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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-11407?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=17047453#comment-17047453
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Pierre Smits commented on OFBIZ-11407:
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With Commit 227ecf8023a13789a7ed739807e1d93ee7891e0c in ofbiz-plugins's the
proposed upgrade is added to the 'example' plugin.
Isn't this upgrade in the main ofbiz repo not also working for components in
plugins? If so, there should be no need to have it explicitly in the example
component, correct?
> Upgrade Tomcat from 9.0.29 to 9.0.31 (CVE-2020-1938)
> ----------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: OFBIZ-11407
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-11407
> Project: OFBiz
> Issue Type: Sub-task
> Components: framework
> Affects Versions: Trunk
> Reporter: Michael Brohl
> Assignee: Michael Brohl
> Priority: Major
> Fix For: Upcoming Branch
>
>
> CVE-2020-1938 AJP Request Injection and potential Remote Code Execution
> Severity: High
> Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
> Versions Affected:
> Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.30
> Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.50
> Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.99
> Description:
> When using the Apache JServ Protocol (AJP), care must be taken when
> trusting incoming connections to Apache Tomcat. Tomcat treats AJP
> connections as having higher trust than, for example, a similar HTTP
> connection. If such connections are available to an attacker, they can
> be exploited in ways that may be surprising.
> Prior to Tomcat 9.0.31, 8.5.51 and 7.0.100, Tomcat shipped with an AJP
> Connector enabled by default that listened on all configured IP
> addresses. It was expected (and recommended in the security guide) that
> this Connector would be disabled if not required.
> Prior to this vulnerability report, the known risks of an attacker being
> able to access the AJP port directly were:
> - bypassing security checks based on client IP address
> - bypassing user authentication if Tomcat was configured to trust
> authentication data provided by the reverse proxy
> This vulnerability report identified a mechanism that allowed the following:
> - returning arbitrary files from anywhere in the web application
> including under the WEB-INF and META-INF directories or any other
> location reachable via ServletContext.getResourceAsStream()
> - processing any file in the web application as a JSP
> Further, if the web application allowed file upload and stored those
> files within the web application (or the attacker was able to control
> the content of the web application by some other means) then this, along
> with the ability to process a file as a JSP, made remote code execution
> possible.
> Mitigation:
> It is important to note that mitigation is only required if an AJP port
> is accessible to untrusted users.
> - If AJP support is not required, the Connector may be disabled e.g. by
> removing the AJP Connector element from the server.xml file
> - If AJP support is required, untrusted users may be prevented from
> accessing the AJP port by one or more of the following means:
> - configuring appropriate network firewall rules
> - configuring an explicit address attribute to the connector so that
> the Connector listens on a non-public interface
> - configuring a shared secret for the AJP connection
> Users wishing to take a defence-in-depth approach and block the vector
> that permits returning arbitrary files and execution as JSP may upgrade to:
> - Apache Tomcat 9.0.31 or later
> - Apache Tomcat 8.5.51 or later
> - Apache Tomcat 7.0.100 or later
> Users should note that a number of changes were made to the default AJP
> Connector configuration in these versions to harden the default
> configuration. The changes are:
> - The AJP Connector is commented out in the provided server.xml file.
> - The "requiredSecret" attribute has been renamed "secret" (the old name
> continues to work but is deprecated).
> - A new attribute "secretRequired" has been added which defaults to
> "true". When this attribute is "true", the AJP Connector will not
> start unless a shared secret has been configured.
> - The default listen address for the AJP Connector is now the loopback
> address.
> It is likely that users upgrading to 9.0.31, 8.5.51 or 7.0.100 and later
> will need to make small changes to their configurations as a result.
> References:
> [1] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html
> [2] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html
> [3] http://tomcat.apache.org/securit
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