http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=1575
Strategic Culture Foundation
August 28, 2008
South Ossetia and Abkhazia: Independence Recognized
Andrei Areshev
-The six points which emerged with the help of French
President Sarkozy who became “the self-proclaimed
mediator” and were later subjected to editing by the
Tbilisi criminal did help to address the tactical task
of freezing military activity and of easing the
tensions to an extent....Tbilisi would use the
agreement to get the pause needed to build up its
military capabilities in the region.
-Attempts to internationalize the conflict in a format
acceptable to the West – possibly by deploying armed
peacekeepers in the region under the UN or the OCSE
flag – are another direction of the political activity
of Washington and Brussels.
-In 1998, Serbia admitted a diplomatic observer
mission to Kosovo which was supposed to monitor the
situation in the region but focused on reconnaissance
instead.
Officially the mission was led by the OCSE, but in
practice it was largely run by the CIA.
The mission head, William Walker, “discovered” mass
murders of Kosovo Albanians in Racak, etc.
The next logical step following Russia’s recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia must
be a military-political alliance of Moscow, Sukhumi,
and Tskhinvali aimed at securing the new Caucasian
states against any further aggression and eliminating
the risk of conflict internationalization in the
framework of a Balkan-style scenario.
Georgian aggression against South Ossetia and the
genocide of the Ossetian population which triggered
Russia’s adequate military response eventually led to
irreversible consequences.
The developments transformed fundamentally the
situation in the Transcaucasia and possibly even with
entire global politics.
The hopes of the Georgian leadership and its patrons
that Moscow would take a passive role did not
materialize.
The situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the
expulsion of the aggressor from the regions forced
Russia to take clear and immediate political steps.
Following the unanimously adopted appeal of the two
chambers of the Russian Parliament to the Russian
President, it became obvious what the decision had to
be. Desperate calls for agreeing to international
mediation, voiced by a number of analysts, were
nothing more than the last attempts to reverse the
essentially irreversible.
On August 26, 2008 Russian President D. Medvedev
officially declared that Russia had recognized the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In his statement, he laid out a clear historical,
political, and legal vision of the ethnic conflicts
which had taken place in the territory of the former
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic since 1991.
He said that the attacks on Tskhinvali and Sukhumi
ordered by Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in
1991 under the unthinkable slogan “Georgia for
Georgians” killed thousands of people and turned tens
of thousands into refugees.
At that time, Russia blocked the extermination of the
Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples, and, seeking a
political solution, undertook a peacekeeping mission
in the conflict.
President Medvedev emphasized that in the process
Russia invariably based its activities on the
recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia.
In 1990 Georgia scrapped all Soviet-era legislation
and thus destroyed the legal basis of the
incorporation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia into it.
For a long time, this fact was ignored, the result
being that Georgia was allowed to act aggressively in
the conflict zone (it amassed armaments in the
demilitarized zone, illegally installed checkpoints,
and took other steps contrary to the peacekeeping
regime in South Ossetia).
The inaction was seen as a sign of weakness by the
Georgian political leaders, and the appeasement policy
logically made possible the Georgian attack on South
Ossetia on the night of August 7.
President Medevedev said that the breakdown of the
negotiation process, violations of the previously
reached agreements, political and military
provocations, and attacks on peacekeepers were severe
breaches of the conflict zone regime established with
UN and OCSE support.
Legally, the Russian President’s decision to recognize
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is
based on the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources of
International Law, the OCSE Helsinki Final Act of
1975, and other documents.
Yet, the factor of greatest importance is the will of
the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The reading of specific international law norms such
as the right to self-determination and the territorial
integrity is inevitably affected by the current
political context, but the principles demanding not to
use force and to resolve conflicts peacefully (not by
means of mass extermination campaigns) must be
accepted as the unquestionable basics under any
circumstances.
