dependabot[bot] opened a new pull request, #807:
URL: https://github.com/apache/dubbo-kubernetes/pull/807

   Bumps 
[github.com/opencontainers/runc](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc) from 
1.1.7 to 1.2.8.
   <details>
   <summary>Release notes</summary>
   <p><em>Sourced from <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases";>github.com/opencontainers/runc's
 releases</a>.</em></p>
   <blockquote>
   <h2>runc v1.2.8 -- &quot;鳥籠の中に囚われた屈辱を&quot;</h2>
   <blockquote>
   <p>[!NOTE]
   Some vendors were given a pre-release version of this release.
   This public release includes two extra patches to fix regressions
   discovered very late during the embargo period and were thus not
   included in the pre-release versions. Please update to this version.</p>
   </blockquote>
   <p>This release contains fixes for three high-severity security
   vulnerabilities in runc (<a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2";>CVE-2025-31133</a>,
 <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r";>CVE-2025-52565</a>,
 and
   <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm";>CVE-2025-52881</a>).
 All three vulnerabilities ultimately allow (through
   different methods) for full container breakouts by bypassing runc's
   restrictions for writing to arbitrary <code>/proc</code> files.</p>
   <h3>Security</h3>
   <ul>
   <li>
   <p><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2";>CVE-2025-31133</a>
 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented in
   runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's 
<code>/dev/null</code>
   inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace 
<code>/dev/null</code>
   with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the
   symlink target read-write. This issue affected all known runc versions.</p>
   </li>
   <li>
   <p><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r";>CVE-2025-52565</a>
 is very similar in concept and application to
   <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2";>CVE-2025-31133</a>,
 except that it exploits a flaw in <code>/dev/console</code>
   bind-mounts. When creating the <code>/dev/console</code> bind-mount (to 
<code>/dev/pts/$n</code>),
   if an attacker replaces <code>/dev/pts/$n</code> with a symlink then runc 
will
   bind-mount the symlink target over <code>/dev/console</code>. This issue 
affected all
   versions of runc &gt;= 1.0.0-rc3.</p>
   </li>
   <li>
   <p><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm";>CVE-2025-52881</a>
 is a more sophisticated variant of <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw";>CVE-2019-19921</a>,
   which was a flaw that allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM
   process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not
   apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation we
   applied for <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw";>CVE-2019-19921</a>
 was fairly limited and effectively only caused
   runc to verify that when we write LSM labels that those labels are actual
   procfs files. This issue affects all known runc versions.</p>
   </li>
   </ul>
   <h3>Static Linking Notices</h3>
   <p>The <code>runc</code> binary distributed with this release are 
<em>statically linked</em> with
   the following <a 
href="https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/lgpl-2.1.en.html";>GNU 
LGPL-2.1</a> licensed libraries, with <code>runc</code> acting
   as a &quot;work that uses the Library&quot;:</p>
   <ul>
   <li><a href="https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp";>libseccomp</a></li>
   </ul>
   <!-- raw HTML omitted -->
   </blockquote>
   <p>... (truncated)</p>
   </details>
   <details>
   <summary>Changelog</summary>
   <p><em>Sourced from <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/v1.2.8/CHANGELOG.md";>github.com/opencontainers/runc's
 changelog</a>.</em></p>
   <blockquote>
   <h2>[1.2.8] - 2025-11-05</h2>
   <blockquote>
   <p>鳥籠の中に囚われた屈辱を</p>
   </blockquote>
   <h3>Security</h3>
   <p>This release includes fixes for the following high-severity security 
issues:</p>
   <ul>
   <li>
   <p><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2";>CVE-2025-31133</a>
 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented in
   runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container's 
<code>/dev/null</code>
   inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace 
<code>/dev/null</code>
   with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead bind-mount the
   symlink target read-write. This issue affected all known runc versions.</p>
   </li>
   <li>
   <p><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-qw9x-cqr3-wc7r";>CVE-2025-52565</a>
 is very similar in concept and application to
