In 1.4.1 - I'm ok with this use of having the AS token endpoint issue an access token to an anonymous client to begin the registration process (just not sure the value of it).
I'm not ok with what is happening in 1.4.2 (Protected Registration). I think we should make it clear that it is for Protected *Local* Registration. In this case it makes sense that the local OOB registration process could reasonably issue a local access token. A new option (1.4.3), Protected 3rd Party Registration would proceed differently (the BB+ case)…. It opens the door for a scenarios such as where a certifying entity, e.g. the publisher of a REST API issues the developer a client application assertion that includes some defined application metadata. We should specify what claims are typically present and what is minimally required. Because this assertion is not an AuthN statement (technically), my preference is that this assertion then be presented as the software_id because it is identifying the software and represents assertions about client metadata. IMPORTANT: By NOT presenting the 3rd party assertion as the initial access token, it is possible for an administrator to then take that assertion and locally register the application --> converting the client application registration to a 1.4.2 local registration. The client would still present the 3rd party assertion as the software_id AND the initial access token from the manual registration. OR, The client registers *anonymously* but presents the signed 3rd party assertion in software_id. Phil @independentid www.independentid.com phil.h...@oracle.com On 2013-05-30, at 9:08 AM, John Bradley wrote: > The initial access token is a OAuth bearer Access token (Authz). Like any > bearer token it can be structured or not. Your concern is I think around > some work BB+ has done to profile a structured token for this particular RS > use. That is out of scope for the core of dynamic registration, as it is out > of scope for OAuth core. > > So http basic vs parameters makes no difference to you. The assertion > profile only uses POST parameters for the assertion rather than headers so > that should not be an issue for that authentication method. > > John B. > > On 2013-05-30, at 11:52 AM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: > >> No different issue. I was concerned about the initial client assertion being >> passed in as authen cred. It is a signed set of client reg metadata. >> >> See we are confused. Hence my worry. :-) >> >> Phil >> >> On 2013-05-30, at 8:48, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote: >> >>> I think Phil also had some processing reason why a Token endpoint or RS >>> wouldn't want to tale the authentication as a header, as the processing was >>> easier with them as parameters as they are potentially available to >>> different parts of the stack. That may have been mostly around RS, but >>> the principal may apply to the token endpoint as well. >>> >>> On 2013-05-30, at 10:21 AM, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org> wrote: >>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "client_secret_post vs client_secret_basic" >>>>>>> BASIC and POST are essentially the same just different ways to send the >>>>>>> client secret. If an authorization server supports both, both should >>>>>>> work for any client. So are both methods treated differently? >>>>>> I agree, and this was one of my original arguments for making this field >>>>>> plural (or plural-able), but there hasn't been WG support for that so >>>>>> far. >>>>> >>>>> I'm not arguing to make it plural. I think the authentication method is >>>>> just "client_secret". >>>> >>>> That was also an option that was brought up, but in the OIDC WG the >>>> counter-argument was (as I recall) that the two are syntactically separate >>>> and there's a desire to restrict to a single type, such as disabling >>>> client_secret_post. Basically, to make it unambiguous. >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
