Date: Sunday, November 15, 2009, 12:13 PM
The challenge that the rise of China presents to the United States is more pressing than any other global issue except for the ever-present threat of jihad. Beijing is rapidly becoming a regional power of the first order, the Asian superpower that will need to be contained or appeased. Presently, one possible bone of contention is the status of Taiwan. Many Taiwanese would prefer to sever all links with the mainland so that Taiwan can become an independent state. Beijing says, unsurprisingly, that it will not allow that to happen. To condone Taiwan’s separation would be tantamount to accepting the status of a second-class power, with serious implications for the future status of Tibet and -- perhaps more seriously still -- for the restive Muslim-populated Sinkiang-Uighur province in the far west of the country, which was the scene of bloody jihadist riots last summer. China is an ancient power, coldly hostile to outsiders, steeped in Realpolitik, and indifferent to the notion that diplomacy is or should be guided by any motive other than self-interest. Her neighbors will be hard pressed to negotiate the terms and conditions of an acceptable relationship with Beijing that fall short of China’s outright hegemony. To keep her ambitions in check, it is necessary to halt further American investment in the Chinese economy, to exercise fiscal responsibility that will make America less dependent on China's continuing purchase of T-bills, to reverse the outsourcing that has thus far obtained, and to erect trade barriers against the continuing deluge of Chinese-made products in American stores. It is also necessary to provide Taiwan—in addition to Japan and South Korea—with top-notch defensive arsenals, including nuclear weapons. The alternative -- and I see this as more likely course under the circumstances -- is to accept, with the best possible grace, the rise of China as a first-order power. A reigning power is naturally disinclined to look on benignly as another rises, but the fact remains that a conflict between America and China is not inevitable. The relationship will need to be managed skillfully—with more reciprocity in the field of trade and exchange rates—but its essential ingredient will be our acceptance of Taiwan as part of China. Taiwan will be eventually reintegrated (preferably with all kinds of safeguards and special-status provisions a la Hong Kong), and it is in the American interest to facilitate peaceful reunification. The geopolitical equation of containing and confronting China in northeastern Asia and jihad everywhere else would also demand better relations with India and Russia. India is China’s sole natural rival in Asia and a neglected ally in the „War on Terror,“ but no strategic relationship can be effected so long as Pakistan continues to be perceived in Washington—mistakenly—as an essential regional ally. Islamabad is guilty of nuclear proliferation as well as aiding and abetting Islamic terrorism of the kind that hit Bombay just over a year ago. Pakistan is in a state of meltdown, unable to keep jihad at bay even in Rawalpindi, let alone in the Northwest Frontier Province. Improving our relations with Russia, by accepting the legitimacy of her strategic interests in the former Soviet Union, is even more pressing. It is critically important for us to prevent the emergence of an alliance between other powers that would be directed against our interests. The ongoing improvement in Russo-Chinese relations (the Shanghai group) does not have the character of a formal alliance as yet, but it may lay the groundwork for one, so long as the flawed September 2002 Bush Doctrine remains in force. Most of our disputes with Russia over the past two decades, including the crisis in Georgia in August 2008, tensions over the mercifully abandoned missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic and over pipelines bypassing Russia (Nabuco most notably), constant demands for NATO expansion, designs in Central Asia, and support for Kosovo’s independence have resulted from Washington's refusal to accept the validity of any Russian claims and the legitimacy of any Russian interests. This has to change if the show in Afghanistan is to remain on the road. ____________________________________________________________
