http://www.zcommunications.org/zmag/viewArticle/16277
Kosovo: Waiting for War, Dreaming of Diplomacy
February, 01 2008 By Diana Johnstone
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The United States and its European allies have announced that diplomacy has
failed to solve the Kosovo problem. When diplomacy fails, that means war.
Especially in so serious a matter as unilaterally declaring the independence
of a part of another country¹s territory.
But the next Kosovo war is supposed to be such a small, muted, insignificant
war that nobody will notice. NATO is occupying the potential battlefield
with over 16,000 troops, backed by air power, and is poised, it says, to
³avoid violence.² The overwhelming military advantage of NATO
may indeed
prevent any eventual violence from reaching the status of a
³war.² The
confidence that comes of wielding decisive military force has allowed the
United States and its NATO allies to pursue a policy that normally would be
a sure-fire formula for war.
War results when the opposing parties have totally conflicting views of
reality. The Albanians and Serbs have totally opposing views of the very
history of the disputed province of Kosovo. The role of diplomacy is to take
such conflicting views of reality into account. It means avoiding pushing
one party to a dispute into a humiliating corner. It involves seeking to
promote mutual respect and understanding, at least enough to accept
compromise.
Instead, the United States, followed by its irresponsible European allies,
has from the start endorsed the extreme Albanian nationalist view, treating
Serbia as a ³rogue state² that does not deserve the normal
protection of
international law. Washington has orchestrated two rounds of sham
³negotiations,² whose conclusions it dictated from the start, on
behalf of
its Albanian clients. The first round took place at Rambouillet, leading to
the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia and the occupation of Kosovo. The second
round took place in 2007, leading to what could be another unpredictable
conflict.
Sham Negotiations
At the end of the 1990s, the Clinton administration was not really concerned
with solving the Kosovo problem. It wanted to solve its own NATO problem.
Its NATO problem was this: What is the use of this military alliance, now
that the Communist bloc, which it was created to deter, no longer exists? To
preserve NATO, a new raison d¹être had to be found. This was
³humanitarian
intervention.² From now on, NATO would exist in order to rescue
oppressed
minorities in foreign countries�especially those with some
geostrategic or
economic value, of course. The deep-rooted Kosovo conflict between the
Serbian state and an Albanian secessionist movement, marked by spasmodic
violence on both sides, provided the experimental terrain for this new
policy. The Kosovo problem was proclaimed to be a crisis, requiring
international intervention, only weeks before NATO¹s 50th anniversary
meeting, when this U.S.-designed policy was officially adopted.
To provide a pretext, the Clinton administration orchestrated sham
negotiations at the French château in Rambouillet. The U.S. abruptly
promoted Hashim Thaqi, the head of the armed Kosovo Liberation Army, to head
the Kosovo Albanian delegation, shoving aside more reputable Albanian
leaders such as Ibrahim Rugova. No direct encounters between the Serbian and
Albanian delegations were even allowed. Both were ordered to accept a
comprehensive plan drafted by the United States, allowing for the NATO
occupation of Kosovo. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright bullied Thaqi
into reluctantly accepting the ultimatum, with back-stage assurances that he
would eventually get his own ³independent Kosovo.² The Serbs had
agreed to
the principle of autonomy of Kosovo, and their parliament had drafted a
proposal�totally ignored at Rambouillet. But the Serbian delegation
rejected
the ultimatum, which included an annex that would have allowed NATO
occupation of the whole of Serbia. This rejection was the result Albright
sought. On the pretext that Serbia had ³refused to negotiate,²
NATO could
wage its victorious little ³humanitarian² war.
In 2007 the world was provided with the spectacle of much more prolonged
sham negotiations. For weeks and months, the West¹s semi-official
media put
out ³news² reports that the negotiations to settle the Kosovo
problem were
not getting anywhere. This was not news because the negotiations were framed
in such a way that they could not possibly succeed.
³The Serbian and Albanian sides can¹t agree,² the
pseudo-diplomats said of
their pseudo-diplomacy. They meant that the Serbian side had not agreed to
the Albanian demand for an independent Kosovo. This was the only proposal
with U.S. support. It amounted to yet another ultimatum to the Serbs. The
Albanians knew they had the support of the United States and NATO, who are
occupying Kosovo militarily. They had no incentive to bargain. They could
just wait for the negotiations to fail, sure they would be given what they
wanted by occupying Great Powers.
Russia Supports Diplomacy
The West is putting the blame for this failure on Vladimir Putin, puffing up
Putin¹s status as the latest world class bad guy, motivated by
³power² and a
perverse desire to annoy the ³virtuous² Americans. Since the
Americans back
the Albanian demand for independence, says the West, the Russians, out of
contrariness, back the Serbian position.
