> Am 27.08.2018 um 11:32 schrieb Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladi...@connect2id.com>:
> 
> Thanks for the update!
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-07#section-3.7.1.3
> 
> Audience restricted access token:
> 
> In a multi-RS environment with aud-restricted token policy in place, how 
> should the AS respond to an authZ request with scope values that belong to 
> more than one RS?
> 
That’s a really good question! 

I see the following options:
1) the AS may abort and require the client to request tokens for different RSs 
using multiple authz requests (not cool)
2) the AS mints an access token for one of the resource servers and indicates 
this in the scope parameter of the token response. The AS may additionally 
issue a refresh token for the complete scope
3) the client could indicate the target RS it wants to interact with in the 
first step (e.g. using the resource parameter introduced by the resource 
indicators draft). The rest could work like (2)

kinds regards,
Torsten.
> Vladimir
>> On 24/08/18 12:57, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote:
>> Hi all, 
>> 
>> I just published a new revision of the OAuth Security BCP. 
>> 
>> Here is the list of changes:
>> * added section on access token privilege restriction based on comments from 
>> Johan Peeters
>> * incorporated findings of Doug McDorman (e.g. domains used in examples)
>> * added section on HTTP status codes for redirects
>> 
>> kind regards,
>> Torsten. 
>> 
>>> Am 24.08.2018 um 11:51 schrieb internet-dra...@ietf.org:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
>>> directories.
>>> This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol WG of the IETF.
>>> 
>>>        Title           : OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
>>>        Authors         : Torsten Lodderstedt
>>>                          John Bradley
>>>                          Andrey Labunets
>>>                          Daniel Fett
>>>     Filename        : draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-07.txt
>>>     Pages           : 33
>>>     Date            : 2018-08-24
>>> 
>>> Abstract:
>>>   This document describes best current security practices for OAuth
>>>   2.0.  It updates and extends the OAuth 2.0 Security Threat Model to
>>>   incorporate practical experiences gathered since OAuth 2.0 was
>>>   published and covers new threats relevant due to the broader
>>>   application of OAuth 2.0.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics/
>>> 
>>> There are also htmlized versions available at:
>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-07
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-07
>>> 
>>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-07
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>> 
>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> 
>> 
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