   <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2";>CVE-2025-31133</a>,
 except that it exploits a flaw in <code>/dev/console</code>
   bind-mounts. When creating the <code>/dev/console</code> bind-mount (to 
<code>/dev/pts/$n</code>),
   if an attacker replaces <code>/dev/pts/$n</code> with a symlink then runc 
will
   bind-mount the symlink target over <code>/dev/console</code>. This issue 
affected all
   versions of runc &gt;= 1.0.0-rc3.</p>
   </li>
   <li>
   <p><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm";>CVE-2025-52881</a>
 is a more sophisticated variant of <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw";>CVE-2019-19921</a>,
   which was a flaw that allowed an attacker to trick runc into writing the LSM
   process labels for a container process into a dummy tmpfs file and thus not
   apply the correct LSM labels to the container process. The mitigation we
   applied for <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw";>CVE-2019-19921</a>
 was fairly limited and effectively only caused
   runc to verify that when we write LSM labels that those labels are actual
   procfs files. This issue affects all known runc versions.</p>
   </li>
   </ul>
   <h2>[1.2.7] - 2025-09-05</h2>
   <blockquote>
   <p>さんをつけろよデコ助野郎!</p>
   </blockquote>
   <h3>Fixed</h3>
   <ul>
   <li>Removed preemptive &quot;full access to cgroups&quot; warning when 
calling <code>runc pause</code> or <code>runc unpause</code> as an unprivileged 
user without
   <code>--systemd-cgroups</code>. Now the warning is only emitted if an actual 
permission
   error was encountered. (<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4709";>#4709</a>, 
<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4720";>#4720</a>)</li>
   <li>Add time namespace to container config after checkpoint/restore. CRIU 
since
   version 3.14 uses a time namespace for checkpoint/restore, however it was
   not joining the time namespace in runc. (<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4696";>#4696</a>, 
<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4714";>#4714</a>)</li>
   <li>Container processes will no longer inherit the CPU affinity of runc by
   default. Instead, the default CPU affinity of container processes will be
   the largest set of CPUs permitted by the container's cpuset cgroup and any
   other system restrictions (such as isolated CPUs). (<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4041";>#4041</a>, 
<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4815";>#4815</a>, 
<a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4858";>#4858</a>)</li>
   </ul>
   <!-- raw HTML omitted -->
   </blockquote>
   <p>... (truncated)</p>
   </details>
   <details>
   <summary>Commits</summary>
   <ul>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/eeb7e6024f9ee43876301b1d23c353384fa6dcdd";><code>eeb7e60</code></a>
 VERSION: release v1.2.8</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/cdee962c391af84a922252c283bd065e5cabb34b";><code>cdee962</code></a>
 merge private security patches into ghsa-release-1.2.8</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/b4cb2f5436a1110a1de4eec7335a791d2b30a868";><code>b4cb2f5</code></a>
 rootfs: re-allow dangling symlinks in mount targets</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/ee56b8571cc81d41f85b069671bb6d33fd235cf1";><code>ee56b85</code></a>
 openat2: improve resilience on busy systems</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/2462b68fa2d6618480e6a4f615661ee6e762d13a";><code>2462b68</code></a>
 Merge pull request <a 
href="https://redirect.github.com/opencontainers/runc/issues/4943";>#4943</a> 
from lifubang/backport-1.2-4934-4937</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/99e41a58f7a51cf1b6caa5bed58ffbe615193523";><code>99e41a5</code></a>
 ci: only run lint-extra job on PRs to main</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/f2a1c986629e82cffb3b7c01eee68405894f4783";><code>f2a1c98</code></a>
 CI: remove deprecated lima-vm/lima-actions/ssh</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8f901856f96126285585e7343d7bc600013798fc";><code>8f90185</code></a>
 selinux: use safe procfs API for labels</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/948d6e9dbece33da25886f18c97a128c347e95ff";><code>948d6e9</code></a>
 rootfs: switch to fd-based handling of mountpoint targets</li>
   <li><a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/7aa42ade85d575294cf778b21edbd53c0171a3d4";><code>7aa42ad</code></a>
 libct: align param type for mountCgroupV1/V2 functions</li>
   <li>Additional commits viewable in <a 
href="https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/v1.1.7...v1.2.8";>compare 
view</a></li>
   </ul>
   </details>
   <br />
   
   
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