http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/08/31/do3101
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[Allusions to the Crimean War of 1854-56 are rife in
the British press since Foreign Secretary David
Miliband's recent trip to Kiev where he, attempting to
ape Winston Churchill, called for a 'world coalition
against Russian aggression.'
Attempts to turn the Black Sea into NATO's mare
nostrum and to 'defend' Ukraine currently have the
same intent as the Crimean War did: To drive Russia
out of the Black Sea, prevent it from entering the
Mediterranean, and deny its navy any warm water ports.
This is what in the Anglo-Saxon universe is called
'confronting the new Ivan the Terrible.' (See below.)]
Sunday Telegraph
August 31, 2008
Europe must stand up to the Russian bully
By Malcolm Rifkind
Sir Malcolm Rifkind is MP for Kensington and Chelsea
and was foreign secretary and defence secretary,
1992-97
-A tough reaction by the United States and Europe over
Georgia and South Ossetia is necessary not because
changing the frontiers in the Caucasus will directly
affect our security but because, if Russia sees the
West as weak and indifferent, it will be emboldened to
repeat its behaviour in Ukraine - and in Crimea, in
particular.
-Russian-speakers in Crimea are now citizens of
Ukraine, and Moscow has no right to control its
so-called "near abroad".
-European leaders - not just Britain and France - when
they meet tomorrow, must resolve to develop a much
more substantial military capability for the difficult
years ahead. And they must be willing to share their
military experience and capability in a more
substantial way. France's stated intention to return
to full membership of Nato is very much to be
welcomed.
-Nato is able to intervene with military force if it
wishes to do so, even on behalf of non-members. This
is what it did, rightly or wrongly, in Kosovo....
-Putin - who remains the real power in the country -
is no new Lenin waging ideological war. He is more
like a 19th-century tsar trying to extend Russian
power, like all tsars since Ivan the Terrible.
"The policy and practice of the Russian Government has
always been to push forward its encroachments as fast
and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other
Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop
and retire when it met with decided resistance."
So said Lord Palmerston during the Crimean crisis 150
years ago. If the United States and Europe are not
careful we may end up with a new Crimean War in the
not-too-distant future.
European Union leaders, meeting in emergency session
in Brussels tomorrow, therefore have an awesome
responsibility when deciding on future relations with
Russia. They cannot leave it all to Washington. Russia
is part of Europe. Russia is Western Europe's
neighbour.
Recent events in the Caucasus are not the start of a
new Cold War. But Russia's behaviour in Georgia marks
the worst deterioration in its relations with the West
since the end of the Soviet Union.
However, Russian aggression against Ukraine that would
be the deepest crisis for the international community.
We are right to back the democratic government of
Georgia but our strategic interests in that country
are only slightly greater than our interests and
support for the struggling people of Zimbabwe or
Tibet.
A tough reaction by the United States and Europe over
Georgia and South Ossetia is necessary not because
changing the frontiers in the Caucasus will directly
affect our security but because, if Russia sees the
West as weak and indifferent, it will be emboldened to
repeat its behaviour in Ukraine - and in Crimea, in
particular.
Such a crisis would cause massive instability in
Europe. Ukraine is a major country with a frontier
with the EU. While it is true that parts of Ukraine -
including Crimea - have a largely Russian-speaking
population, that is far from unique in Europe.
Dare I say it, Russian minorities in Ukraine, Latvia
or elsewhere are like the Sudeten Germans in pre-war
Czechoslovakia.
[Rifkind fails to mention that Ukraine and Latvia, the
latter on and off but more on than off, were part for
Russia for centuries, hence the Russian-speaking
populations there. The Sudetenland had never been part
of a German state prior to 1938.]
Demanding the absorption of the Sudeten Germans into
the Third Reich was the prelude to the Second World
War. Russian-speakers in Crimea are now citizens of
Ukraine, and Moscow has no right to control its
so-called "near abroad". Nor would it be entitled to
demand changes of international boundaries on ethnic
or national grounds.
The US and EU must be tough. But can the EU meet such
a challenge or must it be left to the US? The Russians
are not going to be impressed by rhetoric from
Brussels....
The truth is that Europe remains terribly weak
militarily. Only Britain and France are significant
military powers and they are both overstretched, with
inadequate defence budgets.
Furthermore, on oil and gas, Europe is deeply divided,
with Germany too dependent on Russian gas to be
prepared to fight for a really tough European energy
policy.
There has also been a disinclination by the EU to
consider the use of hard power to achieve political
ends. The EU has seen itself as the champion of "soft
diplomacy" just as Russia has reverted to its historic
role as an expansionist empire.
Washington has few illusions as to what Russia
respects; the Europeans are more ambivalent.
So European leaders - not just Britain and France -
when they meet tomorrow, must resolve to develop a
much more substantial military capability for the
difficult years ahead. And they must be willing to
share their military experience and capability in a
more substantial way. France's stated intention to
return to full membership of Nato is very much to be
welcomed.
But calling for a tougher European strategy is not the
same as saying that Nato membership for Georgia and
Ukraine is part of the answer.
I do not doubt that if Georgia had been a member of
Nato it is less likely that Russia would have behaved
in the way it did. But that is precisely the point. It
is less likely; not unlikely nor impossible. For
Russia, the Caucasus is a crucial area: vital, as they
see it, to their southern security.
The Russians are not naïve. They would have known that
the US, Britain and France would not go to war with
them to force South Ossetia back into Georgia against
the wishes of its own people.
So if Georgia had been a member of Nato, President
Saakashvili would have invoked Article 5 and demanded
military intervention by the rest of the Alliance.
This would have been refused and Nato, and its
members, would have responded much as they are doing
now.
The real damage, however, would have been to Nato's
credibility and to the security of the UK and other
European countries, which have relied on Article 5 for
over half a century.
A member state would have been attacked without Nato
rushing to its defence. Some in the US may be fairly
relaxed if Nato becomes more of a political alliance
and less of a mutual defence pact. After all it is the
US that provides most of the military guarantee.
But for the Europeans, including Britain, the
weakening of Article 5 would require major increases
in defence expenditure and force the British
Government into a more substantial common European
defence policy, probably under the EU. This would suit
some, but the Conservative party, in particular, must
be alert to this risk.
The alternative to Nato membership is not to throw
Ukraine or Georgia to the Russian wolves. The main
prize they should and can be offered is membership of
the EU - bringing economic benefits and greatly
increasing their political security. Finland, Austria
and Sweden are no less secure from Russian aggression
than Lithuania or Latvia, despite not being members of
Nato.
In any event, in a real crisis, Nato is able to
intervene with military force if it wishes to do so,
even on behalf of non-members. This is what it did,
rightly or wrongly, in Kosovo. The difference is that
Nato had choice. It had no treaty obligation.
So Europe must be tough but also realistic with
Russia. Putin - who remains the real power in the
country - is no new Lenin waging ideological war. He
is more like a 19th-century tsar trying to extend
Russian power, like all tsars since Ivan the Terrible.
It is not the end of history, but the Russians must be
made to realise it is the end of empire.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind is MP for Kensington and Chelsea
and was foreign secretary and defence secretary,
1992-97
Serbian News Network - SNN
[email protected]
http://www.antic.org/
