sadpandajoe commented on code in PR #39925:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/39925#discussion_r3293333695
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,169 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
+): void {
+ let safe: string;
+ try {
+ safe = assertSafeNavigationUrl(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ } catch (err) {
+ // Full-page nav fallback: the user clicked something that resolved to
+ // the home page is better than landing on an attacker-controlled origin.
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- guarded surface, observable in
dev.
+ console.error('navigationUtils.navigateTo refused unsafe URL:', url, err);
+ window.location.href = ensureAppRoot('/');
Review Comment:
Addressed in 3922c7fc1e: `navigateTo` and `navigateWithState` now use an
inline regex gate (`SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(target) &&
!target.includes('\\') && (!USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(target) ||
isSafeNavigationUrl(target))`) at each `window.*` sink, instead of routing
through the throw-based `assertSafeNavigationUrl` helper.
Through-function sanitisers aren't in CodeQL's default model — the throw
path guaranteed safety in practice, but the data-flow analysis didn't propagate
`safe` as sanitised at the `window.location.href` / `window.location.assign` /
`window.open` / `window.history.pushState` / `window.history.replaceState`
writes. Mirroring the same regex inline (with `isSafeNavigationUrl` as a 1:1
boolean predicate for the userinfo-bearing scheme branch) lets CodeQL recognise
the barrier at every sink. The fallback `window.location.href =
ensureAppRoot('/')` path is re-validated through the same inline gate so the
sanitiser is visible there too. Behaviour is unchanged. Resolving.
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,169 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
+): void {
+ let safe: string;
+ try {
+ safe = assertSafeNavigationUrl(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ } catch (err) {
+ // Full-page nav fallback: the user clicked something that resolved to
+ // the home page is better than landing on an attacker-controlled origin.
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- guarded surface, observable in
dev.
+ console.error('navigationUtils.navigateTo refused unsafe URL:', url, err);
+ window.location.href = ensureAppRoot('/');
+ return;
+ }
if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
+ window.open(safe, '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
} else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ window.location.assign(safe);
Review Comment:
Addressed in 3922c7fc1e: `navigateTo` and `navigateWithState` now use an
inline regex gate (`SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(target) &&
!target.includes('\\') && (!USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(target) ||
isSafeNavigationUrl(target))`) at each `window.*` sink, instead of routing
through the throw-based `assertSafeNavigationUrl` helper.
Through-function sanitisers aren't in CodeQL's default model — the throw
path guaranteed safety in practice, but the data-flow analysis didn't propagate
`safe` as sanitised at the `window.location.href` / `window.location.assign` /
`window.open` / `window.history.pushState` / `window.history.replaceState`
writes. Mirroring the same regex inline (with `isSafeNavigationUrl` as a 1:1
boolean predicate for the userinfo-bearing scheme branch) lets CodeQL recognise
the barrier at every sink. The fallback `window.location.href =
ensureAppRoot('/')` path is re-validated through the same inline gate so the
sanitiser is visible there too. Behaviour is unchanged. Resolving.
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,169 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
+): void {
+ let safe: string;
+ try {
+ safe = assertSafeNavigationUrl(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ } catch (err) {
+ // Full-page nav fallback: the user clicked something that resolved to
+ // the home page is better than landing on an attacker-controlled origin.
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- guarded surface, observable in
dev.
+ console.error('navigationUtils.navigateTo refused unsafe URL:', url, err);
+ window.location.href = ensureAppRoot('/');
+ return;
+ }
if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
+ window.open(safe, '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
} else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ window.location.assign(safe);
Review Comment:
Addressed in 3922c7fc1e: `navigateTo` and `navigateWithState` now use an
inline regex gate (`SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(target) &&
!target.includes('\\') && (!USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(target) ||
isSafeNavigationUrl(target))`) at each `window.*` sink, instead of routing
through the throw-based `assertSafeNavigationUrl` helper.
Through-function sanitisers aren't in CodeQL's default model — the throw
path guaranteed safety in practice, but the data-flow analysis didn't propagate
`safe` as sanitised at the `window.location.href` / `window.location.assign` /
`window.open` / `window.history.pushState` / `window.history.replaceState`
writes. Mirroring the same regex inline (with `isSafeNavigationUrl` as a 1:1
boolean predicate for the userinfo-bearing scheme branch) lets CodeQL recognise
the barrier at every sink. The fallback `window.location.href =
ensureAppRoot('/')` path is re-validated through the same inline gate so the
sanitiser is visible there too. Behaviour is unchanged. Resolving.
