+1

Phil

@independentid
www.independentid.com
phil.h...@oracle.com



On Jul 24, 2014, at 10:25 AM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> I am not against discussion in the WG.
> 
> I happen to agree with Phil's fundamental premise that some developers are 
> using OAuth in a insecure way to do authentication.
> 
> That raises the question of how to best educate them, and or address 
> technical barriers.
> 
> It is on the second point that people's opinions seem to divide.
> 
> Some people thing that if we have a OAuth flow that eliminates the access 
> token (primarily to avoid asking for consent as I understand it) and just 
> return a id_token from the token endpoint that can be done in a spec short 
> enough to het people to read.   The subtext of this is that the Connect 
> specification is too large that it scare people,  and they don't find the 
> spec in the first place because it is not a RFC.
> 
> An other common possession is that if you don't want to prompt the user for 
> consent then don't ask for scopes.  Twisting the OAuth spec to not return an 
> access token is not OAuth,  yes you could use a different endpoint rather 
> than the token endpoint, but that is not OAuth.   Connect was careful not to 
> break the OAuth spec.    As long as you are willing to take a access token 
> with no scopes (the client needs to understand that there are no attributes 
> one way or another anyway or it will break) then you don't need to change 
> OAuth.   You can publish a profile of connect that satisfies the use case.
> 
> I think Mike has largely done that but it might be better being less stingy 
> on references back to the larger spec.
> 
> The questions are do we modify OAuth to not return an access token, and if so 
> how,  and if we do is it still OAuth.
> 
> The other largely separable question is do we create confusion in the market 
> and slow the the adoption of identity federation on top of OAuth, or find a 
> way to make this look like a positive alignment of interests around a subset 
> of Connect.
> 
> There are a number of options.  
> 1: We can do a profile in the OIDF and publish it as a IETF document.   
> Perhaps the cleanest from an IPR point of view.
> 2:We can do a profile in the OAuth WG referencing connect.
> 3:We can do a AD sponsored profile that is not in the OAuth WG.
> 4:We can do a small spec in OAuth to add response_type to the token endpoint. 
>  in combination with 1, 2, or 3
> 
> I agree that stoping developers doing insecure things needs to be addressed 
> somehow.  
> I am not personally convinced that Oauth without access tokens is sensible.
> 
> Looking forward to the meeting:)
> 
> John B.
> On Jul 24, 2014, at 6:52 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> 
> wrote:
> 
>> I'd note that the reaction at the conference to Ian's statement was 
>> overwhelmingly positive. There was a wide range of industry people here - 
>> implementers, practitioners, deployers, strategists, etc. - and it seems 
>> pretty clear that the "rough consensus" of the industry at large is that a4c 
>> is not wanted or needed.
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Jul 24, 2014 at 5:29 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> And here is a quote from Ian's blog. 
>> 
>> And although the authentication wheel is round, that doesn’t mean it isn’t 
>> without its lumps. First, we do see some reinventing the wheel just to 
>> reinvent the wheel. OAuth A4C is simply not a fruitful activity and should 
>> be put down.  
>>  
>> (Source) 
>> http://www.tuesdaynight.org/2014/07/23/do-we-have-a-round-wheel-yet-musings-on-identity-standards-part-1.html
>> 
>> 
>> 2014-07-23 16:53 GMT-04:00 John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com>:
>> 
>> I thought I did post this to the list. 
>> 
>> I guess I hit the wrong reply on my phone. 
>>  
>> John B. 
>> Sent from my iPhone
>> 
>> On Jul 23, 2014, at 4:50 PM, tors...@lodderstedt.net wrote:
>> 
>>> we are two, at least :-)
>>> 
>>> Why didn't you post this on the list?
>>> 
>>> When will be be arriving?
>>> 
>>> Am 23.07.2014 16:39, schrieb John Bradley:
>>> 
>>>> Ian Glazer mentioned this in his keynote at CIS yesterday. 
>>>>  
>>>> His advice was please stop,  we are creating confusion and uncertainty. 
>>>>  
>>>> We are becoming our own wort enemy. ( my view though Ian may share it)
>>>>  
>>>> Returning just an id_ token from the token endpoint has little real value. 
>>>>  
>>>> Something really useful to do would be sorting out channel_id so we can do 
>>>> PoP for id tokens to make them and other cookies secure in the front 
>>>> channel.   I think that is a better use of time. 
>>>>  
>>>> I may be in the minority opinion on that,  it won't be the first time.  
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> John B. 
>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>> 
>>>> On Jul 23, 2014, at 4:04 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> You are right from a theoretical perspective. Practically this was caused 
>>>>> by editorial decisions during the creation of the RFC. As far as I 
>>>>> remember, there was a definition of the (one) token endpoint response in 
>>>>> early versions. No one every considered to NOT respond with an access 
>>>>> token from the token endpoint. So one might call it an implicit 
>>>>> assumption.
