Sorry to chime in late but I wanted to say that I strongly agree with Torsten's characterization of things.
On Sat, Apr 30, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt < tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote: > Hi Nat, > > sure, one could also authenticate and cryptographically protect the > redirect response. Leveraging OIDC concepts is an idea worth considering > but they should be adopted to the OAuth philosophy. The id token as used in > the hybrid flows mixes an identity assertion with elements of transport > security measures. A OAuth AS does not provide identity data to clients, so > we only need the transport security part. > > I personally would prefer a OAuth response object (similar to request > object you have proposed) over the id token. Such a response object could > contain (and directly protect) state, code and other response values. I > consider this the more elegant design and it is easier to implement then > having detached signatures over hash values of codes or access tokens. > Moreover, it would allow to encrypt the response as well. > > Generally, our threat analysis so far does not have provided justification > for cryptographically protected redirect responses. All proposals currently > on the table stop mix up and code injection using simpler mechanisms. > > I think OAuth 2.0 is a huge success due to its balance of versatility, > security and _simplicity_. We definitely need to keep it secure, but we > should also keep it as simple as possible. > > kind regards, > Torsten. > Am 29.04.2016 um 10:08 schrieb Nat Sakimura: > > As I look at it more and more, it started to look like the problem of > accepting tainted values without message authentication. To fix the root > cause, we would have to authenticate response. ID Token was designed to > also serve as a solution anticipating it. > > Any concrete ideas? > > On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 04:47 Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net> > wrote: > >> Hi all, >> >> discussion about Mix-Up and CnP seems to have stopped after the session >> in BA - at least in the OAuth WG. There is a discussion about >> mitigations in OpenId Connect going on at the OpenId Connect mailing list. >> >> I'm very much interested to find a solution within the OAuth realm as >> I'm not interested to either implement two solutions (for OpenId Connect >> and OAuth) or adopt a OpenId-specific solution to OAuth (use id! tokens >> in the front channel). I therefore would like to see progress and >> propose to continue the discussion regarding mitigations for both threats. >> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00 >> proposes reasonable mitigations for both attacks. There are alternatives >> as well: >> - mix up: >> -- AS specific redirect uris >> -- Meta data/turi >> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-07#section-5) >> - CnP: >> -- use of the nonce parameter (as a distinct mitigation beside state for >> counter XSRF) >> >> Anyone having an opinion? >> >> best regards, >> Torsten. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >
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