Krajina, Not Kosovo

Ossetia as botched Balkans replay


by Nebojsa Malic 

Six days ago, as most of the world was watching the opening ceremonies of the 
Olympics in Beijing, Georgian troops attacked the self-proclaimed Republic of 
South Ossetia. Russia quickly intervened, ousting Georgian forces from the 
region and attacking Georgian military bases. Despite the training and weapons 
supplied by the U.S. and Israel, the Georgian military quickly collapsed. 
President Mikheil Saakashvili, installed in power in 2003 by a CIA-sponsored 
<http://www.infowars.com/?p=3840>  "Rose Revolution," pleaded for help from his 
patrons, painting himself and his country as victims of "Russian aggression." 
Aside from empty words of encouragement and hypocritical condemnation of 
Russian "excessive force," the Empire had no help to give.

Over the past week, many commentators have compared 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH12Ag02.html>  Russia's 
intervention to protect Ossetia with NATO's 1999 attack on Serbia. The analogy 
does not apply, though. If there is a Balkans comparison to be made, a far 
better one would be with the Republic of Serbian Krajina, destroyed 
<http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=6861>  by Croatia in August of 1995. 

Another August

There are many similarities between Ossetia and Krajina. Both are inhabited by 
populations distinct from the country they nominally belonged to – Ossetians 
and Serbs, respectively. Both were created in the aftermath of secessions; 
Croatia had seceded from Yugoslavia, Georgia from the Soviet Union. Both were a 
response to the government's attack on their people's rights: Serbs were 
written out of Croatia's constitution, while Ossetia was officially abolished 
by the regime in Tbilisi. Both came out ahead in the resulting conflicts with 
government troops, and both became de facto independent after armistices in 
1992. 

Here is where their fates diverged, however. Krajina's armistice was guaranteed 
by the UN and Serbia, but with the war breaking out in Bosnia, Serbia was 
blamed for "aggression" and sidelined by a UN blockade. When Croatian forces 
struck at Krajina, in August 1995, the government in Belgrade stood by and did 
nothing. The UN did not resist, either.

Backing both Croatia and Georgia was the American Empire. Back in 1995, it was 
still in its formative stages, neither ready nor willing to get directly 
involved in a Balkans shooting war and seeking to use Croatians as proxies in 
the Bosnian War <http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052903.html> . The troops that 
attacked Krajina in 1995 were trained 
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=7052>  and equipped by 
the U.S. and provided with air cover and intelligence reports. Georgia received 
similar help after Saakashvili came to power in late 2003. 

Among the few who made this connection is Russian analyst Boris Shmelyov. As 
quoted <http://byzantinesacredart.com/blog/2008/08/look_whos_talking.html>  in 
the Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti: 

"Back then, the Croats took an incredibly brutal action and killed many 
civilians, but the West pretended they did not see it. Now, the Georgians have 
done the same…"

Noting that the same U.S. military instructors were training Croats, then 
Albanians, and now Georgians, Shmelyov pointed out there is a powerful 
structure of the retired officers in the U.S., who are involved in the training 
of armed forces in the countries supported by the American authorities.

Could it be that Saakashvili's orders to attack Ossetia were inspired by the 
August 1995 Croatian "Storm"? The parallels are uncanny. However, unlike 
Croatia's triumphant blitz, celebrated even 
<http://www.javno.com/en/croatia/clanak.php?id=169428>  today with a "Homeland 
Thanksgiving Day," Georgia's adventure in Ossetia backfired spectacularly. For, 
unlike Croatia in 1995, Saakashvili was not dealing with an intimidated and 
blockaded Serbia, but with an angry and powerful Russian Federation.

Enter the Russophobes

It took several days for politicians and the media in the West to work 
themselves up into proper self-righteous lather. Once they did, however, it 
became obvious that Russophobia was not a Cold War relic, but rather a 
fashionable creed <http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3448>  in Washington's 
policymaking circles. One can understand the hysterical pronouncements coming 
from Georgian officials about how the fate of their country – or rather, their 
government – was an issue of "freedom" and "democracy." But it certainly did 
not take long for ex-diplomat Richard Holbrooke to compare 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/10/AR2008081001870.html>
  Russia to Nazi Germany. Once again, every enemy is Hitler, and it's always 
Munich 1938 – except when it really 
<http://www.anti-war.com/malic/?articleid=12951>  is, of course. 

Washington commentators displayed all the symptoms of what Richard Spencer at 
Takimag.com called 
<http://www.takimag.com/sniperstower/article/putin_derangement_syndrome/>  
"Putin Derangement Syndrome": a delusional belief that Vladimir Putin is "not 
simply a totalitarian dictator at home but a super-genius strategist in foreign 
affairs – if anything unusual happens in his part of the world, it's all part 
of one of his wicked schemes."

Granted, there was some dissent. The rabidly Russophobic Washington Post did 
run an article 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081101372_pf.html>
  by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who condemned the Georgians for 
starting the war. In the Guardian, Mark Almond challenged 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/09/georgia.russia1>  the Cold 
War analogies. Charles King in the Christian Science Monitor argued 
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0811/p09s03-coop.html>  the conflict wasn't 
entirely Russia's fault. But since when have facts stopped a good story? As 
Brendan O'Neill argues 
<http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/5568/>  persuasively, 
both Georgians and Ossetians have been used as pawns by the West to fabricate 
yet another <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/5494/>  
morality tale.

