On Wed, Dec 31, 2008 at 11:13 AM, David Lum <david....@nwea.org> wrote: > Microsoft is not aware of specific attacks against MD5, so previously > issued certificates that were signed using MD5 are not affected and do not > need to be revoked. This issue only affects certificates being signed using > MD5 after the publication of the attack method.
I thought the idea was that an attacker would forge a certificate, with info matching an existing certificate, but using a private key of their own, and then set their fleet of PlayStation 3's to work to come up with an MD5 collision, so they could use the signature from a real certificate to sign their forgery. Or something like that. So not only does this affect already-issued certificates, it depends on them. Or am I misunderstanding? > Most public Certificate Authority roots no longer use MD5 to sign > certificates, but have upgraded to the more secure SHA-1 algorithm. But as long as browsers still accept the older certificates, they'd still be vulnerable, right? -- Ben ~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~ ~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/> ~
