Russia, Serbia and the Kosovo Problem



17:27

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28/ 10/ 2008

 <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081028/117995277-print.html> Print version

(John Laughland for RIA Novosti) - Every evening at 5pm a group of 
demonstrators meets on Republic Square in central Belgrade to protest "against 
the occupation of Kosovo" by the European Union. 

 For these people, the apparently harmless transfer of power from one 
international administration (the United Nations, which has governed Kosovo 
since 1999) to another (the EU) - a transfer which is supposed to take place 
formally in December, but which is already being implemented as EU personnel 
are even now being deployed to the province - is in fact a matter of principle. 
The EU treats Kosovo as an independent state, whereas the UN administration is 
based on a Security Council Resolution which proclaims it to be part of Serbia. 

The nightly demonstrations are notable for two things. First, the turnout is 
very low - perhaps twenty or thirty people in a city of nearly two million. The 
Western-backed destruction of Yugoslavia has been going on for sixteen long 
years now (since 1992) and most Serbs are now so exhausted and demoralised by 
it that they are incapable of offering any further resistance. Second, the 
demonstrators carry Russian flags and sing the Russian national anthem. 
Vladimir Putin is said to be the most popular politician in Serbia, and Russia 
generally is regarded now (by anti-EU Serbs at least) as their only remaining 
hope. 

However understandable, this hope is shortly to be dashed. Ever since the 
violent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000, Serbia has had an 
uninterrupted line of pro-Western governments and presidents. This pro-Western 
orientation has brought Serbia only further sales of the country's economic 
assets to foreigners, and the further stripping of territory from Belgrade's 
control. In 2006, Montenegro proclaimed its independence from democratic 
Serbia, only to be followed by Kosovo this February. Both acts were encouraged 
by the West. Serbia is therefore damned if she opposes the West (as she did 
from 1990 to 2000 under Milosevic) and damned if she supports it (as she has 
done did since 2000 under Prime Ministers Vojislav Kostunica and Zoran Djindjic 
and the current president, Boris Tadic). No wonder some Serbs look to Russia. 

Moreover, in order for the Western (EU and US) policy on Kosovo to take effect, 
the existing United Nations Administration in Kosovo must be dissolved. This 
can happen only with a vote in the Security Council and therefore only with 
Moscow's consent. Moscow has said that it will not agree to anything which 
Belgrade opposes, and Belgrade does indeed currently oppose both the 
independence of Kosovo and the transfer of authority to the EU. 

However, people who are in the know in Belgrade - including those who have 
exercised the highest offices of state - are certain that the present 
government's public opposition to the transfer of power from the United Nations 
Mission in Kosovo to EULEX (the acronym given to the EU administration), and 
indeed to the independence of Kosovo itself, is merely cosmetic. The present 
Foreign Minister of Serbia, Vuk Jeremić, said recently in a private meeting 
with the US State Department officials responsible for Kosovo that his 
government's only problem was how to find a way of sugaring the bitter bill of 
Kosovo independence in such a way that Serbian public opinion could be 
convinced to swallow it. 

The Belgrade government has indeed inched towards an acceptance of EULEX and 
therefore of the independence of Kosovo. It has said that it will accept EULEX 
on three conditions - if it is approved by the United Nations Security Council; 
if it is neutral towards the status of Kosovo; and if it does not implement the 
Ahtisaari plan for (internationally supervised) Kosovo independence. Although 
it is difficult to see how these last two conditions can ever be met (the EU 
mission is inseparable from the change in status, otherwise there would be no 
need to install it in place of the current UN administration), it is obvious 
from his acts that President Boris Tadic is prepared to pay any price for 
Serbia's entry ticket to the EU. Serbia's appeal to the International Court of 
Justice for an advisory ruling on Kosovo (whose independence has been 
recognised by less than one third of the member states of the UN), an appeal 
which was successfully accepted at the beginning of this month, is likely to 
lead to an ambiguous judgement which is any case will be non-binding and which 
will probably be overtaken by events in the meantime. 

Some sort of fudge - of the sort which the European Union is already a world 
expert at concocting-will therefore be produced between now and December to 
square the circle between Belgrade's declared opposition to Kosovo independence 
and its de facto acceptance of it. Such a fudge is certainly very dangerous for 
the province itself, since government and policing cannot function without very 
clear lines of authority - as an UNMIK policeman said to me last week, "How can 
you arrest someone if you do not have the clear right to do so?"  Crime and 
corruption, already rampant in Kosovo, will only prosper even more so. But if 
Moscow currently does hold the key to Kosovo in virtue of its veto in the 
Security Council, and if Russia therefore represents a beacon of hope for 
patriotic Serbs, there is little she can do with this power if Belgrade itself 
is determined to throw it away. 

John Laughland is a British historian and political scientist, Director of 
Studies at the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Paris. 

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily 
represent those of RIA Novosti. 

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