The HCP protocol is utilized by the helpctr.exe which is related to the
issue, you basically have to disable invocation of the protocol but the
helpctr.exe itself, which the advisory shows how to do with a registry
hack which deletes the HCR\HCP registry key. 

Z

Edward Ziots
CISSP,MCSA,MCP+I,Security +,Network +,CCA
Network Engineer
Lifespan Organization
401-639-3505
ezi...@lifespan.org


-----Original Message-----
From: David Lum [mailto:david....@nwea.org] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 11:30 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

So what does Help and Support have to do with it? It "tells" the OS that
hcp:// is a valid URL? Would that also mean disabling that service
mitigates it?

Dave

-----Original Message-----
From: Ziots, Edward [mailto:ezi...@lifespan.org] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 7:29 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

Any site could have the malicious code in it, and we all know that our
web filtering software isn't going to block everything on the big bad
internet :) 

Z

Edward Ziots
CISSP,MCSA,MCP+I,Security +,Network +,CCA
Network Engineer
Lifespan Organization
401-639-3505
ezi...@lifespan.org


-----Original Message-----
From: David W. McSpadden [mailto:dav...@imcu.com] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 10:28 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

Drive by dns poisioning.  Think you are going to google.com and end up
and
fu.google.com.  get the bad code embedded on your machine redirect to
google.com.  Nanoseconds and flicker to the user.  

-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Heaton [mailto:jhea...@dfg.ca.gov] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 10:24 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

But, again, they'd have to browse a site with that exploit, which would
mean
clicking a link within an e-mail, or just dumb luck...

>>> "David W. McSpadden" <dav...@imcu.com> 6/10/2010 7:20 AM >>>
Other way around.

Your users have the opening on their pc.

The browse a site the the hcp:// embedded and the the embedded code can
run
with their permissions on their pc.  So they could in fact install
something
or copy something to their machine with the hcp:// exploit.

That's how I read it anyways.

 

  _____  

From: David Lum [mailto:david....@nwea.org] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 10:09 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

 

So I'm not clear.if someone clicks on "Help and Support" in 2003 / XP
it's
possible for them to get exploted because they might look for something
and
get redirected to a compromised site? I'm not clear.what would my users
have
to go to get exploited?

David Lum // SYSTEMS ENGINEER 
NORTHWEST EVALUATION ASSOCIATION
(Desk) 971.222.1025 // (Cell) 503.267.9764

 

From: Ziots, Edward [mailto:ezi...@lifespan.org] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 6:46 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

 

What I am thinking if we don't have the spot in the registry, then maybe
configuring your web filtering, to block all URL's  or sequences that
are
calling HCP://

 

Per the seclist.org site the rogue html file had the following in it: 

$ cat starthelp.html 

<iframe src="hcp://...">

 

But this was shown accordingly;

Few users rely on Help Centre urls, it is safe to temporarily disable
them
by removing HKCR\HCP\shell\open. This modification can be deployed
easily
using
GPOs. For more information on Group Policy, see Microsoft's Group Policy
site,
here
 
This is the exported registry per my XP SP3 system. 
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
 
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP]
@="Help Center Pluggable Protocol"
"URL Protocol"=""
"EditFlags"=dword:00000002
"FriendlyTypeName"="@C:\\WINDOWS\\PCHealth\\HelpCtr\\Binaries\\HCAppRes.
dll,
-2100"
 
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell]
 
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell\open]
 
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell\open\command]
@="\"C:\\WINDOWS\\PCHealth\\HelpCtr\\Binaries\\HelpCtr.exe\" -FromHCP
-url
\"%1\""
 
Then you can send save this .reg file for restoration procedures if
needed. 
 
The following the directions in http://support.microsoft.com/kb/310516 
 
Basically I believe it would look like the following for 
 
HCPfix.reg
 
[-HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP]
@="Help Center Pluggable Protocol"
"URL Protocol"=""
"EditFlags"=dword:00000002
"FriendlyTypeName"="@C:\\WINDOWS\\PCHealth\\HelpCtr\\Binaries\\HCAppRes.
dll,
-2100"
 
[-HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell]
 
[-HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell\open]
 
[-HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell\open\command]
@="\"C:\\WINDOWS\\PCHealth\\HelpCtr\\Binaries\\HelpCtr.exe\" -FromHCP
-url
\"%1\""
 
Then do a test deploy with Startup GPO with the following as the script.

