sadpandajoe commented on code in PR #44406:
URL: https://github.com/apache/superset/pull/44406#discussion_r4277065243


##########
tests/unit_tests/common/test_query_context_processor.py:
##########
@@ -2639,6 +3215,101 @@ def 
test_mark_force_executed_noop_without_nonce(processor, mock_query_context):
     cache_manager.data_cache.set.assert_not_called()
 
 
+# =============================================================================
+# Annotation-data cache decoupled from the dataframe cache
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+def test_get_annotation_data_cached_reads_from_cache(
+    processor: QueryContextProcessor,
+) -> None:
+    """A hit on the annotation-specific key skips recomputation entirely."""
+    with patch(
+        "superset.common.query_context_processor.cache_manager"
+    ) as cache_manager:
+        cache_manager.data_cache.get.return_value = {"annotation_data": {"a": 
1}}
+        with patch.object(processor, "get_annotation_data") as mock_get:
+            result = processor._get_annotation_data_cached(
+                query_obj=MagicMock(),
+                cache_key="ak",
+                force_query=False,
+                force_cached=False,
+                timeout=60,
+                datasource_uid="ds",
+            )
+    assert result == {"a": 1}
+    mock_get.assert_not_called()
+
+
+def test_get_annotation_data_cached_computes_and_caches_on_miss(
+    processor: QueryContextProcessor,
+) -> None:
+    """A miss computes the annotation data and stores it under the scoped 
key."""
+    with (
+        patch("superset.common.query_context_processor.cache_manager") as 
cache_manager,
+        patch("superset.common.query_context_processor.set_and_log_cache") as 
mock_set,
+    ):
+        cache_manager.data_cache.get.return_value = None
+        with patch.object(
+            processor, "get_annotation_data", return_value={"a": 1}
+        ) as mock_get:
+            result = processor._get_annotation_data_cached(
+                query_obj=MagicMock(),
+                cache_key="ak",
+                force_query=False,
+                force_cached=False,
+                timeout=60,
+                datasource_uid="ds",
+            )
+    assert result == {"a": 1}
+    mock_get.assert_called_once()
+    mock_set.assert_called_once_with(
+        cache_manager.data_cache, "ak", {"annotation_data": {"a": 1}}, 60, "ds"
+    )
+
+
+def test_get_annotation_data_cached_force_cached_raises_on_miss(

Review Comment:
   The new `except Exception` around `cache_manager.data_cache.get(cache_key)` 
in `_get_annotation_data_cached` has no test: the only read-error test 
(`test_resolve_forced_query_forces_when_marker_read_errors`) exercises the 
marker lookup in `_resolve_forced_query`, not this catch. If that catch were 
dropped, a cache backend `ConnectionError` would propagate and fail the whole 
chart-data request, and every test here would still pass. Could you add a case 
where a dataframe cache hit is paired with `data_cache.get` raising, asserting 
live annotations are returned without `force_cached` and `CacheLoadError` is 
raised (no live fetch) with `force_cached=True`?



##########
superset/common/query_context_processor.py:
##########
@@ -474,73 +503,226 @@ def query_cache_key(self, query_obj: QueryObject, 
**kwargs: Any) -> str | None:
         )
         return cache_key
 