This is not exactly accurate. The Serbian position is to offer very
comprehensive autonomy to Kosovo, a self-government just short of formal
independence. The Russian position is to be ready to support any agreement
reached between the two sides.
Western media have refused to grasp that this means that the Russians are
insisting on genuine negotiations, between the two parties, the Serbian
government and Kosovo Albanian separatists. They are not saying what the
outcome of such genuine negotiations would be. They might reach some sort of
compromise providing for some sort of independence.
The point is that such an agreement, reached by both parties, would be legal
under international law. Independence proclaimed unilaterally by Kosovo
Albanians, without a negotiated agreement with Serbia, would constitute a
clear violation of international law. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
has repeatedly warned that a unilateral proclamation of independence could
provoke further interethnic violence in the region and set a dangerous
precedent for other countries with ethnic minorities.
In the level of principles, the contrast is not between the U.S. backing
Albanian Kosovo independence and Russia backing Serbia. It is between Russia
backing diplomacy and the United States backing force.
A ³NATO State²
But how much ³independence² will Kosovo really enjoy? In
private, European
governments know that Kosovo is not a viable independent state. This has
been demonstrated during eight years of international protectorate.
Kosovo¹s
economy is almost entirely dependent on remittances from emigrés to their
families, international aid (including Saudia Arabian mosque building
projects), and flourishing crime (drug and sex trafficking in particular).
Since official international endorsement of unilateral Serbian guilt has
made reconciliation between Serb and Albanian inhabitants impossible, NATO
forces, under the guise of the European Union, are expected to stay on
³to
protect the human rights of minorities.² In terms of security, the
³independent² Kosovo will be a NATO satellite. Formal
independence from
Serbia, following eight years of de facto independence from Serbia, will do
nothing to improve the miserable state of the economy. The huge number of
unemployed young Albanians hope independence will bring jobs and prosperity.
But it is hard to see how closed borders with a hostile Serbia will do more
for Kosovo¹s economy than decades of preferential Yugoslav development
funds. Some sources of income may even diminish, notably foreign aid, as
³humanitarian² NGOs move elsewhere. Foreign remittances may be
cut back if
certain European governments decide to send their Albanian guestworkers back
to their ³liberated² homeland. Only organi- zed crime seems
certain to
prosper.
Last August, as the long round of sham negotiations got underway, Slobodan
Samardzic, the Serbian minister for Kosovo, said that a Kosovo state created
with U.S. support ³would only serve the interests of America and the
local
mafia clans.² Samardzic belongs to a younger, pro-Western generation
that
tends to attribute the West¹s hostility to Serbia to Slobodan
Milosevic. But
he has been gone for years and Western policy remains unchanged.
Samardzic said that NATO plans to make Kosovo virtually its own territory,
³a satellite, an army barracks state on foreign territory.² The
main source
of power in Kosovo would be the huge U.S. military base, Camp Bondsteel,
built immediately after NATO occupied the territory in June 1999, without
asking permission from anyone.
As the latest round of sham negotiations ended, Serbian prime minister
Vojislav Kostunica said events prove that the real reason NATO bombed Serbia
in 1999 was in order to conquer Kosovo as a ³NATO puppet
state.²And what has
Serbia been offered in return for loss of its historic territory? Merely a
vague suggestion that, if it behaves, it may eventually obtain EU
membership. In short, in return for losing sovereignty over Kosovo, it may
be allowed to give up more of its sovereignty to the European Union. But
even this is a hazy prospect.
It is quite possible that Serbia could manage better economically without
Kosovo, which was always the poorest and least developed part of Yugoslavia,
despite massive development funds from the rest of the country. But
Serbia¹s
reasons for wanting to retain Kosovo are not economic, but moral. The West
has refused to take these into account, brushing them all aside with the
single argument that Serbia ³lost its right² to the territory
because of
Milosevic¹s repression of Albanian separatists. Realistically, NATO
³won its
right² to dispose of Kosovo by bombing Serbia. The Western argument
comes
down to might makes right or, rather, superior might makes right.
Serbia¹s Case
The Serbian reasons to reject Kosovo¹s secession are legal and moral:
(1)
International law. Even after NATO bombed Serbia into allowing Kosovo to be
occupied, its sovereignty over the province was officially confirmed under
international law. As the one-sided war ended, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 1244, which reaffirmed ³the commitment of all Member
States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity² of Yugoslavia,
of which
Serbia is the successor state. Resolution 1244, which remains the existing
basis for the legal status of Kosovo, also speaks of ³substantial
autonomy
and meaningful self-administration²‹which is what Serbia has
agreed to and
proposed. It does not speak of independence.
