I’m going to +1 Dick and Annabelle’s question about the scope here. That was the one major thing that struck me during the DPoP discussions in Singapore yesterday: we don’t seem to agree on what DPoP is for. Some (including the authors, it seems) see it as a quick point-solution to a specific use case. Others see it as a general PoP mechanism.
If it’s the former, then it should be explicitly tied to one specific set of things. If it’s the latter, then it needs to be expanded. I’ll repeat what I said at the mic line: My take is that we should explicitly narrow down DPoP so that it does exactly one thing and solves one narrow use case. And for a general solution? Let’s move that discussion into the next major revision of the protocol where we’ll have a bit more running room to figure things out. — Justin > On Nov 22, 2019, at 3:13 PM, Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 3:08 PM Neil Madden <neil.mad...@forgerock.com > <mailto:neil.mad...@forgerock.com>> wrote: > On 22 Nov 2019, at 01:42, Richard Backman, Annabelle <richa...@amazon.com > <mailto:richa...@amazon.com>> wrote: >> There are key distribution challenges with that if you are doing validation >> at the RS, but validation at the RS using either approach means you’ve lost >> protection against replay by the RS. This brings us back to a core question: >> what threats are in scope for DPoP, and in what contexts? > > > Agreed, but validation at the RS is premature optimisation in many cases. And > if you do need protection against that the client can even append a > confirmation key as a caveat and retrospectively upgrade a bearer token to a > pop token. They can even do transfer of ownership by creating copies of the > original token bound to other certificates/public keys. > > While validation at the RS may be an optimization in many cases, it is still > a requirement for deployments. > > I echo Annabelle's last question: what threats are in scope (and out of > scope) for DPoP? > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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