Familiar Stories

Despite the fact that Georgia was the clear 
<http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13285>  aggressor, and that Russian 
intervention only followed after the razing of Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, 
many civilian deaths, a mass of refugees, and the killing of several Russian 
peacekeepers, the Western media have slowly spun the crisis as Russian 
"aggression." As Justin Raimondo put it 
<http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=13292> :

"According to our 'free' media, the Georgians didn't invade the land of the 
Ossetians – they merely tried to ' 
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/08/08/europe/EU-Georgia-South-Ossetia.php> 
retake' it, as a child would bloodlessly and even quite playfully retake a 
shiny red ball from a playmate. Those evil Russkies, on the other hand,  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html?em> invaded,  
<http://www.suntimes.com/news/world/1102975,CST-NWS-geoqanda12.article> plunged 
into, and  <http://www.theledger.com/article/20080809/NEWS/808090359/0/EDIT> 
escalated their  <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,402466,00.html> attack on 
Georgia. At least, those are the words our 'reporters' are using."

That is another way in which the Caucasus war resembles the Balkans. In 
addition to loaded words, there are loaded images. Sharp eyes have already 
begun to question several photographs of Georgians mourning their dead, 
offering compelling evidence they were staged 
<http://byzantinesacredart.com/blog/2008/08/deceiving_the_world_with_pictu.html>
 . There are no pictures of Ossetians mourning, of course, and only a few 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-view-from-south-ossetia-joy-and-thanks-in-the-land-that-is-now-part-of-russia-892861.html>
  testimonies. 

Speaking of pictures: for their "voices on Georgia 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7554420.stm> " feature, the BBC somehow managed to 
get portrait pictures of two young Georgians, both making passionate emotional 
appeals. Representing the other side were an Ossetian professor and a Russian 
architect, both over 40. No pictures.

On Tuesday, there was even a flashback of Bosnia: several journalists were 
injured when a "series of sudden explosions" rocked the city of Gori, 
birthplace of Josef Stalin and the closest city to the Ossetian front. Once 
again, "it was not clear who was responsible" even though the closest Russian 
forces were 12 kilometers away and the fire came from "mortars 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/wtMostRead/idUSN11408884._CH_.2400>  firing 
from 1-2 km away." 

Scapegoating Saakashvili?

On Aug. 12, Russian President Medvedev ordered a halt 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH14Ag01.html>  to military 
operations, as a peace <http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=292462>  plan proposed 
by French President Sarkozy was negotiated. Moscow publicly stated 
<http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=292103>  it had no plans to depose 
Saakashvili, and angrily rejected U.S. charges 
<http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N10272978.htm>  of plotting "regime 
change." However, Saakashvili's political future looks very precarious at this 
point.

Analysts interviewed <http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=290466>  by Reuters seem 
to agree that Saakashvili committed a "strategic blunder" and that Georgia is 
likely to lose Ossetia and Abkhazia now. The London Telegraph calls 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/2547517/Georgia-Mikheil-Saakashvili-the-man-who-lost-it-all.html>
  him "the man who lost it all," while the Independent painted him as a 
"beleaguered 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-beleaguered-president-highstakes-gambler-who-risked-his-country-and-links-with-the-west-891500.html>
  gambler."

The New York Times blamed 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/washington/13diplo.html?em>  "mixed 
messages" from Washington; supposedly, Washington urged Saakashvili privately 
not to attack, while publicly supporting him in full. But is that so?

At first glance, it is hard to see how Georgia's fiasco could benefit the 
Empire. Its strongest military and political client in the Caucasus has been 
neutered. The war almost endangered 
<http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24158007-2703,00.html>  the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the one source of Caspian oil under American 
control. Russia has asserted itself 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/12/georgia1> , and now looms like a 
shadow over the West… 

Once again, keep in mind the way politics works. Saakashvili was a good client, 
but he failed. Now a liability, he can be written off, allowing the Empire to 
engage in self-righteous posturing. The very same people who invaded Iraq now 
thunder <http://wiredispatch.com/news/?id=290103>  about "Russian aggression" 
and call Moscow's actions "unacceptable 
<http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/11/us.georgia/?iref=hpmostpop> " with a 
straight face <http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/081108b.html> . The Empire 
may have suffered a defeat, but as we learned in the Balkans, it's never about 
what really happens – it's about managing perceptions. So a setback in the 
Caucasus is being spun as a proof that the West is righteous, good, and 
democratic, that Russia is evil and aggressive – and oh, yes, that the Kosovo 
war was just and right. After all, didn't Russians validate it with their 
actions? (No.)

Either way, the Imperial establishment has now latched on to the notion of 
Russian belligerence as yet another excuse for their project of global 
hegemony, benevolent or otherwise.

Lesson Not Learned

On the second day of the conflict, before the media received their marching 
orders, the New York Times carried 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/world/europe/10diplo.html?_r=2&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin&oref=slogin>
  a story about how the West misread Russia. It quoted George Friedman of 
analytical think-tank Stratfor:

"We've placed ourselves in a position that globally we don't have the 
wherewithal to do anything. … One would think under those circumstances, we'd 
shut up."

When told of the quote, the NYT story concludes, one senior administration 
official, laughed. "Well, maybe we're learning to shut up now."

It seems the lesson didn't take.

http://antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=13294

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