From my point of view, your use case can be implemented in two ways

1) tokenized & signed URLs provided by your origin server
2) URLs with one-time usage bearer tokens as parameter acquired by your origin server

I see the following pros/cons:

Load: (2) requires the origin server to acquire one token per link on your page from the auth server, which may cause a lot of load on the authz server :-(. (1) only needs to obtain a single token since the signature is calculated by the origin server locally. This might be much better from a load perspective.

Security: As a further downside (2) either requires HTTPS communication for the whole page or you acquire the URL with one-time usage bearer token over HTTP. Acquisition from authz server can still be performed over HTTPS. If this acceptable depends on your security considerations.

Comments?

regards,
Torsten.

Am 10.04.2010 03:34, schrieb Moore, Jonathan:
However, this doesn't address my earlier use case of a signed, cross-domain JSONP call, especially if it's sitting on a non-HTTPS page; I need to make a non-HTTP XHR request to obtain a (signed or tokenized) URL to include in my <script> include, so requiring a bearer token and SSL basically forces me to have the whole page delivered over HTTPS, which may be overkill for my application.

While I can understand that token and secret acquisition might need SSL, always requiring it on authorized requests too seems too much.

Can someone explain/re-explain why query parameter signatures need to be eliminated? The Authorization header is great when you can manipulate it, but you can't always. Why is it problematic for the signatures to be able to appear in either place?

Jon

........
Jon Moore


On Apr 9, 2010, at 1:39 PM, "Eran Hammer-Lahav" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

In practice this is the same as logging in which I expect to require SSL anyway. Signed or not, attackers should not be able to login to your email account simply by using a MITM attack when you click on your IM client. So SSL is required already.

EHL


On 4/9/10 7:30 AM, "George Fletcher" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    Yes, this is possible, though to be secure it should really
    happen over SSL which is less of a requirement for a signed request.

    I guess the main question is whether we really need to remove the
    signature related parameters from URL and only allow them in the
    Authorization header. For signed requests, these use cases pretty
    much require that the signature parameters be allowed in the URL.

    Obviously, if we change our model to not use signed URLs then
    this issue goes away:)

    Thanks,
    George

    On 4/9/10 12:58 AM, Brian Eaton wrote:


        On Thu, Apr 8, 2010 at 7:08 AM, George Fletcher
        <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
        <mailto:[email protected]>  wrote:



            I realize that these sorts of use cases are trivial if
            establishment of the
            SSO session switches from a signed mechanism to the OAuth
            WRAP bearer token
            model. The one nice feature of the signed URL is that it
            is one time use
            where the bearer token can be replayed multiple times.




        Yep, Google does this kind of thing too.

        Is there something that stops you from declaring that a
        particular
        token is single use?

        1) Client makes call to Authorization server, passing in
        either the
        refresh token or an access token (depending on the security
        model you
        want.)
        2) AS returns a token.
        3) Client uses the token to pop open a web browser.

        Cheers,
        Brian



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