Pushing documents such as AS metadata because Connect uses them does not help 
anything but muddies the water, Metadata is not a solution to Mix-up and 
Metadata is not a solution to Discovery, both Discovery and Mix-up are problems 
we need and agreed to fix. So I totally agree that we should not be conflating 
metadata with Mix-up or Discovery. I’m not hearing overwhelming consensus on 
adopting the metadata, maybe that is just consensus amongst OpenID folks and 
yes there are a few vocal people.

Most RS and AS relationships are not static relationships, we are seeing 
tenants that are suppling their own AS infrastructure as well as seeing 
portable RS’s which gets us into some very dynamic situations.



From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Brian Campbell
Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2016 8:00 AM
To: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for 
draft-hunt-oauth-bound-config-00.txt

Discovery in general for OAuth isn't well understood. This conversation and 
others like it around the 'discovery' draft demonstrate that. But publishing AS 
metadata is something that is understood and already in wide use for Connect. 
The rough consensus (except for a very few but vocal dissenters) on this list 
over the last few weeks/months has been that draft-ietf-oauth-discovery should 
describing AS metadata and its location. It's been suggested that the title 
reflect that scope and I might even suggest that the document identifier be 
changed to avoid further confusion.
The IDP mixup is addressed by the AS identifying itself to the client in the 
authorization response (it has a few other things in it that arguably shouldn't 
be in or should be elsewhere but that's a different question). The Mix-Up 
Mitigation draft uses the issuer value to do that. Issuer becomes a logical 
name/identifier for an AS. And that can tie it to AS metadata or even discovery 
if/when that exists. But discovery or AS metadata isn't necessary there. Yes 
Tony, we'd all like to see a comprehensive solution but conflating different 
and unrelated things is only making matters worse (as I'm sure you are well 
aware).
A 'bad RS' phishing for legitimate access tokens is a different kind of 
endpoint confusion. Most deployments now have a static relationship defined 
between RS and AS so it's more of a potential problem in the future. Despite 
the concern voiced about it the potential (as far as I can tell anyway), 
draft-hunt-oauth-bound-config provides a very nice attack vector for such a 
'bad RS' by pointing to an AS to obtain tokens it could misuse at legitimate 
RS(s). John has alluded to this.

There have been a number of incremental updates/extensions to OAuth 2.0 and 
there look to be more coming.  Concerns have been expressed over the number of 
documents and implements knowing what to use when. I don't think the answer is 
to try and jam unrelated new stuff into new docs to keep the number of docs low 
is a good idea though. I'd much prefer to have concise and cohesive documents. 
The larger issue of confusion around too many documents should be addressed at 
a higher level. For example, something like an implementation guide or even 
something like an OAuth 2.1 that describes the available extensions and 
when/why one would use them.



On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Anthony Nadalin 
<tony...@microsoft.com<mailto:tony...@microsoft.com>> wrote:
I would really like to see a comprehensive solution not this piece work, so we 
know what we are solving and what we are not.

-----Original Message-----
From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] On 
Behalf Of Hans Zandbelt
Sent: Monday, March 14, 2016 3:26 PM
To: Phil Hunt (IDM) <phil.h...@oracle.com<mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com>>; John 
Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com>>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for 
draft-hunt-oauth-bound-config-00.txt

On 3/14/16 10:17 PM, Phil Hunt (IDM) wrote:
<snip>
> On Mar 14, 2016, at 14:13, John Bradley 
> <ve7...@ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com>
> <mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com>>> wrote:
>> Any client that has the resource and issuer hard coded probably
>> doesn't need discovery.
> We agree

Yet any client that has hard coded a resource and 2 issuers doesn't need 
discovery either but is vulnerable to the IDP mixup attack.

I'd really like to see the two being addressed independently of each other, 
regardless of the fact that a Discovery solution *could* solve the IDP mixup 
attack as well.

Hans.

--
Hans Zandbelt              | Sr. Technical Architect
hzandb...@pingidentity.com<mailto:hzandb...@pingidentity.com> | Ping Identity

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