Some old posts on designing a single sign-on system with OAuth 2.

They may not have been in the ones I sent to Justin.
http://www.thread-safe.com/2012/02/designing-single-sign-on-system-using.html
http://www.cloudidentity.com/blog/2013/01/02/oauth-2-0-and-sign-in-4/

Are you wanting something more like these with the info on how you could do it 
with OAuth 2?

John B.


On Nov 2, 2014, at 8:14 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> Many of the threats can only be mitigated by the AS/IDP .   This document 
> should cover that.   
> 
> I didn't say the IdP must use connect only that it needs to understand and 
> mitigate the treats from the document,  implementing Connect is one way to do 
> it.
> 
> Sorry I was trying to interpret "Sigh"
> 
> John B.
> 
> 
> 
> On Nov 2, 2014, at 6:47 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
>> That is not what I said. 
>> 
>> I said establish the criteria for mitigation of the threats. 
>> 
>> Phil
>> 
>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 12:53, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Your proposal required changes and extensions to the AS.
>>> 
>>> Without some cooperation from the AS /API provider, they shouldn't be using 
>>> OAuth for identity.
>>> 
>>> The client can't make it secure all on it's own.   The API semantics might 
>>> change,  the client would largely be relying on luck.
>>> 
>>> Sorry,
>>> 
>>> What sort of advice are you looking for that the client can implement 
>>> without the cooperation of the IdP around some of the security 
>>> considerations.
>>> About the only thing would be to never use implicit.  However that alone in 
>>> my opinion is not sufficient for real security.
>>> 
>>> John B.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 4:55 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Sigh.
>>>> 
>>>> Phil
>>>> 
>>>> @independentid
>>>> www.independentid.com
>>>> phil.h...@oracle.com
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 10:33 AM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> If a client developer doesn't have Connect available then they need to 
>>>>> point the API developer at this doc, so that they do provide Connect or 
>>>>> some other API that takes into account all of the security considerations.
>>>>> 
>>>>> A client developer should never make up there own identity protocol out 
>>>>> of someone else's API that is not designed for it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> A vanilla OAuth API with no additional security considerations on the API 
>>>>> developers part is pretty much guaranteed to go horribly wrong.
>>>>> 
>>>>> John B.
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 2:15 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> We may have a problem with audience here. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Justin mentioned he wrote it for service providers but the threats are 
>>>>>> against the client that wants to authenticate users. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Would be better to have recommendations for each group. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Since oidc is the only recommendation, what does a client implementer do 
>>>>>> when openid connect is not available?  Suggest we give a list of 
>>>>>> qualities developers should look for (eg is fb connect good)?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Phil
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Nov 2, 2014, at 09:04, Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hi all,
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I just read the document. It explains the situation, 
>>>>>>> challenges/threats, and options very clear and readable.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> So +1 for publishing it soon.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> kind regards,
>>>>>>> Torsten.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Am 28.10.2014 00:21, schrieb Richer, Justin P.:
>>>>>>>> I've been incorporating peoples' feedback into the proposed oauth.net 
>>>>>>>> page, and the current state is here:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> https://github.com/jricher/oauth.net/blob/authentication/articles/authentication.php
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> Commentary has slowed down and I think the document's in reasonable. I 
>>>>>>>> would like to publish this as a draft version on oauth.net in the very 
>>>>>>>> near future (like, this week), so get comments and feedback to me on 
>>>>>>>> this soon. I'm going to be at IIW all week if anyone wants to back me 
>>>>>>>> into a corner and talk about this.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> -- Justin
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> On Oct 16, 2014, at 12:54 PM, Hannes Tschofenig 
>>>>>>>>> <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Participants:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> * Brian Campbell
>>>>>>>>> * John Bradley
>>>>>>>>> * Derek Atkins
>>>>>>>>> * Phil Hunt
>>>>>>>>> * William Kim
>>>>>>>>> * Josh Mandel
>>>>>>>>> * Hannes Tschofenig
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Notes:
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Justin distributed a draft writeup and explained the reasoning behind
>>>>>>>>> it. The intended purpose is to put the write-up (after enough review) 
>>>>>>>>> on
>>>>>>>>> oauth.net. See attachments. Justin solicited feedback from the
>>>>>>>>> conference call participants and from the working group.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> One discussion item was specifically related to the concept of 
>>>>>>>>> audience
>>>>>>>>> restrictions, which comes in two flavours: (a) restriction of the 
>>>>>>>>> access
>>>>>>>>> token regarding the resource server and (b) restriction of the id 
>>>>>>>>> token
>>>>>>>>> regarding the client. Obviously, it is necessary to have both of these
>>>>>>>>> audience restrictions in place and to actually check them.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> The group then went into a discussion about the use of pseudonyms in
>>>>>>>>> authentication and the problems deployments ran into when they used
>>>>>>>>> pseudonyms together with a wide range of attributes that identified
>>>>>>>>> users nevertheless. Phil suggested to produce a write-up about this 
>>>>>>>>> topic.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Finally, the group started a discussion about potential actions for 
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> OAuth working groups. Two activities were mentioned, namely to produce
>>>>>>>>> an IETF draft of the write-up Justin has prepared as a "formal" 
>>>>>>>>> response
>>>>>>>>> to the problems with authentication using OAuth and, as a second 
>>>>>>>>> topic,
>>>>>>>>> potential re-chartering of the OAuth working group to work on some
>>>>>>>>> solutions in this area. Hannes suggested to postpone these discussions
>>>>>>>>> and to first finish the write-up Justin had distributed.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> Ciao
>>>>>>>>> Hannes & Derek
>>>>>>>>> <Authentication with OAuth 2.doc><Authentication with OAuth 
>>>>>>>>> 2.html><Authentication with OAuth 
>>>>>>>>> 2.pdf>_______________________________________________
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>>>>>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>> 
> 

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