On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 3:58 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
> I am fine with that, however saying integrity protected, may be better > than signed. May people will argue that HMAC or encryption with sender > verification is not signature. > Good point, I also prefer integrity protected. Are we all good with this now? I'd like to look at a diff to make sure after following the thread. Thanks! Kathleen > However they are perfectly valid. > > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 5:53 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote: > > The requirement is not that signed JWTs be used, it’s that unsigned JWTs > not be used on their own. Reference tokens and encrypted JWTs are also > valid, as are other signed formats like SAML assertions or even a COSE > Token (if it’s encoded to HTTP friendliness). > > My recommendation: > > Remove the erroneous requirement text from section 5 and restore to > previous version. > > Amend the text in section 6 from: > > To > simplify the subsequent description we assume in the PoP architecture > > that the token itself is digitally signed by the authorization server > and therefore cannot be modified. > > > > To: > > In all such cases, the token remains opaque to the client. To > simplify the subsequent example and description we assume in the PoP > architecture > > that the token itself cannot be modified by the client, either due to > > cryptographic protection (such as signature or encryption) or use of > > a reference value with sufficient entropy and associated secure lookup. > > These are characteristics shared with bearer tokens and more information > > on best practices can be found in [[RFC6819]] and in the security > > considerations section of [[RFC6750]]. > > > > — Justin > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 3:39 PM, Kathleen Moriarty < > kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi, > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 3:20 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote: > > Tokens are signed or the information is otherwise integrity protected > between the AS and the RS. > > I suspect Kathleen is concerned about the key getting modified in transit. > > That needs to be protected against, but there is more than one way to do > that. > > > Phil is correct. I was looking for consistency between the sections since > they related to each other. If there is a security risk or consideration, > that needs to be explicitly called out as a concern such as a key being > modified in transit. If there are options to protect against that, those > would ideally be required or would have warnings. > > > So sending the public key in a unsigned JWT access token would be > immensely stupid, not just for PoP but for scopes and everything else. > > > Good, easy to require then. > > Thanks, > Kathleen > > > In OAuth 2 all tokens need to be integrity protected between the AS and > RS. > That can be via signature, by having a reference with sufficient entropy > and secure introspection or database lookup. > > I think that is a OAuth 2 security consideration. We are adding a > additional confirmation claim to the existing information that needs to be > protected the same as the rest. > > John B. > > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 4:38 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: > > <editors hat> > If there is agreement that tokens are opaque then the requirement that > tokens be signed must be removed from the threat mitigation requirements. > > And the paragraph in sec 5 that brian was concerned about be restored. > > Phil > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 11:24, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote: > > It is still end to end authentication with opaque tokens — since all OAuth > tokens, including PoP tokens, have always been intended to be opaque to the > client. That hasn’t changed and that isn’t the intent of this document. If > that’s how people are reading it then we need to pull it back and rewrite > it so that’s not the case. > > The client gets a token that has two parts: the token and the key. The > token is analogous to the access_token we have today and would come out of > the server in the same field. The key is handed to the client alongside the > token or registered by the client during the token request. Either way > there’s an association between the two but it’s not the same association as > a public/private keypair. > > It’s possible to sign the token itself, but the client doesn’t care. It > sends the token and signs the HTTP request to the RS whether the token is > signed, unsigned, hex blob, encrypted, or anything else. The same series of > options are available as with bearer tokens. PoP tokens have never, ever > been intended to be anything but opaque to the client. > > The token can’t be opaque to the RS, which has to figure out what key to > use to check the message signature. But we’ve got options there, like the > embedded key in a JWT from Mike’s draft, or doing introspection to get the > key (from an extension that hasn’t been written yet), or simply looking it > up in the same database because the RS and the AS are in the same box. Does > this structure/service/database choice sound familiar? It should, it’s the > same as bearer tokens. This is also how the RS gets information like which > scopes are associated with the token, if it’s expired, and all that. > > > > > So here’s how I see it going on the wire: > > > > [image: > http://www.websequencediagrams.com/cgi-bin/cdraw?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgQ2xpZW50IGFzIEMKAAwMUmVzb3VyY2UgT3duZXIgYXMgUk8AFA1BdXRob3JpemF0aW9uIFNlcnYAIQZBUwA7DVByb3RlY3RlZABICmFzIFJTCgoKClJPLS0-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&s=modern-blue] > > > > (I just wrote this up so there are probably holes. Here’s the source if > anyone wants to tweak it: > http://www.websequencediagrams.com/?