Tbilisi is guilty of numerous severe violations of the
principles as it organized blockades, perpetrated
terrorist acts, created intolerable living conditions
for the Tskhinvali population, and eventually attacked
Russian peacekeepers and citizens in South Ossetia.
Even though, in strict accord with the UN Charter, the
Georgian aggression has been repelled, the situation
in the region remains far from normal.
Russia’s official recognition of the independence of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia opens the way for the next
set of necessary measures to ensure peace and security
in the Caucasus. Those may include the extension of
security guarantees to the peoples of the two
Republics and the establishment of fully functional
mechanisms of Russia’s peacekeeping in the Caucasus.
The situation appeared fairly definite till August 26.
The six points which emerged with the help of French
President Sarkozy who became “the self-proclaimed
mediator” and were later subjected to editing by the
Tbilisi criminal did help to address the tactical task
of freezing military activity and of easing the
tensions to an extent.
However, they cannot be regarded as a valid long-term
instrument.
First, the Georgian side has no intentions of
fulfilling its part of the obligations.
Rather, Tbilisi would use the agreement to get the
pause needed to build up its military capabilities in
the region. Secondly, the interpretation of the
document is bound to be increasingly anti-Russian.
The French delegation has already submitted to the UN
Security Council a resolution draft seemingly based on
the Sarkozy plan but including a statement asserting
the territorial integrity of Georgia in the borders of
the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.
Such diplomatic maneuvers actually targeting Russia
are exactly what had to be expected.
Attempts to internationalize the conflict in a format
acceptable to the West – possibly by deploying armed
peacekeepers in the region under the UN or the OCSE
flag – are another direction of the political activity
of Washington and Brussels.
The truth is that the OCSE structures have shown
themselves absolutely unfit to deal with the region’s
problems and, moreover, have been known to collaborate
with the aggressor.
There is information that the OCSE knew exactly when
the attack would be launched and did nothing to
prevent it (miraculously, the OCSE mission suffered no
damage during the widespread bombardment of
Tskhinvali).
In Abkhazia, the OCSE made no efforts to stop the
militarization of the Kodori Gorge by Georgia.
This does not seem surprising if one recalls the
developments around Kosovo.
In 1998, Serbia admitted a diplomatic observer mission
to Kosovo which was supposed to monitor the situation
in the region but focused on reconnaissance instead.
Officially the mission was led by the OCSE, but in
practice it was largely run by the CIA.
The mission head, William Walker, “discovered” mass
murders of Kosovo Albanians in Racak, etc. (1)
The next logical step following Russia’s recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia must
be a military-political alliance of Moscow, Sukhumi,
and Tskhinvali aimed at securing the new Caucasian
states against any further aggression and eliminating
the risk of conflict internationalization in the
framework of a Balkan-style scenario.
Russian diplomacy should not slow down upon the
recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
A lot has already been said about the need to
immediately carry out the economic reconstruction in
the Republics.
The political and diplomatic background maximally
favorable from Moscow’s perspective must also be
ensured as there is a potential to do so.
We should not forget that it is Brussels, not Moscow,
who needs Russia-NATO cooperation most.
Leaks concerning the possible bans on the NATO
military transit to Afghanistan across Russia have
already seen the light of day in Western media.
Considering the difficult situation in Central Asia,
prone with instabilities, for example, in the
north-western part of China, such a ban could be a
natural measure.
The logic behind Moscow’s politics must be explained
to Russia’s allies, particularly Shanghai Cooperation
Organization members. A spokesperson for the Chinese
Foreign Ministry indicated that a joint Shanghai
Cooperation Organization statement on South Ossetia
would be issued on August 28.
In the future, the purpose should be to form an
efficient collective security system in Eurasia to
replace the UN which has demonstrated poor efficiency
and reluctance to abide by its own principles during
the Caucasian crisis.
_________________________
1J. Laughland. The Coup D’état Technique. Orange
Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek. Saint-Petersburg.
2008. P. 34-35.
Serbian News Network - SNN
[email protected]
http://www.antic.org/