HCPfix.cmd

regedit.exe /s HCPFIX.reg

 
 
 
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/bb310732.aspx 

 

 

I haven't tried it, since I have HIPS at the workstation is a mitigation
control, but for those who don't this might just be the workaround you
are
going to need before M$ puts out an OOB patch if they are going too.
Depends on how many PCs you have at risk, how much privileges your users
have and how much of a threat you believe them to be at against this
exploit
from the internet. 

 

Sincerely,

EZ

 

Edward Ziots

CISSP,MCSA,MCP+I,Security +,Network +,CCA

Network Engineer

Lifespan Organization

401-639-3505

ezi...@lifespan.org 

 

From: James Rankin [mailto:kz2...@googlemail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 9:14 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: Re: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

 

I think it is just for XP/2003, and it is the MS Help Center stuff

It actually doesn't work properly on 2008, as far as I can tell - I was
looking a bit too deep

On 10 June 2010 14:08, David W. McSpadden <dav...@imcu.com> wrote:

I don't have it as well but I am win7pro and I didn't install the HP
help
center software??

Maybe??

 

 

  _____  

From: James Rankin [mailto:kz2...@googlemail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 8:38 AM


To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: Re: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

 

I can't find the protocol handler anywhere in HKCR?

On 10 June 2010 13:31, Joe Tinney <jtin...@lastar.com> wrote:

The article Susan linked had a mitigations section. The one I am most
interested in was the temporary disabling of the hcp protocol handler in
the
registry.

 

http://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/b10a58b75029f79b5f93f4add3ddf992/ADVISORY 

 

From: Ziots, Edward [mailto:ezi...@lifespan.org] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 7:23 AM


To: NT System Admin Issues

Subject: RE: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

 

My intial thought would be HIPS to block the helpctr from even being
called,
either that or stopping the help and support center service, and ACLing
the
helpctr.exe. But still waiting to see what comes up on the Security
lists
from Microsoft that Susan Bradley myself and others are on, for
additional
mitigation aspects. 

 

It is a unique exploit since it combines XSS with a hex obfuscation to
bypass windows system controls. 

 

Z

 

Edward Ziots

CISSP,MCSA,MCP+I,Security +,Network +,CCA

Network Engineer

Lifespan Organization

401-639-3505

ezi...@lifespan.org 

 

From: James Rankin [mailto:kz2...@googlemail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2010 7:16 AM
To: NT System Admin Issues
Subject: Re: More pain on the Windows front, possible 0 day

 

Saw this earlier on Patch Management...any word yet on
workaround/mitigation
to keep us sane until the inevitable OOB patch comes around?

On 10 June 2010 12:00, Ziots, Edward <ezi...@lifespan.org> wrote:

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/06/10/windows_help_bug/ 
http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2010/Jun/205 

Looks like a combination of XSS, and invoking the hcp protocol for help
and
support center to execute commands in the context of the logged on user.

PS: Mad Props to Susan Bradley on the Patch Management list for putting
this
out....

Z

Edward Ziots
CISSP,MCSA,MCP+I,Security +,Network +,CCA
Network Engineer
Lifespan Organization
401-639-3505
ezi...@lifespan.org 


~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~




-- 
"On two occasions...I have been asked, 'Pray, Mr Babbage, if you put
into
the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?' I am not
able
rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke
such
a question."

 

 

 

 

 

 




-- 
"On two occasions...I have been asked, 'Pray, Mr Babbage, if you put
into
the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?' I am not
able
rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke
such
a question."

 

 

 

 




-- 
"On two occasions...I have been asked, 'Pray, Mr Babbage, if you put
into
the machine wrong figures, will the right answers come out?' I am not
able
rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke
such
a question."

 

 

 

 

 

 

~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~

~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~





~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~

~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~




~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~


~ Finally, powerful endpoint security that ISN'T a resource hog! ~
~ <http://www.sunbeltsoftware.com/Business/VIPRE-Enterprise/>  ~

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