http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/02/ahmet-davutoglu-turkey-obama-opinions-contributors-ottoman-empire_print.html

Commentary
A New Ottoman Empire?
Asli Aydintasbas, 06.02.09, 2:57 PM ET

ISTANBUL -- This week, Turkey assumed the presidency of the United 
Nation's Security Council, and while that may just be a passing story in 
most countries, here it is a big deal.

"This is very important and a big responsibility for our country," said 
Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu--and he should know. Davutoglu 
has been the chief architect of Turkey's neo-imperial foreign policy 
that envisions a far greater role for this pro-western Islamic country 
than as an aspiring second-tier member of the European club.

No one was surprised last month when Turkey's Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdogan appointed his longtime political adviser Davutoglu as the 
Foreign Minister. The soft-talking professor--who was also an adviser to 
President Abdullah Gul--has largely been responsible for reshaping 
Turkey's foreign policy over the past six years, moving it away from its 
isolationist roots and toward a role as a self-declared regional power 
broker in the Middle East.

Turks love the spotlight that has come from efforts to mediate between 
Israelis and Syrians, act as peacekeepers in Lebanon and host 
high-profile world dignitaries. They got a kick out of seeing their 
globetrotting leader Erdogan in a face-off with Israeli President Shimon 
Peres in Davos.

The official television station TRT has recently started to refer to 
Turkey as a "global power." These days, the book du jour in Turkish 
power circles is Stratfor founder George Friedman's The Next 100 Years: 
A Forecast for the 21st Century. It predicts the rise of a hegemonic 
Turkish empire in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire.

All that talk may be premature, but not for Davutoglu.

Meeting the Turkish foreign minister, you would never guess that you are 
talking to one of the most powerful figures in the Middle East. 
Davutoglu is a short, even-tempered man in his fifties who talks, in 
fact nearly mumbles, with a relaxing half-smile that gives you the 
momentary hope that the world's most vicious problems are actually not 
that difficult to solve. He is more avuncular than imposing, more 
monotonous than charismatic.

 From Damascus to Tel Aviv, regional leaders have been talking to him as 
the best private channel to the decision-makers in Ankara--making him 
the most influential consigliore in the history of the modern republic. 
His book Strategic Depth is a must-read for diplomats coming to Turkey. 
He has been at the heart of every critical diplomatic initiative over 
the last few years--from lobbying to attain U.N. Security Council 
membership for Turkey to conducting secret Israeli-Syrian mediation efforts.

It's not power for power's sake. There is a whole political theory 
behind the Davutoglu Doctrine. In a nutshell, instead of defining Turkey 
as the eastern flank of the Transatlantic Alliance, Davutoglu sees it as 
a pivotal country ("merkez ülke"), the centerpoint of concentric power 
circles. The governing Justice and Development Party, or AKP, does not 
see the European Union as an end goal, and does not regard Turkey's 
western orientation as its sole strategic axis. Instead, they talk of 
multiple axes of alliances to solidify Turkey's leadership in the Muslim 
world.

But not everyone is happy about the New Turkey. To his critics, 
Davutoglu is responsible for the neo-Ottomanist revisionism in foreign 
policy that values Muslim solidarity over the secular nation's 
long-standing alliance with the West. He was partly blamed in media for 
Turkey's refusal to open a northern front for U.S. troops in the Iraq 
war, as well as Ankara's controversial invitation to Hamas leader Khaled 
Mashal in 2006.

Davutoglu defended both decisions by pointing out that Turkey, in each 
case, made more gains than losses. Ankara currently differs from the 
European and American positions on numerous issues, including relations 
with Russia, the role of Hamas in Israeli-Palestinian issues and Darfur, 
where the AKP government openly supports the regime of President Omar 
al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court.

But even his critics agree, AKP reign has somehow elevated Turkey's 
stature as a democratic Muslim country and an independent actor in the 
Middle East. Among his fans, including leading members of the 
Islamist-oriented governing party, he has somewhat of a cult following, 
"Before AKP, no one in the mainstream media had heard of his name, but 
in our circles he was a legend. We used to think of him as the next 
Ozal," says a conservative journalist with close ties to the government.

Born in Konya, Turkey's conservative heartland, Davutoglu is a pious man 
who has spent a good chunk of his academic career teaching in 
Malaysia--somewhat unusual among Turkish academics, who gravitate toward 
European and American colleges for academic research. South Asia's brand 
of Islamic politics, marked with the growth of religion within a 
democratic framework, impacted his thinking on state and society. He has 
been very active in the Balkans with efforts to help Muslims in the 
Bosnian war. His particular view of Turkey as seen from the outside has 
led to the development of an unconventional understanding of its place 
in the world stage.

Davutoglu's vision somewhat differs from traditional Turkish foreign 
policy. Weary of troubling imperial baggage and decades of wars, the 
modern Turkish republic, founded in 1923, has predominantly been 
isolationist--aimed at anchoring Turkey to the "civilized" West and 
untangling it from the "backward" lands to the East. The AKP challenges 
this view and sees an active role in the Middle East as an asset for 
Turkey's relations with the West.

Under AKP, Turkey has been delving into areas that its traditional 
westward-looking foreign policy establishment considered off-limits, 
acting as a power-broker in far off disputes from Afghanistan to 
Palestine. In doing so, it certainly has become more enmeshed in the 
Muslim world, sometimes even positioning itself as the spokesman for the 
Islamic world, as reflected in Erdogan's outburst in Davos against 
Peres, or Turkey's reluctance to accept Danish Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen as the head of NATO, due to his stance during the Danish 
cartoon crisis.

When Davutoglu coined the term "Neighborhood Rapprochement Policy" back 
in 2003, the idea of Turkey becoming friends with its arch enemies--like 
Syria, a rogue state that hosted Kurdish guerilla leader Abdullah Ocalan 
for many years, Iran, whose efforts to export Islamic revolution 
threatened Turkey's secular foundations, or Armenia, with its unyielding 
diaspora lobbying against Turkey--seemed pointless, at best.

Today, Turkey is best of friends with historical enemies Greece, Syria 
and Iran, on course to normalize its relations with Armenia and even 
talking to the Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq. Journalists 
who used to scoff at Davutoglu's theories nowadays generously throw 
around his terminology, like "zero conflict with neighbors," "flexible 
focal point" and, of course, Turkey as a "global power."

Conservatives who tend to credit Davutoglu with raising Turkey's 
influence through a non-aligned foreign policy were encouraged by 
President Barack Obama's visit here in April. Speaking to lawmakers in 
Ankara, Obama said, "Turkey's greatness lies in your ability to be at 
the center of things. This is not where East and West divide--this is 
where they come together." He sounded almost like Davutoglu himself.

One major problem with Davutoglu's policies has always been the question 
of what would happen domestically if Turkey traded its place in the West 
in return for a greater regional role. While Turks enjoy their 
high-profile role in the Middle East, there are pitfalls. Typically the 
farther a nation moves from the West and its mechanisms, the more likely 
it is to see a rise in illiberal tendencies.

Russia, for example, is a very important country, but its independent 
status is precisely what makes it impossible for the U.S. to pressure 
Vladimir Putin or Dmitry Medvedev for accountability when it comes to 
corruption, a free press or democratic norms.

What if Turkey were no longer a candidate for E.U. membership. Would 
human rights be as closely monitored? Media freedoms and minority rights 
still protected? Women's rights guaranteed?

No one knows the answer. But Turks seem to like the ride.

Asli Aydintasbas is an Istanbul-based journalist and former Ankara 
bureau chief of the newspaper Sabah.





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