Toward a U.S. Strategic Accord with Russia? Toward a U.S. Strategic Accord with Russia?September 4, 2009
James George Jatras formerly Foreign Policy Analyst, U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee and U.S. Foreign Service Officer Obama has a chance to fix the mistakes of his predecessors If the information is correct that the Obama administration is seriously reconsidering plans for installing a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Poland and the Czech Republic, it is a welcome development. It may mean that someone in authority in Washington finally is at least groping for the right attitude toward Russia with the hope of mending the damage caused by the policies of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, which seemingly believed Russia should be treated not as a partner but as a defeated power with no say about security issues in its own neighborhood. Mr. Clinton set the pattern with the first wave of NATO expansion in 1998 and then the illegal 1999 Kosovo war (which was voted down in Congress). Mr. Bush went even further, with a second wave of expansion in 2004 and, in the name of “promoting democracy,” fostering “color revolutions” in the former USSR – the 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia and the 2004 “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. Followed then by a push to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and the BMD project in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Bush policy was reminiscent, with the roles reversed, of Khrushchev’s attempts to establish a military base in Cuba and to deploy missiles with nuclear warheads within 90 miles of the Florida coast. Mr. Clinton and Mr. Bush wasted the chance to achieve the realistic and worthwhile goals of an integrated security structure in Europe that could include united BMD system against rogue states. Such a structure would encompass NATO (the U.S. and our European allies); non-NATO EU states like Sweden, Ireland, and Finland; and the former communist countries, including not only Russia, but Ukraine, Georgia, and other former Soviet republics. Even undemocratic former Soviet states like Belarus and the Central Asian republics, whom Washington has been actively courting, can find a place there too. Belarus merits a special and more detailed discussion, as it is currently the focus of stepped-up Western attention. For nearly two decades both the U.S. and the EU pointedly ostracized Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko as “Europe’s last dictator,” citing lack of political freedom, media repression, and a cult of personality some have termed “Lukashism” – combined with erratic antics, such as kicking Western embassies out of the Drozdy estate near Minsk, issuing Belarusian passports to Saddam Hussein’s entourage, and selling weapons to Iraq and Iran. At the same time, even Russia’s leadership got fed up with subsidizing Belarus’ economy to the tune of more than $10 billion a year in exchange for sugary but empty talk of eternal brotherly friendship and the creation of a vague “Russia-Belarus Union.” Russia started talking about placing relations between the two states on a market track, as its policy has been trending with other customers. These days, with the raging financial and economic crisis, this has become a dire necessity – no one can now afford to throw good money after bad. But the most remarkable thing in all this is the West’s newfound readiness to step in and enroll “Europe’s last dictator” on its team. We have seen a recent series of events, such as: taking Belarus into the “Eastern Partnership” sponsored by Poland and Sweden, the IMF’s promptness with loans for Belarus, and even visits from top Western officials, including just a few days ago U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs of State Philip Gordon. So much for “human rights” and “democracy.” Can it be that all that matters to the West is closing a circle of unfriendly states around Russia? One can safely assume that the West’s policy of double standards will be fully in play in this case, too: talk of democratic values will continue apace, while in practice everything will be done to pull Belarus over into the anti-Russia camp. Since Mr. Lukashenko runs too tight a ship for a “color revolution,” why not just buy him? The price tag for outbidding Russia is no secret – by the IMF’s estimate, it is roughly $11 billion a year. True, it will be tough luck for the erstwhile western-sponsored democratic opposition in Belarus, but who cares. After all, in Georgia, President Mikheil Saakashvili crushes his opposition every bit as ruthlessly as Lukashenko, if not more so, such as young mother Maia Topuria, given virtually a life sentence on a transparently absurd charge of “armed insurgency.” But as with his disastrous decision to send his army blasting into South Ossetia last year, who cares. The important thing is, he’s “our guy” against Russia. In light of the foregoing, skeptics in Moscow might be forgiven for thinking Washington’s anti-Russia policies are not about “democracy and human rights” and other “values,” but about geopolitics, security and money. Then this is what politicians should say and face reality instead of endless exercises in demagoguery. Now coming back to the matter of a sensible policy toward Russia. Joining Afghanistan and Iraq, horrendous terrorist acts have become a daily occurrence in Russia’s North Caucasus. There is no alternative: Russia and the West must pool their efforts to fight the one and the same jihadist enemy of modern civilization. Belatedly, a joint, state-level U.S.-Russian group has been set up to meet this end. For obvious reasons its activity is not widely advertised, so it is difficult to tell just how successful it has been. Perhaps this group has helped forestall other terrorist acts we know nothing about. Or perhaps it’s just a token. In any case, a single working group like that is not enough to tackle the problem of terrorism. A restructured system of European security would also set the basis for global cooperation linking the United States, Europe, Russia, and the former Soviet republics with China, India and other willing countries. In this context, it is only natural to step up close cooperation among such entities as NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. But that must mean the U.S. and NATO decisively foreswear the adversarial attitude they have shown toward Russia in expanding NATO, the “color revolutions,” trying to create an independent Kosovo, and installing the missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Clearly, without Washington’s initiative the matter will not shift from square one. Positive signals from the White House about reconsidering the BMD project in Eastern Europe are a good beginning. The same can be said about Moscow’s increasingly cooperative role with NATO over Afghanistan – where Mr. Obama needs all the help he can get – even before any comparable substantive gesture has come from Washington. The next move should be a working group of experts from the United States, Europe and Russia that would devise a new system of Euro-Atlantic security. http://www.america-russia.net/eng/face/222548965?user_session=4a3c14620a90f738d5705adb435e47d4
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