On Wed, Jul 21, 2010 at 1:26 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Dirk,
>
> Inline:
>
> On Tue, Jul 20, 2010 at 9:22 AM, Dirk Balfanz <balf...@google.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Jul 18, 2010 at 8:20 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
> > <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Dirk,
> >>
> >> I have some questions concerning your proposal:
> >>
> >> - As far as I understand, the difference to "magic signatures" lays in
> the
> >> usage of a JSON token carrying issuer, not_before, not_after and
> audience.
> >> While such properties are important for security tokens (assertions), I
> >> cannot see an advantage of using this format for signatures of HTTP
> >> requests. Would you please explain?
> >
> > You mean advantage over magic signatures? It's really a similar idea -
> it's
> > just that magic signatures as is don't quite fit the bill. For example,
> they
> > have newlines in
> > them:
> http://salmon-protocol.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/draft-panzer-magicsig-00.html#anchor5
>
> Well, they MAY, but they do not have to. Would not profiling Magic
> Signatures so that it does not contain newlines do?
>

I'll look into it. There are some other differences, like HMAC signatures in
addition to RSA, X.509 encodings of certs, but perhaps those differences can
be smoothed over in favor for a common spec. I'll talk to John Panzer.

Dirk.


>
>
>
> --
> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
> http://www.sakimura.org/en/
> http://twitter.com/_nat_en
>
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