-    def _annotation_cache_context(self, query_obj: QueryObject) -> dict[str, 
Any]:
+    def annotation_cache_key(self, query_obj: QueryObject) -> str | None:
         """
-        Cache-key material binding cached annotation data to its security
-        context.
-
-        Annotation payloads are fetched per requesting user and stored on the
-        same cache entry as the dataframe, so the key also binds the requesting
-        user and, for chart-backed layers, the RLS clauses of the referenced
-        chart's datasource.
+        Cache key for this query's annotation-layer payload, or ``None`` when
+        the query has no annotation layers or when some layer's access scope
+        could not be resolved (the payload is then never cached, see
+        :meth:`_annotation_source_scope`).
+
+        Annotation payloads are fetched under the requesting user's access
+        scope, which is a stricter security requirement than the dataframe
+        itself has. Keying them separately from :meth:`query_cache_key` keeps
+        that scoping from forcing every distinct viewer of an annotated chart
+        onto their own full copy of the (potentially much larger) shared
+        dataframe: users with the same access scope share this key too.
         """
-        source_rls: dict[str, list[str] | None] = {}
-        source_versions: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {}
-        metadata_versions: dict[str, str] = {}
+        if not query_obj or not query_obj.annotation_layers:
+            return None
+        if (annotation_context := self._annotation_cache_context(query_obj)) 
is None:
+            return None
+        return self.query_cache_key(query_obj, 
annotation_context=annotation_context)
+
+    def _annotation_cache_context(
+        self, query_obj: QueryObject
+    ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+        """
+        Cache-key material binding annotation data to its security *scope* so
+        users with the same access share a cache entry and users with a
+        different scope — or no access — never read each other's data.
+
+        * NATIVE layers: the ``can_read`` permission on ``Annotation``, the
+          only user-dependent dimension of these global records.
+        * Chart-backed (``line``/``table``) layers: see
+          :meth:`_annotation_source_scope`, recorded per *layer* (not per
+          referenced chart) since two layers can reference the same chart
+          with different overrides, and so different scopes.
+
+        Returns ``None`` when any layer's scope cannot be resolved, meaning
+        the payload must not be cached at all.
+        """
+        context: dict[str, Any] = {}
+
+        if any(
+            layer.get("sourceType") == "NATIVE" for layer in 
query_obj.annotation_layers
+        ):
+            context["annotation_read"] = security_manager.can_access(
+                "can_read", "Annotation"
+            )
+
+        source_scope: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
         for layer in query_obj.annotation_layers:
             if (
                 layer.get("sourceType")
                 not in ANNOTATION_SOURCE_TYPES_WITH_CHART_REFERENCE
             ):
                 continue
-            layer_value = layer.get("value")
+            if (scope := self._annotation_source_scope(layer)) is None:
+                return None
+            source_scope.append({"value": str(layer.get("value")), **scope})
+        if source_scope:
+            context["source_scope"] = source_scope
+
+        return context
+
+    def _annotation_source_scope(self, layer: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, 
Any] | None:
+        """
+        Access and data-identity cache-key material for one chart-backed
+        annotation layer, or ``None`` when it cannot be resolved.
+
+        ``None`` means "do not cache": a missing chart, a chart with neither
+        a saved query context nor a resolvable datasource, or any error while
+        deriving the scope would otherwise collapse an authorized and a
+        denied requester onto one shared identity, letting the latter read
+        the former's warmed payload. The caller fetches live instead.
+
+        ``access`` keeps a user denied the referenced chart's datasource from
+        reading an authorized user's cached payload. When the chart has a
+        saved query context, this runs the *same* authorization path
+        :meth:`get_viz_annotation_data` executes
+        (``QueryContext.raise_for_access``) rather than the coarser
+        :meth:`SecurityManager.can_access_datasource` — a requester whose
+        access comes from a dashboard/viewer-promiscuous-mode bypass (which
+        depends on the chart's own saved ``form_data``, e.g. its
+        ``slice_id``/``dashboardId``) would otherwise still fail that coarser,
+        context-free check and collapse onto the same denied scope as a
+        genuinely unauthorized requester, letting the latter read the
+        former's cached payload. ``data_key`` is the annotation chart's own
+        query cache key(s) — derived from the same, override-applied query
+        objects actually executed (see :meth:`_apply_annotation_overrides`),
+        so it captures the datasource version, RLS clauses, and any per-user
+        Jinja/virtual-dataset RLS material exactly as the live fetch would,
+        including material an override only introduces at a finer grain.
+        Reusing this logic avoids re-deriving it and automatically inherits
+        any future correctness fixes made there.
+        """
+        layer_value = layer.get("value")
+        try:
             chart = (
                 ChartDAO.find_by_id(layer_value) if layer_value is not None 
else None
             )
-            annotation_datasource: Datasource | None = (
-                chart.resolved_datasource if chart else None
-            )
-            if chart and isinstance(chart.query_context, str):
+            if chart is None:
+                return None
+
+            # The saved query context is what the live fetch executes and
+            # authorizes against, so it is consulted first, independent of
+            # the chart's own datasource pointer: a chart can have its
+            # ``datasource_id`` cleared while its saved query context still
+            # targets a valid dataset, and the live fetch would still work.
+            annotation_query_context = chart.get_query_context()
+            if annotation_query_context is not None:
+                self._apply_annotation_overrides(annotation_query_context, 
layer)
                 try:
-                    source: dict[str, Any] = json.loads(chart.query_context)[
-                        "datasource"
-                    ]
-                    annotation_datasource = DatasourceDAO.get_datasource(
-                        source["type"], source["id"]
-                    )
-                except (
-                    ValueError,
-                    TypeError,
-                    KeyError,
-                    DatasourceNotFound,
-                    DatasourceTypeNotSupportedError,
-                    DatasourceValueIsIncorrect,
-                ):
-                    annotation_datasource = None
+                    annotation_query_context.raise_for_access()
+                    access: Any = True
+                except SupersetSecurityException:
+                    access = False
+                data_key: Any = [

Review Comment:
   When `raise_for_access()` just denied this requester, `access` is `False`, 
but execution still falls through to 
`annotation_query_context.query_cache_key(...)`. That call runs 
`get_extra_cache_keys`, which can compile the referenced dataset's SQL and 
render its Jinja (including DB-backed macros like `latest_partition`) for a 
user who has no access to it, on every load of the annotated chart — and 
nothing is ever cached under an `access: False` scope, so the work repeats. 
Should the denied branch skip `data_key` (e.g. return `{"access": False}`), 
since a denied scope never needs a data identity?



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