That’s what test vectors and interop testing are for!

From: Justin Richer [mailto:jric...@mit.edu]
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 10:38 AM
To: Mike Jones
Cc: John Bradley; Brian Campbell; <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Nesting Signatures and Encryption JWT Tokens

Unless you’re implementing both halves with parallel wrongness, in which case 
you’re completely screwed and have no idea.

 — Justin

On Jul 17, 2015, at 12:38 PM, Mike Jones 
<michael.jo...@microsoft.com<mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>> wrote:

As for “ECDH-SS rfc6278 (being) easier for implementers to get wrong than 
ECDH-ES” the good news about crypto is that if you get it even a little bit 
wrong, it doesn’t work with other’s implementations at all, so this situation 
tends to be self-correcting.

                                                            Cheers,
                                                            -- Mike

From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 7:02 AM
To: Brian Campbell
Cc: oauth
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Nesting Signatures and Encryption JWT Tokens

They provide integrity protection for the encryption,  that is very important 
for preventing padding oracle attacks.

AES 
GCM<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7518%23section-5.3&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=Km4lrYHuFSmIvYONtiusFoZEtSRoAj4Ri8udIoiA5Nk%3d>
 and 
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7518%23section-5.2&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=IaQ9hYN4Lw5bVTXRcSwNi4RzKnojIKAAIdtf53JDBvE%3d>
 are both examples of Authenticated 
Encryption<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fen.wikipedia.org%2fwiki%2fAuthenticated_encryption&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=eRV5xgf17IWyz0j5QwgDmubDw5rqJneMaYtCHu1CLVs%3d>
 in the sense that the received encryption is true and not that the sender is 
identified.

English speakers have a hard time with the subtle difference between 
identification and authentication , so I wanted to be clear.

That being said there is a special case where if the JWT ie encrypted with a 
symmetric key known only to two parties and it is “authenticated” and you 
didn’t create it, then by a process of elimination it cold have only come from 
one party.   This is NOT a signature,  however it is a useful trick that some 
people use to only encrypt and while still knowing with relative certainty who 
encrypted it.

I should note that ECDH-SS rfc6278 a key agreement algorithm we didn’t put in 
the base JWA spec also has the property of providing encryption and 
authenticity based on the  public keys of both sender and receiver.
(note this is easier for implementers to get wrong than ECDH-ES but that is 
another debate:)

Probably more than you wanted to know, but Nat started it:)

John B.


On Jul 17, 2015, at 2:09 PM, Brian Campbell 
<bcampb...@pingidentity.com<mailto:bcampb...@pingidentity.com>> wrote:

Though you want to be careful with that as the asymmetric algs in JWE don't 
provide authentication of the sender.

On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 11:26 PM, Nat Sakimura 
<n-sakim...@nri.co.jp<mailto:n-sakim...@nri.co.jp>> wrote:
Hi Malla,

Just to add one more thing:
If you just want to “sign” for the sake of integrity protection, you really do 
not need to do it as all the algs in JWE are integrity protected.

--
Nat Sakimura <n-sakim...@nri.co.jp<mailto:n-sakim...@nri.co.jp>>
Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

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From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] On 
Behalf Of John Bradley
Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 7:45 AM
To: Malla Simhachalam 
<mallasimhacha...@gmail.com<mailto:mallasimhacha...@gmail.com>>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Nesting Signatures and Encryption JWT Tokens

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-11.2<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7519%23section-11.2&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=bJjUa9H%2fhsoQGfjmZEBQIyYxwZNc5Hlt%2bDzrEj%2bHG70%3d>

It is in the JWT spec.   You can do it both ways however you really need a good 
reason not to sign then encrypt, and then after you have a good reason you 
should still sign then encrypt because you probably have not considered 
everything,

There are probably some edge cases that are exceptions to the rule, but they 
are rare.

John B.


On Jul 16, 2015, at 11:33 PM, Malla Simhachalam 
<mallasimhacha...@gmail.com<mailto:mallasimhacha...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Hi,
I am looking at the spec 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7520/?include_text=1<https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fdatatracker.ietf.org%2fdoc%2frfc7520%2f%3finclude_text%3d1&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7c5bc9eda0e8da494e11bb08d28eb0519f%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=9X3auySnL4XlT%2fRW%2bAOaBG5wX8jrNc82AZ0Go%2bZIruM%3d>
 for combining JWS and JWE use case, I could not find it obvious that a JSON 
document should be signed first and then encrypt or other way around.Are there 
any recommendations one over the other?
Thanks for help.
Malla
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