Hi Tom, Indeed RFC 6749 is not well written with respect to this situation and unfortunately leaves some room for varied interpretations. However, in my own not entirely uninformed view having worked on this stuff for awhile now, it is erroneous to interpret the presence of the client_id parameter in the request body as client_secret_post authentication when there is no corresponding client_secret parameter. As you alluded to, there are other types of client authentication that explicitly allow (JWT <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7521>, SAML <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7522>, and their base spec <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7521#section-4.2>) or require (MTLS <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mtls-06>) the client_id parameter and the OIDC core spec even has an example of the client_id parameter in the body <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClientAuthentication> when doing JWT client auth. If client_id with no client_secret in the request body actually implies client_secret_post, then those RFCs (one soon to be RFC) and OIDF standards are all contradicting OAuth 2.0 /RFC 6749. Those supplementary standards as well as widespread implementations/deployments in practice should, I believe, be considered more authoritative than one particular implementation's problematic (in terms of interoperability) interpretation of a not particularly well written area of the OAuth spec.
The problematic text from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.3.1 says that "the client MAY omit the [client_secret] parameter if the client secret is an empty string" so it would only really be reasonable for an AS to reject a request as having two client authentication methods in the case that it issued a client the empty string as a client secret (not a public client but a client with an empty string as its actual secret), which should never happen in practice, and that client sent both a basic authorization header without a password and a client_id without a client_secret in the body. That's one way to read it anyway. And regardless that text in Sec 2.3.1 is problematic and should probably be updated with an errata on RFC 6749 to get rid of the text about empty string password and just state that the client_secret parameter is required when doing client_secret_post authentication. Unfortunately the errata often get overlooked but it'd still be good to have that fixed somewhere and a published RFC can't be changed so errata is the only real option to document the actual intent of the original specification. The presence of the client_secret parameter should be the only thing that implies client_secret_post authentication. If a client_id parameter is present in conjunction with some client authentication mechanism, then both must refer to the same client. On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 3:19 AM, Tom Van Oppens <tom.van.opp...@be.ibm.com> wrote: > Dear Oauth Mailing List > > After some discussion i had i wanted to ask you for some guidance. > > For the following request > > *request_uri* > https://example.com/token > * request_method* > POST > * request_headers* > {"Accept":"application/json","Authorization":"Basic > bWFnaWNpZDpwb3RhdG9zZWNyZXQ=","Content-Type":"application/x- > www-form-urlencoded","Content-Length":"91"} > * request_body* > grant_type=client_credentials&scope=accounts&client_id=magicid > > We had some discussions whether or not this request is a valid request, to > be more exact wether the clientid can be in the body. > Section 2.3.1 states > *A client MAY use the "client_id" request parameter to identify itself > when sending requests to the token endpoint. * > > But at the same time in the case of a client password (2.3.1) > The clientid and secret are carried in the basic auth header as a form of > authentication as a preferred method , > But the standard states that if you choose to use the body as a form of > authentication that if you can ommit the clientsecret the clientsecret is > an empty string, therefore passing only the client_id is the same as > passing the client_id and an empty string clientsecret . > > So the current request would be according to the spec interpreted as > follows > Authentication 1) basic auth cleintid:secret > Authentication 2) body auth clientd and blank secret > > You can choose to use the client_id in the body with public clients or in > the confidential client (the Lloyds situation) if you choose to add the > clientsecret there as well and are not using the basic auth header (this is > due to spec section 2.3 which states > *The client MUST NOT use more than one authentication method in each > request. * > > In short there is no way in the spec that allows for the oauth provider to > distinguish between your intention of sending in the client_id again for > identification and a malformed request with double authentication. > > > So my stance is (for now) that you cannot send a clientid when you find > yourself in the clientid with a corresponding password situation. > Is that a correct statement ? > and if it is not how would that work ? > and if it is, when can you send the clientid in the body but use something > else for authentication (something like mtls ?) ? > > Kind Regards > Van Oppens Tom > > Tenzij hierboven anders aangegeven: / Sauf indication contraire ci-dessus: > / Unless otherwise stated above: > > International Business Machines of Belgium sprl / bvba > Siège social / Maatschappelijke zetel: Avenue du Bourget 42 Bourgetlaan, > B-1130 Bruxelles/Brussel > N° d'entreprise / Ondernemingsnr: TVA / BTW BE 0405 912 336 > RPM Bruxelles / RPR Brussel > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > -- *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your computer. Thank you.*
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