larry-zy commented on code in PR #1609: URL: https://github.com/apache/dubbo-admin/pull/1609#discussion_r4376650185
########## ai/component/server/engine/auth.go: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package engine + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/base64" + "errors" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "net/http" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "dubbo-admin-ai/security" + + "github.com/gin-gonic/gin" + "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5" +) + +const jwtClaimsContextKey = "dubbo-admin-ai.jwt-claims" + +// Cache lifetime after success and retry cooldown after failure. +const jwksRefreshInterval = 30 * time.Second + +type jwksRefresh struct { + done chan struct{} + err error +} + +type JWTAuthConfig struct { + JWKSURL string + Issuer string + Audience string + // TenantID is the trusted deployment tenant for tokens without tenant_id. + // Leave empty to require a signed tenant_id claim. + TenantID string +} + +type Claims struct { + jwt.RegisteredClaims + TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"` + Scopes []string `json:"scopes"` + Username string `json:"username"` + Email string `json:"email"` + Groups []string `json:"groups"` + Roles []string `json:"roles"` + AuthType string `json:"auth_type"` + Provider string `json:"provider"` +} + +type JWTVerifier struct { + config JWTAuthConfig + client *JWKSClient + mu sync.RWMutex + keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey + nextRefresh time.Time + now func() time.Time + refreshing *jwksRefresh +} + +// NewJWTVerifier deliberately fails startup if Admin JWKS is unavailable. +// Subsequent requests share the bounded refresh cache and cooldown. +func NewJWTVerifier(config JWTAuthConfig, client *http.Client) (*JWTVerifier, error) { + verifier := &JWTVerifier{config: config, client: NewJWKSClient(config.JWKSURL, client), keys: map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{}} + if err := verifier.refresh(context.Background()); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("load remote JWKS: %w", err) + } + return verifier, nil +} + +// Authenticate implements the router's trusted identity boundary. +func (v *JWTVerifier) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (security.AccessContext, error) { + claims, err := v.verify(r) + if err != nil { + return security.AccessContext{}, err + } + return v.accessContext(claims) +} + +func (v *JWTVerifier) verify(r *http.Request) (*Claims, error) { + if v == nil || r == nil { + return nil, security.ErrAuthenticationRequired + } + parts := strings.Fields(r.Header.Get("Authorization")) + if len(parts) != 2 || !strings.EqualFold(parts[0], "Bearer") { + return nil, security.ErrAuthenticationRequired + } + claims := &Claims{} + token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(parts[1], claims, func(token *jwt.Token) (any, error) { + return v.keyForToken(r.Context(), token) + }, jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{jwt.SigningMethodRS256.Alg()}), + jwt.WithIssuer(v.config.Issuer), jwt.WithAudience(v.config.Audience), + jwt.WithExpirationRequired(), jwt.WithIssuedAt(), jwt.WithLeeway(30*time.Second)) + if err != nil || token == nil || !token.Valid || strings.TrimSpace(claims.Subject) == "" || claims.IssuedAt == nil { + return nil, security.ErrAuthenticationRequired + } + return claims, nil +} + +func (v *JWTVerifier) accessContext(claims *Claims) (security.AccessContext, error) { + tenantID := claims.TenantID + if tenantID == "" { + tenantID = v.config.TenantID + } + return security.NewAccessContext(security.Subject{TenantID: tenantID, UserID: claims.Subject, + Roles: claims.Roles, Scopes: claims.Scopes, AuthMethod: security.AuthMethodJWT}) +} + +func (v *JWTVerifier) Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc { + return func(c *gin.Context) { + // Explicit public probes only; all other paths require authentication. + switch c.Request.URL.Path { + case "/health", "/healthz", "/readyz": + c.Next() + return + } + if c.Request.Method == http.MethodOptions { + c.Next() + return + } + claims, err := v.verify(c.Request) + if err != nil { + abortUnauthorized(c) + return + } + access, err := v.accessContext(claims) + if err != nil { + abortUnauthorized(c) + return + } + c.Set(jwtClaimsContextKey, claims) + c.Request = c.Request.WithContext(security.WithAccessContext(c.Request.Context(), access)) + c.Next() + } +} + +func ClaimsFromContext(c *gin.Context) (*Claims, bool) { + value, ok := c.Get(jwtClaimsContextKey) + if !ok { + return nil, false + } + claims, ok := value.(*Claims) + return claims, ok +} + +func (v *JWTVerifier) keyForToken(ctx context.Context, token *jwt.Token) (any, error) { + if token.Method != jwt.SigningMethodRS256 { + return nil, errors.New("only RS256 is accepted") + } + kid, ok := token.Header["kid"].