+1 I will not comment on the timeline for this, but I will passionately endorse the need for an OAuth 2.1 spec.
Speaking as somebody who now has spent years advocating for, and building out public safety / first responder architectures built on an OAuth 2.0 architecture, I can say 2 things with conviction: The good: OAuth 2.0 has enabled incredible use cases for us, and it is a gift that keeps on giving, the new WG efforts around POP and token exchange are solving even more use cases for us. This is hands down one of the best WGs I've known, and the work done here is nothing short of awesome. The bad: I have yet to meet anybody outside of the WG that really understands OAuth 2.0. I mean "really" understands it. (to this day, I still think it is only because of the good graces of others in this WG like John and Justin that I understand it with the depth that I do). People talk about it at high levels, they talk about tokens, but still don't get what it is trying to solve nor how to securely deploy it. 99% of the people I meet still don't get the difference between authentication and delegated authorization. I have dedicated massive amounts of cycles trying to educate my own community (and anybody else I meet for that matter). I personally found the core RFC very hard to digest, and now I need to refer to N more, many of which should be folded into a new 2.1 core spec. All this given, It is no wonder there are so many insecure implementations of it. So here's to OAuth 2.1 :-) -adam On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Hardt, Dick <d...@amazon.com> wrote: > I think there are already years of implementation and experience since 2.0 > > If we wait until all the outstanding issues and new features have had > implementations and experience, we will never do a 2.1 as there continues > to be new things. > > I would suggest a 2.1 be a clean, simple document of the core spec in one > document that includes the security and implementation recommendations. > > Alternative title: OAuth, The Good Parts. :) > > — Dick > > > > > On 4/7/16, 3:25 PM, someone claiming to be "OAuth on behalf of Mike Jones" > <oauth-boun...@ietf.org on behalf of michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote: > > Yes - an intentionally conservative, implementation- and experience-driven > path. > > Revising OAuth 2.0 is a *big deal*. We shouldn't even be talking about it > until we've completed steps 1-5 below - *including* the "iterate" step, as > necessary. If we get this wrong, we'll fragment OAuth, which is a terrible > and irresponsible outcome we should consciously avoid at all costs. > > In particular, we should not recharter for an OAuth 2.1 until we already > know what will be in it and know from deployment experience that it's the > right stuff. > > -- Mike > > -----Original Message----- > From: Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:tors...@lodderstedt.net] > Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 3:16 PM > To: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> > Cc: Samuel Erdtman <sam...@erdtman.se>; Anthony Nadalin < > tony...@microsoft.com>; oauth@ietf.org > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 > > Hi Mike, > > in my opinion, you described a possible path towards 2.1. Would you agree? > > best regards, > Torsten. > > > Am 07.04.2016 um 13:38 schrieb Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com>: > > > > I am strongly against creating a 2.1 spec until we have at least a year > of deployment experience with the contents we're adding to 2.0, so as not > to fragment the OAuth marketplace. > > > > I think we should: > > 1. Continue working on new security mitigations in new drafts (such > > as mix-up-mitigation, etc.) that add features to use with 2.0 2. > > Continue working on PoP specs (such as pop-key-distribution, etc.) > > that add features to use with 2.0 3. Continue working on other new > > specs (such as discovery, resource-indicators, etc.) that add features > > to use with 2.0 4. Learn from deployment experience with all of them > > 5. Iterate if the deployment experience tells us that we need to > > > > Only after we believe we have all the features right and we know that > they work together well should we consider creating a 2.1. If we rush to a > 2.1 and get it wrong, we'll lose developers' trust and we'll never get it > back. > > > > -- Mike > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Samuel > > Erdtman > > Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 12:48 PM > > To: Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com> > > Cc: oauth@ietf.org > > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 > > > > +1 on a 2.1 version > > > > -1 on defining scopes more precisely in 2.1 > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > >> On 7 apr. 2016, at 14:46, Anthony Nadalin <tony...