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgQ2xpZW50IGFzIEMKAAwMUmVzb3VyY2UgT3duZXIgYXMgUk8AFA1BdXRob3JpemF0aW9uIFNlcnYAIQZBUwA7DVByb3RlY3RlZABICmFzIFJTCgoKClJPLS0-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&s=modern-blue > ) > > The client is oblivious to the token just like always. This is > intentional. The RS has the same options to figure out how to process the > token. > > — Justin > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 2:03 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: > > Folks, > > <editor hat> > I did not want to go here either. :-) > > I don’t read sec 6 as examples. I believe this may stem from the > pop-architecture documents having a dual role as both “architecture” and > “use-case”. Maybe we should clarify the purpose of the document? > > I believe section 6 is talking about threat mitigation assumptions based > on the examples that need to be implemented. I am assuming these are > requirements that the other specifications SHOULD implement. > > <personal hat> > I do not believe we have discussed Opaque PoP tokens and any inherent > risks because the client is not or is unable to validate the authenticity > of the token. Does this introduce the possibility of a MITM attack where a > client can be convinced to sign requests for an attacker? > > If we want to include opaque PoP, I think we need to take a pause and > consider / discuss any threats here. > > I find the desire for opaque PoP tokens to be a bit contradictory. If > we’re saying we don’t want to trust TLS alone (e.g. because of > load-balancer termination), why would we then say, but we are perfectly > willing to accept it worked for the OAuth AS exchanges? Maybe I was very > wrong here, but my assumption all along is that for PoP we’re talking about > end-to-end authentication of all parties except in the case of 3.3 where we > simply want to protect an access token over a non-TLS HTTP connection. > > > Phil > > @independentid > www.independentid.com > phil.h...@oracle.com > > On Nov 25, 2015, at 10:48 AM, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> > wrote: > > While I can't say I disagree with the deeper existential questions about > the draft that Justin raises, I was trying not to go there and rather just > point out concerns with the newly added text. > > The text Phil cites from Sec 6 doesn't say the client must be able to > parse and verify the token. It's an assumption to simplify the examples > that follow and still the token is opaque to the client. I reread the whole > draft (reluctantly) and there's nothing that says the token has to be > non-opaque to the client. And it does talk about reference style tokens and > encrypted tokens, both of which rely on the opaqueness to the client. > > On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 11:27 AM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote: > >> Right, I read that as text for describing the examples and not for >> describing requirements. >> >> The token itself doesn’t have to be signed at all. >> >> — Justin >> >> On Nov 25, 2015, at 1:05 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >> >> Ok. Well this was requested by Kathleen because of this paragraph in Sec >> 6.… >> >> >> To simplify the subsequent description we assume in the PoP architecture >> >> that the token itself is digitally signed by the authorization server >> >> and therefore cannot be modified. >> >> >> Please >> Phil >> >> @independentid >> www.independentid.com >> phil.h...@oracle.com >> >> On Nov 25, 2015, at 9:33 AM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote: >> >> The token doesn’t have to be signed and the client doesn’t have to verify >> the signature on the token. That’s not PoP. The request has to be signed in >> a way that includes the token. The token itself can still be opaque. The >> *key* material can’t be opaque to the client, but the *token* material >> still is. >> >> I agree with Brian that this statement is misleading. >> >> The examples use a signed token but that is absolutely not a requirement. >> Maybe the examples shouldn’t all use one style. >> >> What’s most difficult about this particular spec is that it’s very >> hand-wavy, saying “this is kinda a thing that kinda works like this” >> without saying how to actually do it. I’m honestly not sure it’s worth >> publishing as an RFC in its own right but I’m not going to stand in its way. >> >> — Justin >> >> On Nov 25, 2015, at 12:14 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> >> wrote: >> >> Where does it say that? >> >> >> >> On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 8:44 AM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >> >>> Except that later on we require the token be signed and the client >>> verify that signed token. IOW mutual pop. >>> >>> Phil >>> >>> On Nov 25, 2015, at 07:30, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Looking at the diff I noticed the following new text, which seems to >>> conflate bearer/PoP and opaqueness to the client. A client demonstrating >>> proof-of-possession of some key is orthogonal to the client being able to >>> parse and understand the access token itself. >>> >>> "In contrast to bearer tokens [RFC6750] which call for tokens that are >>> opaque to OAuth 2.0 clients, this specification defines the requirements >>> for proof-of-possession ("PoP") tokens that may be parsed and verified by >>> OAuth 2.0 clients and relying parties." >>> >>> On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:07 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >>> >>>> This draft addresses review comments from Kathleen and Erik raised >>>> since the last draft. >>>> >>>> It may not include some of the discussion from yesterday/today. I will >>>> add that as the group decides. >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> >>>> Phil >>>> >>>> @independentid >>>> www.independentid.com >>>> phil.h...