(string) + if !ok || kid == "" { + return nil, errors.New("JWT kid is missing") + } + v.mu.RLock() + key := v.keys[kid] + fresh := v.clock().Before(v.nextRefresh) + v.mu.RUnlock() + if fresh { + if key == nil { + return nil, errors.New("JWT kid is unknown") + } + return key, nil + } + if err := v.refresh(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + v.mu.RLock() + key = v.keys[kid] + fresh = v.clock().Before(v.nextRefresh) + v.mu.RUnlock() + if !fresh { + return nil, errors.New("JWKS cache expired") + } + if key == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("JWT kid %q is unknown", kid) + } + return key, nil +} + +func (v *JWTVerifier) clock() time.Time { + if v.now != nil { + return v.now() + } + return time.Now() +} + +func (v *JWTVerifier) refresh(ctx context.Context) error { + if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil { + return err + } + v.mu.Lock() + if flight := v.refreshing; flight != nil { + v.mu.Unlock() + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-flight.done: + return flight.err + } + } + if v.clock().Before(v.nextRefresh) { + v.mu.Unlock() + return nil // Use the cache, or reject if a failed refresh left it empty. + } + flight := &jwksRefresh{done: make(chan struct{})} + v.refreshing = flight + // Expired keys must not remain usable when refreshing fails. + v.keys = nil + v.mu.Unlock() + + // All concurrent misses share this attempt. The initiating request owns its + // context; cancellation also ends the fetch for the waiting requests. + err := v.fetchKeys(ctx) + v.mu.Lock() + flight.err = err + v.nextRefresh = v.clock().Add(jwksRefreshInterval) Review Comment: [P2] Keep request cancellation from starting a shared authentication cooldown The refresh uses the initiating HTTP request context and then advances `nextRefresh` by 30 seconds for every error, including that request being canceled; the shared keys have already been cleared. After cache expiry, a parseable, unsigned JWT with an unknown `kid` can reach this path before authentication succeeds. If that client disconnects during the fetch, subsequent valid-token requests fail for the whole cooldown without trying the healthy JWKS endpoint. I reproduced this with a local endpoint that succeeds at startup, blocks only the canceled refresh, and is healthy thereafter: a previously accepted token is rejected and no third JWKS request occurs. Please give the shared refresh its own bounded lifetime, or allow a fresh caller to retry immediately after request-scoped cancellation, while preserving the expired-key rejection. ########## ai/component/server/engine/auth.go: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package engine + +import ( + "context" + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/base64" + "errors" + "fmt" + "math/big" + "net/http" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" + + "dubbo-admin-ai/security" + + "github.com/gin-gonic/gin" + "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5" +) + +const jwtClaimsContextKey = "dubbo-admin-ai.jwt-claims" + +// Cache lifetime after success and retry cooldown after failure. +const jwksRefreshInterval = 30 * time.Second + +type jwksRefresh struct { + done chan struct{} + err error +} + +type JWTAuthConfig struct { + JWKSURL string + Issuer string + Audience string + // TenantID is the trusted deployment tenant for tokens without tenant_id. + // Leave empty to require a signed tenant_id claim. + TenantID string +} + +type Claims struct { + jwt.RegisteredClaims + TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"` + Scopes []string `json:"scopes"` + Username string `json:"username"` + Email string `json:"email"` + Groups []string `json:"groups"` + Roles []string `json:"roles"` + AuthType string `json:"auth_type"` + Provider string `json:"provider"` +} + +type JWTVerifier struct { + config JWTAuthConfig + client *JWKSClient + mu sync.RWMutex + keys map[string]*rsa.PublicKey + nextRefresh time.Time + now func() time.Time + refreshing *jwksRefresh +} + +// NewJWTVerifier deliberately fails startup if Admin JWKS is unavailable. +// Subsequent requests share the bounded refresh cache and cooldown. +func NewJWTVerifier(config JWTAuthConfig, client *http.Client) (*JWTVerifier, error) { + verifier := &JWTVerifier{config: config, client: NewJWKSClient(config.JWKSURL, client), keys: map[string]*rsa.PublicKey{}} + if err := verifier.refresh(context.Background()); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("load remote JWKS: %w", err) + } + return verifier, nil +} + +// Authenticate implements the router's trusted identity boundary. +func (v *JWTVerifier) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (security.AccessContext, error) { + claims, err := v.verify(r) + if err != nil { + return security.AccessContext{}, err + } Review Comment: [P2] Apply the public-probe exception on the actual Router authentication path The production Router installs `authenticationMiddleware(r.authenticator)` globally and invokes this `Authenticate` method; it never installs `JWTVerifier.Middleware()`. Consequently, the public `/health` exception in `Middleware()` is unused. `ServerComponent.Start` registers `/health` on the same engine, so enabling JWT makes a tokenless health probe return 401 and can make a healthy deployment fail its readiness/liveness checks. I reproduced the 401 using `NewRouter` with a real JWKS verifier and the health registration used by `Start`. Please exempt the explicit public probes in the middleware actually used by the Router and add an integration test through that Router; the standalone verifier-middleware tests do not cover this wiring. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. 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