@microsoft.com> > wrote: > >> > >> I don't belive that scopes should be defined more precisely as this > opaqueness was a design feature, I'm not seeing the reason why scopes need > to be defined, as these are application specific. > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Torsten > >> Lodderstedt > >> Sent: Thursday, April 7, 2016 5:32 AM > >> To: George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com> > >> Cc: oauth@ietf.org > >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 > >> > >> Hi all, > >> > >> as I already said in the meeting: I would very much prefer to have an > extension/update of RFC 6819 covering all "new" threats, including: > >> - mix up > >> - code injection aka copy and paste > >> - open redirector at AS and client > >> - potential other threats in the context of "dynamic" OAuth > >> > >> I also assume mitigations for (at least some of) the threats need to go > into an update of RFC 6749 as normative text. To give an example: if we > agree on using the state parameter at the token endpoint to mitigate code > injection, this MUST be part of the core spec (request description and > security consoderations). Otherwise, noone will even consider it. > >> > >> We should also use the opportunity to improve/enhance the text of the > spec. In the course of the last years, we have learned a lot about > ambiquities of the text and how different implementations utilize OAuth. > >> > >> I think time is right to define scopes more precisely. As the > discussions in the last days proved again (at least for me), scope is not > sufficiently defined to come up with interoperable implementations. > Additionally, there seems to be a need to represent resource server > locations (to not say identities :-)) in this context. > >> > >> To bundle all changes in a version 2.1 would also make communication > into the market much easier. > >> > >> best regards, > >> Torsten. > >> > >>> Am 06.04.2016 um 16:05 schrieb George Fletcher <gffle...@aol.com>: > >>> > >>> I'd definitely prefer a single solution document to many little ones > that have to be combined to actually build a secure solution. It's already > getting complex with the additional specs that have been added. > >>> > >>> Additionally, I'm not against working on OAuth 2.1. > >>> > >>> Thanks, > >>> George > >>> > >>>> On 4/6/16 2:06 PM, Phil Hunt (IDM) wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Existing implementations are for the large part ok and do not need > these mitigations. > >>>> > >>>> Only the new use cases we have been discussing (configure on the fly > and multi-as, etc) really need mitigation. > >>>> > >>>> The updated by approach seems like a good way to address the new > cases. > >>>> > >>>> Phil > >>>> > >>>>> On Apr 6, 2016, at 14:35, Hannes Tschofenig < > hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Hi all, > >>>>> > >>>>> today we discussed the OAuth Authorization Server Mixup draft. We > >>>>> were wondering what types of threats the document should find > solutions for. > >>>>> > >>>>> We discussed various document handling approaches including > >>>>> * OAuth Mix-Up and Cut-and-Paste attacks documented in separate > >>>>> solution documents > >>>>> * combined solution document covering the OAuth Mix-Up and the > >>>>> Cut-and-Paste attacks. > >>>>> > >>>>> Barry pointed out that these documents could update the OAuth base > >>>>> specification. > >>>>> > >>>>> As a more radical change it was also suggested to revise RFC 6749 > >>>>> "OAuth > >>>>> 2.0 Authorization Framework" and RFC 6819 "OAuth 2.0 Threat Model > >>>>> and Security Considerations". > >>>>> > >>>>> Opening up the OAuth base specification obviously raises various > >>>>> other questions about cleaning up parts that go far beyond the AS > >>>>> mix-up and the cut-and-paste attacks. Other specifications, such > >>>>> as the Open Redirector, could be folded into such a new > specification. > >>>>> > >>>>> Derek and I would appreciate your input on this topic before we > >>>>> make a decision since it has significant impact on our work. > >>>>> > >>>>> Ciao > >>>>> Hannes & Derek > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> OAuth mailing list > >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org > >>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fw > >>>>> w > >>>>> w > >>>>> .ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40mi > >>>>> c > >>>>> r > >>>>> osoft.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91a > >>>>> b > >>>>> 2 > >>>>> d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI% > >>>>> 3 > >>>>> d > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> OAuth mailing list > >>>> OAuth@ietf.org > >>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww. > >>>> ietf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40micr > >>>> o > >>>> s > >>>> oft.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d > >>>> 7 c > >>>> d011db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI%3d > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> OAuth mailing list > >>> OAuth@ietf.org > >>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww. > >>> i > >>> etf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40micros > >>> o > >>> f > >>> t.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd > >>> 0 > >>> 1 1db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI%3d > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> OAuth mailing list > >> OAuth@ietf.org > >> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3a%2f%2fwww. > >> i > >> etf.org%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2foauth&data=01%7c01%7ctonynad%40microso > >> f > >> t.com%7cce8c942bed81437aca0408d35ee0be21%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd0 > >> 1 1db47%7c1&sdata=BqcE9eDhm8pgdoitrPFufouxS6qYndnkLgLa5SPk2HI%3d > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> OAuth mailing list > >> OAuth@ietf.org > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > OAuth@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > _______________________________________________ > > OAuth mailing list > > OAuth@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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