<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/may/08/whatsapp-could-disappear-uk-over-privacy-concerns-ministers-told>

The UK government risks sleepwalking into a confrontation with WhatsApp that 
could lead to the messaging app disappearing from Britain, ministers have been 
warned, with options for an amicable resolution fast running out.

At the centre of the row is the online safety bill, a vast piece of legislation 
that will touch on almost every aspect of online life in Britain. More than 
four years in the making, with eight secretaries of state and five prime 
ministers involved in its drafting, the bill, which is progressing through the 
House of Lords, is more than 250 pages long. The table of contents alone spans 
10 pages.

The bill gives Ofcom the power to impose requirements for social networks to 
use technology to tackle terrorism or child sexual abuse content, with fines of 
up to 10% of global turnover for those services that do not comply. Companies 
must use “best endeavours” to develop or source technology to obey the notice.

But for messaging apps that secure their user data with “end-to-end encryption” 
(E2EE), it is technologically impossible to read user messages without 
fundamentally breaking their promises to users. That, they say, is a step they 
will not take.

“The bill provides no explicit protection for encryption,” said a coalition of 
providers, including the market leaders WhatsApp and Signal, in an open letter 
last month, “and if implemented as written, could empower Ofcom to try to force 
the proactive scanning of private messages on end-to-end encrypted 
communication services, nullifying the purpose of end-to-end encryption as a 
result and compromising the privacy of all users.”


If push came to shove, they say, they would choose to protect the security of 
their non-UK users. “Ninety-eight per cent of our users are outside the UK,” 
WhatsApp’s chief, Will Cathcart, told the Guardian in March. “They do not want 
us to lower the security of the product, and just as a straightforward matter, 
it would be an odd choice for us to choose to lower the security of the product 
in a way that would affect those 98% of users.”

Legislators have called on the government to take the concerns seriously. 
“These services, such as WhatsApp, will potentially leave the UK,” Claire Fox 
told the House of Lords last week. “This is not like threatening to storm off. 
It is not done in any kind of pique in that way. In putting enormous pressure 
on these platforms to scan communications, we must remember that they are 
global platforms.

“They have a system that works for billions of people all around the world. A 
relatively small market such as the UK is not something for which they would 
compromise their billions of users around the world.”

A Home Office spokesperson said: “We support strong encryption, but this cannot 
come at the cost of public safety. Tech companies have a moral duty to ensure 
they are not blinding themselves and law enforcement to the unprecedented 
levels of child sexual abuse on their platforms.

“The online safety bill in no way represents a ban on end-to-end encryption, 
nor will it require services to weaken encryption.

“Where it is the only effective, proportionate and necessary action available, 
Ofcom will be able to direct platforms to use accredited technology, or make 
best endeavours to develop new technology, to accurately identify child sexual 
abuse content, so it can be taken down and the despicable predators brought to 
justice.”

Richard Allan, the Liberal Democrat peer who worked as Meta’s head of policy 
for a decade until 2019, described the government approach as one of 
“intentional ambiguity”.

“They are careful to say that they have no intention of banning end-to-end 
encryption … but at the same time refuse to confirm that they could not do so 
under the new powers in the bill. This creates a high-stakes game of chicken, 
where the government think companies will give them more if they hold the 
threat of drastic technical orders over them.

“The government’s hope is that companies will blink first in the game of 
chicken and give them what they want.”

Allan said another scenario could be that the government comes clean and 
declares its intent is to limit end-to-end encryption. “It would at least allow 
for an orderly transition, if services choose to withdraw products from the UK 
market rather than operate here on these terms. It might be that there are no 
significant withdrawals, and the UK government could congratulate themselves on 
calling the companies’ bluff and getting what they want at little cost, but I 
doubt that this would be the case.”


Backers of the bill are unimpressed with efforts to rewrite it to suit big 
tech, though. Damian Collins, the Conservative MP who chaired a Westminster 
committee scrutinising the bill, said he did not support one amendment 
introduced to try to protect end-to-end encryption.

“I don’t think you want to give companies subjective grounds for deciding 
whether or not they need to comply with the duties set out in the bill.”

Collins added that the bill did not attack encryption because it would only 
require messaging companies sharing information that they have access to – 
which does not include message content. However, he said authorities should be 
able to access the background data behind users, including data about usage of 
the app, contacts, location and names of user groups.

If users access WhatsApp through a web browser, the service can also collect 
information about websites visited before and after sending messages, Collins 
added.

This week Politico reported that the Department for Science, Innovation and 
Technology wanted to find a way through the row and is having talks “with 
anyone that wants to discuss this with us”.

Last year, the chief executive of the trade association Digital Content Next, 
Jason Kint, flagged a US antitrust complaint that contained 2019 communications 
between Mark Zuckerberg and his policy chief, Nick Clegg, in which they 
discussed flagging the importance of privacy and end-to-end encryption as a 
“smokescreen” in any debate over integrating the back end of Meta’s apps.

Clegg wrote: “Are you suggesting we should lead with E2EE and not 
interoperability? You may be right that – as a matter of political practicality 
– the latter is easier to block/hinder than the former.”

He added that it was “very easy to explain” why E2EE is helpful to users 
whereas integrating the interoperability of apps looks like “a play for our 
benefit, not necessarily users”.

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