>>>>>  
>>>>> I'm worried that people get totally confused if an exception is 
>>>>> introduced now given the broad adoption of OAuth based on this assumption.
>>>>>  
>>>>> regards,
>>>>> Torsten.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Am 23.07.2014 um 15:41 schrieb Thomas Broyer <t.bro...@gmail.com>:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Is it said anywhere that ALL grant types MUST use Section 5.1 responses? 
>>>>>> Each grant type references Section 5.1, and "access token request" is 
>>>>>> only defined in the context of the defined grant types. Section 2.2 
>>>>>> doesn't talk about the request or response format.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Le 23 juil. 2014 21:32, "Nat Sakimura" <sakim...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>>>> Is it? Apart from the implicit grant that does not use token endpoint, 
>>>>>> all other grant references section 5.1 for the response, i.e., all 
>>>>>> shares the same response. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2014-07-23 15:18 GMT-04:00 Thomas Broyer <t.bro...@gmail.com>:
>>>>>> I hadn't realized the JSON response that requires the access_token field 
>>>>>> is defined per grant_type, so I'd be OK to "extend the semantics" as in 
>>>>>> the current draft.
>>>>>> That was actually my main concern: that the token endpoint mandates 
>>>>>> access_token; but its actually not the case.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Le 23 juil. 2014 20:46, "Nat Sakimura" <sakim...@gmail.com> a écrit :
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I agree with John that overloading response_type @ authz endpoint is a 
>>>>>> bad idea. It completely changes the semantics of this parameter. NOTE: 
>>>>>> what I was proposing was not this parameter, but a new parameter 
>>>>>> response_type @ token endpoint. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> I also think overloading grant_type is a bad idea since it changes its 
>>>>>> semantics. I quote the definition here again: 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> grant 
>>>>>>     credential representing the resource owner's authorization
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> grant_type
>>>>>>  type of grant sent to the token endpoint to obtain the access token
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> It is not about controlling what is to be returned from the token 
>>>>>> endpoint, but the hint to the token endpoint describing the type of 
>>>>>> credential the endpoint has received. It seems the "control of what is 
>>>>>> being returned from token endpoint"  is just a side effect. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> I am somewhat ambivalent[1] in changing the semantics of token endpoint, 
>>>>>> but in as much as "text is the king" for a spec., we probably should not 
>>>>>> change the semantics of it as Torsten points out. If it is ok to change 
>>>>>> this semantics, I believe defining a new parameter to this endpoint to 
>>>>>> control the response would be the best way to go. This is what I have 
>>>>>> described previously. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Defining a new endpoint to send code to get ID Token and forbidding the 
>>>>>> use of it against token endpoint would not change the semantics of any 
>>>>>> existing parameter or endpoint, which is good. However, I doubt if it is 
>>>>>> not worth doing. What's the point of avoiding access token scoped to 
>>>>>> UserInfo endpoint after all? Defining a new endpoint for just avoiding 
>>>>>> the access token for userinfo endpoint seems way too much the heavy wait 
>>>>>> way and it breaks interoperabiliy: it defeats the purpose of 
>>>>>> standardization. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> I have started feeling that no change is the best way out. 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Nat
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> [1]  If instead of saying "Token endpoint - used by the client to 
>>>>>> exchange an authorization grant for an access token, typically with 
>>>>>> client authentication", it were saying "Token endpoint - used by the 
>>>>>> client to exchange an authorization grant for tokens, typically with 
>>>>>> client authentication", then it would have been OK. It is an expansion 
>>>>>> of the capability rather than changing the semantics.
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2014-07-23 13:39 GMT-04:00 Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com>:
>>>>>> You need the alternative response_type value ("code_for_id_token" in the 
>>>>>> A4C draft) to tell the Authorization Server to return a code to be used 
>>>>>> with the new grant type, rather than one to use with the 
>>>>>> "authorization_code" grant type (which is what response_type=code does).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2014 10:33 AM
>>>>>> To: tors...@lodderstedt.net
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for 
>>>>>> draft-hunt-oauth-v2-user-a4c-05.txt
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> If we use the token endpoint then a new grant_type is the best way. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> It sort of overloads code, but that is better than messing with 
>>>>>> response_type for the authorization endpoint to change the response from 
>>>>>> the token_endpoint.  That is in my opinion a champion bad idea. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> In discussions developing Connect we decided not to open this can of 
>>>>>> worms because no good would come of it.   