Besides, what has Serbia done since the fall of Milosevic to merit worse
treatment than was prescribed in 1999?
(2) The impossibility of abandoning the Serbian minority to almost certain
persecution and expulsion. Nor can Serbia abandon its historic monuments,
the precious medieval monasteries of Decani, Gracanica, Pec, and many
others.
(3) The deep, truly painful sense of injustice and humiliation at the manner
in which the Great Powers are orchestrating the amputation of this most
cherished part of Serbia¹s historic territory. Serbs are blamed for
something they never did, something even Milosevic never did: the attempted
³genocide² or at least ³expulsion² of Albanians from
Kosovo. This is no more
than wartime propaganda, which by now is probably believed by most
Albanians, since the Great Powers endorse it. The official line,
criminalizing Serbia, echoed daily by more or less ignorant, but
well-coached editorialists and commentators, heaps unbearable insult on
injury. Sometimes insult is harder to take than injury.
This last reason, which may be the strongest of all, is virtually invisible
to Americans and Europeans who have swallowed whole the official
line�of
wicked Serbs persecuting innocent Albanians�in willful ignorance of
the
complexities of history and culture of the region.
If these legitimate Serb concerns were taken into consideration, patient
diplomacy could in all probability achieve a compromise settlement that
would differ from the initial negotiating positions of both sides, but
which, with international guarantees and incentives, could satisfy at least
part of the demands of both sides.
What Might Have Been
Even after the disaster of NATO bombing and occupation of Kosovo made the
situation far worse, by exacerbating hostility between the Albanian and
Serbian communities to the boiling point, diplomacy might have been able to
play a constructive role. That would require a bit of good will and
constructive imagination� qualities to which current U.S. leaders
do not
even aspire, preferring to rely on the iron fist.
Let us imagine that the United States had not managed to subvert the
peace-making functions of international organizations such as the OSCE and
the UN. Let us imagine the existence of a real ³international
community,²
which could give serious backing to diplomatic efforts to find a compromise
solution for Kosovo. Instead of uniting a ³Troika² made up of
the United
States, the European Union, and Russia, let us suppose that India, China,
and Brazil could appoint a group of diplomats, for instance former
ambassadors to Yugoslavia (including, perhaps, both the former East and West
German ambassadors to pre-disintegration Yugoslavia, former Canadian
Ambassador James Bissett, and former British Ambassador Ivor Roberts, as
well as former ambassadors from non-European countries) to facilitate
open-ended negotiations between Serbs and Albanians. There would be no
preconditions except one: the negotiations would last until the two parties
agreed to a compromise solution.
My personal belief is that genuine, patient negotiations could arrive at
some sort of overall agreement involving border changes and partition, as
well as some sort of union between the secessionist Albanian part of Kosovo
and Albania itself. The arguments for such a solution are overwhelming, and
have been stated most convincingly by Dobrica Cosic, Serbia¹s most
distinguished novelist and a former president of Yugoslavia, well before the
Kosovo problem exploded into armed conflict in 1998-99.
It is true that both the Albanian and Serbian sides reject partition, more
or less vehemently. But that is natural at the start of negotiations. The
Albanians adamantly demand all of Kosovo within its present borders. This
demand is supported by the United States, which also insists that there be
no union between Kosovo and Albania. This is the point on which some
compromise could be worked out.
Serbia¹s position has been to offer a degree of autonomy that would
in fact
be tantamount to total internal independence. This is understandable as a
bargaining position, but it is hard to see how it would be favorable to
Serbia itself. Serbia would risk bearing a financial burden for a territory
over which it exercises no control.
On the other hand, the Albanians¹ expectations for independence and,
most of
all, the hatred they foster for Serbia, makes a return to Serbian rule
impossible in practical terms.
The welfare of both Serbs and Albanians could be ensured best by an overall
agreement to end the hostilities between the two populations, something that
clearly has not been accomplished in eight years of UN-NATO protectorate.
This should involve some territorial rearrangements, as well as economic and
cultural agreements between the parties concerned. Neighboring countries
should also be brought into the negotiations. Agreements should be made on
the basis of practical realities, not on false presumptions of
³guilt² and
³innocence.²
Finally, identity needs to be detached from particular territories and
particular events. Future generations of Serbs and Albanians must be able to
live their lives freed from the burdens of past resentments and ancestral
vendettas. But, unfortunately, this is only a dream.
Z
Diana Johnstone: is the author of Fools¹ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and
Western Delusions, PlutoPress/Monthly Review Press.
Serbian News Network - SNN
news@antic.org
http://www.antic.org/
