Well, the abstract meaning is the same, but the practical implications and interpretation can vary within the boundaries depending on the context.
A jku is a URI of a cryptographical key, which can be a uri of a signing key or encryption key depending on the context. Similarly the azp in an ID Token and an Access Token can share the same abstract concept while the concrete meaning in that particular concept can vary. 2015年8月20日木曜日、Mike Jones<michael.jo...@microsoft.com>さんは書きました: > Let me second John’s point that we shouldn’t have two different > definitions for “azp”. As I wrote in my friendly review of > draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-04 at > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg14679.html, the > claim “azp” has already been registered by OpenID Connect Core at > http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml and so cannot be > re-registered. Given that I believe the intended semantics are the same, > please cite the existing definition in rjwtprof, rather than repeating it > or revising it. > > > > Thanks, > > -- Mike > > > > *From:* John Bradley [mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ve7...@ve7jtb.com');>] > *Sent:* Wednesday, August 19, 2015 11:05 AM > *To:* Nat Sakimura > *Cc:* Mike Jones; OAuth WG > *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] RS as a client guidance > > > > Having two azp claims with slightly different definitions is not a good > way to go, both access tokens and id_tokens are JWT. > > For better or worse the claim was defined for bearer tokens where it was > only the identity of the requester that was able to be confirmed by the > token endpoint. > > It supported a simple use case where a refresh token is used by client A > to use as an assertion at AS B. > > In the simplest 3 party sase the requester of the token and the presenter > of the token are the same. However in some situations they are not the > same. > > The important thing was to allow the “aud” recipient of the token to be > able to differentiate a token that it requested from a a token that a 3rd > party requested and presented to it. > > > > The “azp” should probably be left as it is and not tied to proof of > possession/ binding the token to the presenter. > > There was a lot of debate and back and forth on azp at the time, the main > reason to include it was to warn normal Connect clients that JWT containing > that azp claim need to have it’s value be them or someone they know and > trust that can request assertions for them. That was because we knew that > token containing that claim exist in the wild using that claim. > > > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05 should > probably be using a different claim to reduce the confusion. > > > > John B. > > > > > > On Aug 19, 2015, at 3:17 AM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','sakim...@gmail.com');>> wrote: > > > > So, Mike, > > > > Authorized Presenter is a defined term in *Sender Constrained JWT for > OAuth 2.0* > > ( https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05 ). It is > used in the context of OAuth 2.0 Access Token, not a claim in ID Token of > OpenID Connect. > > > > Nat > > > > 2015-08-19 11:44 GMT+09:00 Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','michael.jo...@microsoft.com');>>: > > Just as a point of clarification, the definition of the “azp” claim is not > “authorised presenter”. At least as defined by OpenID Connect, its > definition is: > > > > azp > > OPTIONAL. Authorized party - the party to which the ID Token was issued. > If present, it MUST contain the OAuth 2.0 Client ID of this party. This > Claim is only needed when the ID Token has a single audience value and that > audience is different than the authorized party. It MAY be included even > when the authorized party is the same as the sole audience. The azp value > is a case sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value. > > > > A reference to this definition is registered by OpenID Connect Core > http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html in the IANA “JSON > Web Token Claims” registry at > http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml. > > > > -- Mike > > > > *From:* OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','oauth-boun...@ietf.org');>] *On Behalf Of *Nat > Sakimura > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 18, 2015 7:37 PM > *To:* Adam Lewis > *Cc:* OAuth WG > *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] RS as a client guidance > > > > It is not directly, but *Sender Constrained JWT for OAuth 2.0* > > ( https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05 > <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2fdraft-sakimura-oauth-rjwtprof-05&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7cdac2bd4946594ba7f4ff08d2a83f23cf%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=DhL9%2bp5Ml32P6%2fdaAQHHkho1yCsbq2W0M4WNrwgo1zo%3d> > ) > > talks about a model that allows it. > > > > In essence, it uses a structured access token that is sender constrained. > > It as a claim "azp" which stands for authorised presenter. > > To be used, the "client" has to present a proof that it is indeed the > party pointed by "azp". > > > > In your case, the native mobile app obtains the structured access token > > with "azp":"the_RS". Since "azp" is not pointing to the mobile app, > > the mobile app cannot use it. > > The mobile app then ships it to the RS. > > The RS can now use it since the "azp" points to it. > > > > In general, shipping a bearer token around is a bad idea. > > If you want to do that, I think you should do so with a sender constrained > token. > > > > Nat > > > > > > > > 2015-08-13 2:01 GMT+09:00 Adam Lewis <adam.le...@motorolasolutions.com > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','adam.le...@motorolasolutions.com');>>: > > Hi, > > > > Are there any drafts that discuss the notion of an RS acting as a client? > I'm considering the use case whereby a native mobile app obtains an access > token and sends it to the RS, and then the RS uses it to access the > UserInfo endpoint on an OP. > > > > It's a bearer token so no reason it wouldn't work, but obviously it is > meant to be presented by the client and not the RS. Curious to understand > the security implications of this, read on any thoughts given to this, or > to know if it's an otherwise accepted practice. > > > > tx > > adam > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','OAuth@ietf.org');> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww.ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7cdac2bd4946594ba7f4ff08d2a83f23cf%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=eM%2f2nMY4YEca%2fyZtl6K4f4pRceNCHt1sF7v9ufZ7qgk%3d> > > > > > > -- > > Nat Sakimura (=nat) > > Chairman, OpenID Foundation > http://nat.sakimura.org/ > <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fnat.sakimura.org%2f&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7cdac2bd4946594ba7f4ff08d2a83f23cf%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=2x5%2f9bLJnUcMdOFrYWIk4G0BIwp8ytDK2LNx2BQuTtk%3d> > @_nat_en > > > > > > -- > > Nat Sakimura (=nat) > > Chairman, OpenID Foundation > http://nat.sakimura.org/ > @_nat_en > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','OAuth@ietf.org');> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > -- Nat Sakimura (=nat) Chairman, OpenID Foundation http://nat.sakimura.org/ @_nat_en
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