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> The token_endpoint returns a access token.  Nothing requires scope to be 
>>>>>> associates with the token. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> That is the best solution.  No change required.  Better interoperability 
>>>>>> in my opinion. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Still on my way to TO, getting in later today. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> John B. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Jul 23, 2014, at 12:15 PM, tors...@lodderstedt.net wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The "response type" of the token endpoint is controlled by the value of 
>>>>>> the parameter "grant_type". So there is no need to introduce a new 
>>>>>> parameter.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> wrt to a potential "no_access_token" grant type. I do not consider this 
>>>>>> a good idea as it changes the semantics of the token endpoint (as 
>>>>>> already pointed out by Thomas). This endpoint ALWAYS responds with an 
>>>>>> access token to any grant type. I therefore would prefer to use another 
>>>>>> endpoint for the intended purpose.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> regards,
>>>>>> Torsten.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Am 23.07.2014 13:04, schrieb Nat Sakimura:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> IMHO, changing the semantics of "response_type" @ authz endpoint this 
>>>>>> way is not a good thing. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Instead, defining a new parameter "response_type" @ token endpoint, as I 
>>>>>> described in my previous message, 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> probably is better. At least, it does not change the semantics of the 
>>>>>> parameters of RFC6749. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  Nat 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 2014-07-23 12:48 GMT-04:00 Thomas Broyer <t.bro...@gmail.com>:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> No, I mean response_type=none and response_type=id_token don't generate 
>>>>>> a code or access token so you don't use the Token Endpoint (which is not 
>>>>>> the same as the Authentication Endpoint BTW).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> With response_type=code_for_id_token, you get a code and exchange it for 
>>>>>> an id_token only, rather than an access_token, so you're changing the 
>>>>>> semantics of the Token Endpoint.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> I'm not saying it's a bad thing, just that you can't really compare none 
>>>>>> and id_token with code_for_id_token.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 6:45 PM, Richer, Justin P. <jric...@mitre.org> 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> It's only "not using the token endpoint" because the token endpoint 
>>>>>> copy-pasted and renamed the authentication endpoint.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> On Jul 23, 2014, at 9:30 AM, Thomas Broyer <t.bro...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Except that these are about not using the Token Endpoint at all, whereas 
>>>>>> the current proposal is about the Token Endpoint not returning an 
>>>>>> access_token field in the JSON.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 4:26 PM, Mike Jones 
>>>>>> <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The response_type "none" is already used in practice, which returns no 
>>>>>> access token.  It was accepted by the designated experts and registered 
>>>>>> in the IANA OAuth Authorization Endpoint Response Types registry at 
>>>>>> http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-parameters.xml#endpoint.
>>>>>>   The registered "id_token" response type also returns no access token.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> So I think the question of whether response types that result in no 
>>>>>> access token being returned are acceptable within OAuth 2.0 is already 
>>>>>> settled, as a practical matter.  Lots of OAuth implementations are 
>>>>>> already using such response types.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>                                                             -- Mike
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Phil Hunt
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2014 7:09 AM
>>>>>> To: Nat Sakimura
>>>>>> Cc: <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for 
>>>>>> draft-hunt-oauth-v2-user-a4c-05.txt
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Yes. This is why it has to be discussed in the IETF.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> @independentid
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> On Jul 23, 2014, at 9:43 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Reading back the RFC6749, I am not sure if there is a good way of 
>>>>>> suppressing access token from the response and still be OAuth. It will 
>>>>>> break whole bunch of implicit definitions like: 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> authorization server
>>>>>>       The server issuing access tokens to the client after successfully
>>>>>>       authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorization.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> After all, OAuth is all about issuing access tokens. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Also, I take back my statement on the grant type in my previous mail. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> The definition of grant and grant_type are respectively: 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> grant 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>     credential representing the resource owner's authorization
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>             
>>>>>> grant_type
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>     (string representing the) type of grant sent to the token endpoint 
>>>>>> to obtain the access token
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Thus, the grant sent to the token endpoint in this case is still 'code'. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Response type on the other hand is not so well defined in RFC6749, but 
>>>>>> it seems it is representing what is to be returned from the 
>>>>>> authorization endpoint. To express what is to be returned from token 
>>>>>> endpoint, perhaps defining a new parameter to the token endpoint, which 
>>>>>> is a parallel to the response_type to the Authorization Endpoint seems 
>>>>>> to be a more symmetric way, though I am not sure at all if that is going 
>>>>>> to be OAuth any more. One straw-man is to define a new parameter called 
>>>>>> response_type to the token endpoint such as: 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> response_type
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>     OPTIONAL. A string representing what is to be returned from the 
>>>>>> token endpoint. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>     
>>>>>> Then define the behavior of the endpoint according to the values as the 
>>>>>> parallel to the multi-response type spec. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-multiple-response-types-1_0.html
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Nat
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>     
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 2014-07-23 7:21 GMT-04:00 Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com>:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The draft is very clear. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Jul 23, 2014, at 0:46, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The new grant type that I was talking about was 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "authorization_code_but_do_not_return_access_nor_refresh_token", so to 
>>>>>> speak. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> It does not return anything per se, but an extension can define 
>>>>>> something on top of it. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Then, OIDC can define a binding to it so that the binding only returns 
>>>>>> ID Token. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This binding work should be done in OIDF. Should there be such a grant 
>>>>>> type, 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> it will be an extremely short spec. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> At the same time, if any other specification wanted to define 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> other type of tokens and have it returned from the token endpoint, 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> it can also use this grant type. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> If what you want is to define a new grant type that returns ID Token 
>>>>>> only, 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> then, I am with Justin. Since "other response than ID Token" is only 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> theoretical, this is a more plausible way forward, I suppose. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> Nat
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 2014-07-22 14:30 GMT-04:00 Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu>:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> So the draft would literally turn into:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> "The a4c response type and grant type return an id_token from the token 
>>>>>> endpoint with no access token. All parameters and values are defined in 
>>>>>> OIDC."
