of the West. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Vecer, Skopje, in Macedonian 29 Jan 05 p 18 Copyright 2005 Financial Times Information All rights reserved Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire Copyright 2005 BBC Monitoring/BBC http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/vercer020205.htm Posted for Fair Use only. Serbian News Network - SNN news@antic.org http://www.antic.org/