##########
superset-frontend/src/utils/navigationUtils.ts:
##########
@@ -16,29 +16,169 @@
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
-import { ensureAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
+import {
+ createElement,
+ type AnchorHTMLAttributes,
+ type ReactElement,
+} from 'react';
+import { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot } from './pathUtils';
-export const navigateTo = (
+// Re-export so callers that legitimately need a raw prefixed path (native
+// fetch, navigator.sendBeacon, image src, third-party `href` props) have a
+// single sanctioned import location. The static-invariant scan disallows
+// importing from `pathUtils` directly outside this module.
+export { ensureAppRoot, makeUrl, stripAppRoot };
+
+// The guard helpers are declared before `navigateTo` / `navigateWithState`
+// so oxlint's no-use-before-define lint (which does not honour function-
+// declaration hoisting) does not fire on the wired-up imperative-nav
+// path. The focused helpers below (`openInNewTab`, `getShareableUrl`,
+// `AppLink`) also reach for `assertSafeNavigationUrl` directly.
+
+const NEW_TAB_FEATURES = 'noopener noreferrer';
+
+// Allow-list of safe URL shapes for navigation: router-relative paths and a
+// small set of known-safe schemes. `ensureAppRoot` already neutralises
+// `javascript:` / `data:` by prefixing them as relative paths; protocol-
+// relative `//host` is intentionally excluded here because it is a cross-
+// origin navigation primitive that previously enabled open redirects.
+//
+// nit-3 / AF-1 hardening: the leading-slash branch also rejects any URL
+// containing a backslash anywhere — browsers normalise `/\evil.com` →
+// `//evil.com` in the special-scheme authority, so backslashes in any
+// position let an attacker craft a path that looks router-relative until
+// the browser parses it. http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo (`@` before the
+// first `/` after `//`) are rejected by the post-regex authority check
+// below, since `https://[email protected]` resolves to the host `evil.com`
+// despite presenting as a same-origin-looking URL to the eye.
+const SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE = /^(?:\/(?!\/)|https?:|ftp:|mailto:|tel:)/i;
+const USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE = /^(?:https?|ftp):/i;
+
+function assertSafeNavigationUrl(url: string): string {
+ if (!SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(url) || url.includes('\\')) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: only relative paths and ' +
+ 'http(s):, ftp:, mailto:, tel: schemes are allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(url)) {
+ let parsed: URL;
+ try {
+ parsed = new URL(url);
+ } catch {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: unparseable authority.',
+ );
+ }
+ if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+ throw new Error(
+ 'navigationUtils refused unsafe URL: ' +
+ 'http(s)/ftp URLs with userinfo are not allowed.',
+ );
+ }
+ }
+ return url;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Imperative full-page navigation. Internal entry point for `redirect()`
+ * and a handful of legacy callers; new code should prefer `<AppLink>` or
+ * `redirect()`. Unsafe URLs (protocol-relative, backslash-laden, userinfo-
+ * carrying http(s)) fall back to `ensureAppRoot('/')` with a `console.error`
+ * — never a silent navigation to the rejected target.
+ *
+ * @internal
+ */
+export function navigateTo(
url: string,
options?: { newWindow?: boolean; assign?: boolean },
-) => {
+): void {
+ let safe: string;
+ try {
+ safe = assertSafeNavigationUrl(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ } catch (err) {
+ // Full-page nav fallback: the user clicked something that resolved to
+ // the home page is better than landing on an attacker-controlled origin.
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-console -- guarded surface, observable in
dev.
+ console.error('navigationUtils.navigateTo refused unsafe URL:', url, err);
+ window.location.href = ensureAppRoot('/');
+ return;
+ }
if (options?.newWindow) {
- window.open(ensureAppRoot(url), '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
+ window.open(safe, '_blank', 'noopener noreferrer');
} else if (options?.assign) {
- window.location.assign(ensureAppRoot(url));
+ window.location.assign(safe);
} else {
- window.location.href = ensureAppRoot(url);
+ window.location.href = safe;
Review Comment:
Addressed in 3922c7fc1e: `navigateTo` and `navigateWithState` now use an
inline regex gate (`SAFE_NAVIGATION_URL_RE.test(target) &&
!target.includes('\\') && (!USERINFO_BEARING_SCHEME_RE.test(target) ||
isSafeNavigationUrl(target))`) at each `window.*` sink, instead of routing
through the throw-based `assertSafeNavigationUrl` helper.
Through-function sanitisers aren't in CodeQL's default model — the throw
path guaranteed safety in practice, but the data-flow analysis didn't propagate
`safe` as sanitised at the `window.location.href` / `window.location.assign` /
`window.open` / `window.history.pushState` / `window.history.replaceState`
writes. Mirroring the same regex inline (with `isSafeNavigationUrl` as a 1:1
boolean predicate for the userinfo-bearing scheme branch) lets CodeQL recognise
the barrier at every sink. The fallback `window.location.href =
ensureAppRoot('/')` path is re-validated through the same inline gate so the
sanitiser is visible there too. Behaviour is unchanged. Resolving.
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