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Seems like the perfect mini extension draft for OIDF to do.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> --Justin
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> /sent from my phone/
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Jul 22, 2014 10:29 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > What about just defining a new grant type in this WG?
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > 2014-07-22 12:56 GMT-04:00 Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com>:
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> That would be nice. However oidc still needs the new grant type in 
>>>>>> >> order to implement the same flow. 
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> Phil
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >> On Jul 22, 2014, at 11:35, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> >>> +1 to Justin. 
>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>> >>> 2014-07-22 9:54 GMT-04:00 Richer, Justin P. <jric...@mitre.org>:
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>> Errors like these make it clear to me that it would make much more 
>>>>>> >>>> sense to develop this document in the OpenID Foundation. It should 
>>>>>> >>>> be something that directly references OpenID Connect Core for all 
>>>>>> >>>> of these terms instead of redefining them. It's doing 
>>>>>> >>>> authentication, which is fundamentally what OpenID Connect does on 
>>>>>> >>>> top of OAuth, and I don't see a good argument for doing this work 
>>>>>> >>>> in this working group.
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>>  -- Justin
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>> On Jul 22, 2014, at 4:30 AM, Thomas Broyer <t.bro...@gmail.com> 
>>>>>> >>>> wrote:
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Jul 21, 2014 at 11:52 PM, Mike Jones 
>>>>>> >>>>> <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for your review, Thomas.  The "prompt=consent" definition 
>>>>>> >>>>>> being missing is an editorial error.  It should be:
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>>  
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>> consent
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>> The Authorization Server SHOULD prompt the End-User for consent 
>>>>>> >>>>>> before returning information to the Client. If it cannot obtain 
>>>>>> >>>>>> consent, it MUST return an error, typically consent_required.
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>>  
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>> I'll plan to add it in the next draft.
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>> It looks like the consent_required error needs to be defined too, 
>>>>>> >>>>> and you might have forgotten to also import 
>>>>>> >>>>> account_selection_required from OpenID Connect.
>>>>>> >>>>>  
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>>  
>>>>>> >>>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that there's no difference between a response with 
>>>>>> >>>>>> multiple "amr" values that includes "mfa" and one that doesn't.  
>>>>>> >>>>>> Unless a clear use case for why "mfa" is needed can be 
>>>>>> >>>>>> identified, we can delete it in the next draft.
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>> Thanks.
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>> How about "pwd" then? I fully understand that I should return 
>>>>>> >>>>> "pwd" if the user authenticated using a password, but what "the 
>>>>>> >>>>> service if a client secret is used" means in the definition for 
>>>>>> >>>>> the "pwd" value?
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>> (Nota: I know you're at IETF-90, I'm ready to wait 'til you come 
>>>>>> >>>>> back ;-) )
>>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>>> >>>>> --
>>>>>> >>>>> Thomas Broyer
>>>>>> >>>>> /tɔ.ma.bʁwa.je/
>>>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> >>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> >>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> >>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>> >>> --
>>>>>> >>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> >>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> >>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> >>> @_nat_en
>>>>>> >>>
>>>>>> >>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> >>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> >>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > --
>>>>>> > Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> > Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> > http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> > @_nat_en
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> @_nat_en
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> @_nat_en
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Thomas Broyer
>>>>>> /tɔ.ma.bʁwa.je/
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Thomas Broyer
>>>>>> /tɔ.ma.bʁwa.je/
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> @_nat_en
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>>  
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> @_nat_en
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> -- 
>>>>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>> @_nat_en
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>  
>>>  
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>> @_nat_en
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> 
>> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

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