FYI in case some aren't on i...@ietf.org
Having responses to these before Thursday would be good. Its
often the case that some AD will turn some of these points into
a DISCUSS so good to know what can be cleared up easily and
what might need further discussion before the telechat.
S
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Gen-ART Telechat review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-25
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2012 09:11:19 -0400
From: Richard L. Barnes <rbar...@bbn.com>
To: General Area Review Team <gen-...@ietf.org>,
draft-ietf-oauth-v2....@tools.ietf.org, IETF-Discussion list <i...@ietf.org>
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Document: draft-ietf-oauth-v2.txt
Reviewer: Richard Barnes
Review Date: 10 Apr 2012
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat Date: 12 Apr 2012
Summary: Almost ready, but with some gaps that need to be addressed
MAJOR:
General: At several points, the document seems to deal in plain-text
usernames and passwords, ranging from the requirement for HTTP Basic
authentication (2.3.1) to the explicit username and password fields one
of the grant types (4.3.2, 10.7). In these cases, it seems like it
would encourage better security practices to use some sort of digest or
other secure scheme for proving ownership of passwords. Otherwise,
there's a risk that proxies, caches, etc. will have access to users'
plaintext credentials.
General: The document requires the Authorization Server to distinguish
between confidential and public clients at several points. It's not
clear, however, how the server is supposed to tell which is which.
Perhaps Section 2.1 could elaborate a little more on this?
4: Throughout the document, the assumption is that the client is moved
from one URI to another via HTTP redirects (302 responses). Could the
protocol also accommodate other techniques of moving clients around,
e.g., in JavaScript (setting window.location). It seems like this could
make deployment much easier in some cases.
10.3: This section seems to ignore the risk of client impersonation at
the resource server. Just as with client credentials in Section 10.2,
if an access token is compromised, then it could be presented by another
party in order to access the protected resource. So the Resource Server
needs to authenticate the client and validate that the token goes with
the client, in addition to just checking the validity of the token.
10: Throughout this section, there are mentions of which parameters
require secure transmission/storage and which do not. It would be
helpful to summarize these requirements, say in a table at the end of
the section.
MINOR:
2.3.1: When you say "request body" in this section, do you actually mean
"query"? I don't see a prohibition on GET here, in which case the
parameters would be in the URI query section.
3.1.2.2: It seems like an explicit requirement would be helpful here, e.g.:
"
The Authorization Server MUST verify that either no redirect_uri is
provided (in which case it uses the registered URI), or else that the
provided redirect_uri matches the registered redirection URI for the
authenticated client_id (where the match can be based on a full or
partial registered URI).
"
4.1.3: Why does this request use redirect_uri and not client_id to
identify the client? (Or both?) It seems like involving the client_id
would better support the goal of client authentication, in order to
mitigate the risk of client impersonation.
4.3.2: Shouldn't there be a client authentication here? (In particular,
a client_id.) Otherwise, it seems like this is essentially the same as
the flow in 4.4.
7. It seems like it would be helpful to have a way to pass access tokens
in the request URI / query in some deployment cases (e.g., a JavaScript
based client). Is there any particular reason this was excluded?
EDITORIAL:
3. Would be helpful to note here that these endpoints are in addition to
the resource endpoint (the one started out to protect), which is handled
in Section 7.
3.2: It's not clear why only POST is allowed here. A couple of words of
explanation would help.
5.1: Why bother with a case-insensitive token_type here? It doesn't
look like anything else in the whole document has this property.
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