In my opinion, there could be two arguments against including 1.0 signatures into the core: 1) The spec will be too long. 2) The signature mechanism isn't good, so it would be replaced with something else anyway. Is 1) a concern? For 2), I think the adoption of OAuth 1.0 speaks for the signature mechanism being both feasible to implement and secure. Also as it's already written it should not delay finishing the spec.
I agree with Dick Hardt that if the signatures are included, there should be a mechanism to allow for different signature schemes who might be defined in the future. There's another question: What will be required for OAuth compliance? Is only-bearer-tokens fine or must the signature mechanism be supported? Is it fine to not allow both but only a third signature algorithm? By not including signatures some people (those who strongly feel about signatures) will feel OAuth 2 is somewhat "less" than OAuth 1 and stick with OAuth 1 instead of the whole web world moving forward to a new standard. 2010/9/27 Eran Hammer-Lahav <[email protected]> > Building on John Panzer’s proposal, I would like to ask if people have > strong objections to the following: > > > > - Add the 1.0a RFC language for HMAC-SHA-1 signatures to the core > specification in -11 > > - Discuss the signature language on the list and improve both prose and > signature base string construction > > - Apply improvements to -12 > > > > Keeping the 1.0a signature in the core specification makes sense and builds > on existing experience and deployment. If we can reach quick consensus on > some improvements, great. If not, we satisfy the need of many here to offer > a simple alternative to bearer tokens, without having to reach consensus on > a new signature algorithm suitable for core inclusion. >
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