+1 for (1) As pointed out in another posting (http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg06723.html), I think we have consensus on the patterns for native app implementation. So in my opinion, we need to adjust the client authentication part to fit.
In my opinion, the authz server cannot prevent a client from using another clients id, even pre-registering a redirect_uri won't help. But this only means, the authz server cannot provide the user with trustworthy data regarding the app. In this case it is the task of the user and the platform the app is running on to detect malicious clients (maleware, viruses). regards, Torsten. > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > Von: Mark Mcgloin [mailto:mark.mcgl...@ie.ibm.com] > Gesendet: Dienstag, 28. Juni 2011 12:26 > An: Shane B Weeden > Cc: oauth@ietf.org; oauth-boun...@ietf.org > Betreff: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Draft 16 comment > > The question below remains unanswered in relation to native apps being > able > to use grant type auth code to utilize refresh tokens. Which of these > is > the best option > > 1) Change oauth spec so client credentials are optional when requesting > access token for grant type 'authorization_code' and for refresh token > requests > 2) Edit section 9 on security considerations to remove any references > to > native apps using auth code > > The difficulty with option 1 is how do you then prevent attackers using > a > legitimate client identifier. If we change the spec to say the client > SHOULD pre-register it's redirect-uri, would that suffice? > > > Regards > Mark > > oauth-boun...@ietf.org wrote on 23/05/2011 05:40:22: > > > From: > > > > Shane B Weeden <swee...@au1.ibm.com> > > > > To: > > > > oauth@ietf.org > > > > Date: > > > > 23/05/2011 06:26 > > > > Subject: > > > > [OAUTH-WG] Draft 16 comment > > > > Sent by: > > > > oauth-boun...@ietf.org > > > > > > First, I'd like to add my support for Brian Eaton's comments on Draft > 16. > > They actually helped clarify the comment I have below.... > > > > > > I found section 9 to be in contradiction to a part of section 6. In > > particular in section 9: > > > > Native applications SHOULD use the authorization code grant type > flow > > without client password credentials (due to their inability to keep > > the credentials confidential) to obtain short-lived access tokens, > > and use refresh tokens to maintain access. > > > > In section 6 the specification is quite clear that client > authentication > is > > REQUIRED for the use of refresh tokens: > > > > The authorization server MUST validate the client credentials, > ensure > > that the refresh token was issued to the authenticated client, > > validate the refresh token, and verify that the resource owner's > > authorization is still valid. > > > > > > My understanding is that refresh tokens are being used as a kind of > > long-lived, rolling "instance secret" for the native application and > > represent the grant authorized by the end user during initial > establishment > > of the authorization code which is used to get the first refresh > token. > > > > It seems to me this use case needs to be allowed for in the wording > of > > section 6. > > > > Regards, > > Shane. > > > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > OAuth@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