@oracle.com >>>> >>>> > On Nov 24, 2015, at 12:05 PM, internet-dra...@ietf.org wrote: >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >>>> directories. >>>> > This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol Working >>>> Group of the IETF. >>>> > >>>> > Title : OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Security >>>> Architecture >>>> > Authors : Phil Hunt >>>> > Justin Richer >>>> > William Mills >>>> > Prateek Mishra >>>> > Hannes Tschofenig >>>> > Filename : draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06.txt >>>> > Pages : 23 >>>> > Date : 2015-11-24 >>>> > >>>> > Abstract: >>>> > The OAuth 2.0 bearer token specification, as defined in RFC 6750, >>>> > allows any party in possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") to get >>>> > access to the associated resources (without demonstrating possession >>>> > of a cryptographic key). To prevent misuse, bearer tokens must be >>>> > protected from disclosure in transit and at rest. >>>> > >>>> > Some scenarios demand additional security protection whereby a >>>> client >>>> > needs to demonstrate possession of cryptographic keying material >>>> when >>>> > accessing a protected resource. This document motivates the >>>> > development of the OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession security mechanism. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: >>>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture/ >>>> > >>>> > There's also a htmlized version available at: >>>> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06 >>>> > >>>> > A diff from the previous version is available at: >>>> > >>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture-06 >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of >>>> submission >>>> > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >>>> > >>>> > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: >>>> > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ >>>> > >>>> > _______________________________________________ >>>> > OAuth mailing list >>>> > OAuth@ietf.org >>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> [image: Ping Identity logo] <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >>> Brian Campbell >>> Distinguished Engineer >>> Ping Identity >>> @ bcampb...@pingidentity.com [image: phone] +1 720.317.2061 [image: >>> twitter] @pingidentity Connect with us! >>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>[image: pingidentity.com] >>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>[image: >>> pingidentity.com] >>> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome> >>> [image: twitter logo] >>> <http://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Ping-Identity-EI_IE380907.11,24.htm> >>> [image: >>> twitter logo] <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> [image: youtube logo] >>> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> [image: LinkedIn logo] >>> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> [image: Facebook logo] >>> <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> [image: Google+ logo] >>> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> [image: slideshare >>> logo] <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> [image: flipboard logo] >>> <http://flip.it/vjBF7> [image: rss feed icon] >>> <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> [image: Ping Identity logo] <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >> Brian Campbell >> Distinguished Engineer >> Ping Identity >> @ bcampb...@pingidentity.com [image: phone] +1 720.317.2061 [image: >> twitter] @pingidentity Connect with us! >> <https://www.pingidentity.com/>[image: pingidentity.com] >> <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>[image: >> pingidentity.com] >> <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome> >> [image: twitter logo] >> <http://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Ping-Identity-EI_IE380907.11,24.htm> >> [image: >> twitter logo] <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> [image: youtube logo] >> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> [image: LinkedIn logo] >> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> [image: Facebook logo] >> <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> [image: Google+ logo] >> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> [image: slideshare >> logo] <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> [image: flipboard logo] >> <http://flip.it/vjBF7> [image: rss feed icon] >> <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > [image: Ping Identity logo] <https://www.pingidentity.com/> > Brian Campbell > Distinguished Engineer > Ping Identity > @ bcampb...@pingidentity.com [image: phone] +1 720.317.2061 [image: > twitter] @pingidentity Connect with us! > <https://www.pingidentity.com/>[image: pingidentity.com] > <https://www.pingidentity.com/> > <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome>[image: > pingidentity.com] > <https://ping.force.com/Support/PingIdentityCommunityHome> > [image: twitter logo] > <http://www.glassdoor.com/Overview/Working-at-Ping-Identity-EI_IE380907.11,24.htm> > [image: > twitter logo] <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> [image: youtube logo] > <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> [image: LinkedIn logo] > <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> [image: Facebook logo] > <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> [image: Google+ logo] > <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> [image: slideshare > logo] <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> [image: flipboard logo] > <http://flip.it/vjBF7> [image: rss feed icon] > <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/> > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > -- Best regards, Kathleen
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