+1 for basic signature support

there is a need to protect end-users from token abuse by rogue resource servers (see http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-10#section-5, paragraph 3). Signatures based on a token secret is one way to prevent this kind of attack.

Signature mechanisms aiming for other purposes (e.g. client authentication) should be defined as extensions in my opinion.

>I think draft –05 went too far in terms of additional parameters for requesting tokens with secrets. Since the core spec lacks any form of discovery, I think servers should simply issue whatever token >they deem appropriate to the client (bearer, with secret, etc.). Other extensions can define parameters to allow the client to ask, and the server to advertise whaich schemes are supported.

>My approach is for the server to issue a token with two additional parameters: signature algorithm and secret. Based on that, the client will send requests with a few additional parameters (nonce, >timestamp, signature – maybe combined into one).

+1

This is simple but sufficient. The authz server and resource server have a strong coupling anyway so the authz server should know what the resource server expects. Does this also mean the client MUST send signed requests if the authz server issued a token secret?

regards,
Torsten.


Am 24.09.2010 03:43, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav:
Since much of this recent debate was done off list, I'd like to ask people
to simply express their support or objection to including a basic signature
feature in the core spec, in line with the 1.0a signature approach.

This is not a vote, just taking the temperature of the group.

EHL

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