renovate-bot opened a new pull request, #8493: URL: https://github.com/apache/texera/pull/8493
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | [Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | |---|---|---|---| | [@angular/compiler](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular) ([source](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/tree/HEAD/packages/compiler)) | [`21.2.19` → `21.2.20`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/@angular%2fcompiler/21.2.19/21.2.20) |  |  | --- ### Angular: Sanitization bypass via directive host bindings on concrete host elements in @​angular/core and @​angular/compiler [CVE-2026-88057](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88057) / [GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Prior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to. When a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through: - `hostDirectives` composition, - Class inheritance of host bindings, - Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives), - Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. `<svg:a>`, `<math>`), or - Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`), the compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing through Angular's built-in sanitizer. ##### Impact An attacker capable of controlling the value bound to an affected directive host binding could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser context (Cross-Site Scripting). ##### Patches This issue has been resolved in versions: - `22.1.0` - `21.2.20` - `20.3.28` ##### Workarounds Ensure that any user-controlled values assigned to properties bound via directive host bindings are explicitly sanitized using `DomSanitizer.sanitize(SecurityContext.URL, ...)` before assignment, or restrict the input to validated safe URL schemes (e.g. `http://`, `https://`). #### Severity - CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/issues/69550](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/issues/69550) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69558](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/pull/69558) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/2f96c8020f85ccb715a76de4b79a0c680c2c7264](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/2f96c8020f85ccb715a76de4b79a0c680c2c7264) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/6afe6fa781c2f0931f0aedd729b9884a8fe212ee](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/6afe6fa781c2f0931f0aedd729b9884a8fe212ee) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/6caa298dee58319b2d674dc91364e26ffe3ecb2b](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/6caa298dee58319b2d674dc91364e26ffe3ecb2b) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.28](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.28) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.20](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.20) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.0](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.0) - [https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Angular: Sanitization bypass via directive host bindings on concrete host elements in @​angular/core and @​angular/compiler [CVE-2026-88057](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88057) / [GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) <details> <summary>More information</summary> #### Details Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Prior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to. When a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through: - `hostDirectives` composition, - Class inheritance of host bindings, - Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives), - Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. `<svg:a>`, `<math>`), or - Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`), the compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing through Angular's built-in sanitizer. ##### Impact An attacker capable of controlling the value bound to an affected directive host binding could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser context (Cross-Site Scripting). ##### Patches This issue has been resolved in versions: - `22.1.0` - `21.2.20` - `20.3.28` ##### Workarounds Ensure that any user-controlled values assigned to properties bound via directive host bindings are explicitly sanitized using `DomSanitizer.sanitize(SecurityContext.URL, ...)` before assignment, or restrict the input to validated safe URL schemes (e.g. `http://`, `https://`). #### Severity - CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium) - Vector String: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N` #### References - [https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/issues/69550](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/issues/69550) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69558](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/pull/69558) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/2f96c8020f85ccb715a76de4b79a0c680c2c7264](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/2f96c8020f85ccb715a76de4b79a0c680c2c7264) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/6afe6fa781c2f0931f0aedd729b9884a8fe212ee](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/6afe6fa781c2f0931f0aedd729b9884a8fe212ee) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/6caa298dee58319b2d674dc91364e26ffe3ecb2b](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/6caa298dee58319b2d674dc91364e26ffe3ecb2b) - [https://github.com/angular/angular](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.28](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.28) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.20](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.20) - [https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.0](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.1.0) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg) and the [GitHub Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)). </details> --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>angular/angular (@​angular/compiler)</summary> ### [`v21.2.20`](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#21220-2026-08-12) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/compare/v21.2.19...v21.2.20) ##### core | Commit | Type | Description | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | ---------------------------------------- | | [6afe6fa781](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/6afe6fa781c2f0931f0aedd729b9884a8fe212ee) | fix | sanitize host bindings on concrete hosts | ##### http | Commit | Type | Description | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | --------------------------------------------------- | | [fec5977df4](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/fec5977df4dda3a10d5ce2923e3e06d86ba11ee7) | fix | match header values exactly when deleting | | [e33d69a71c](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/e33d69a71c5beb8fe5785b53fd6b37658334e8e0) | fix | preserve immutability of materialized clones | | [caf616670f](https://redirect.github.com/angular/angular/commit/caf616670fd20d528aa69e0131cc17d60f0cc27d) | fix | run root interceptors in the terminal request chain | <!-- CHANGELOG SPLIT MARKER --> </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (in timezone Etc/UTC) - Branch creation - At any time (no schedule defined) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Disabled by config. 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