Comments on draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-00.
1) In section 9 (Security considerations), the text states:
DPoP does not, however, achieve the
same level of protection as TLS-based methods such as OAuth Mutual
TLS [RFC8705] or OAuth Token Binding [I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding]
(see also Section 9.1 and Section 9.4).
draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding-08 [i.e. I-D.ietf-oauth-token-binding]
expired on April 22, 2019,
thus it does not seem adequate to refer to it.
2) The text states:
9.1.DPoP Proof Replay
If an adversary is able to get hold of a DPoP proof JWT, the
adversary could replay that token at the same endpoint (the HTTP
endpoint and method are enforced via the respective claims in the
JWTs).
This is true, but there is a worse case: if a client legitimately
obtains a DPoP proof JWT and collaborates
with another client, then it can provide it to that other client.
3) The text states:
9.4.Message Integrity
DPoP does not ensure the integrity of the payload or headers of
requests.The signature of DPoP proofs only contains the HTTP URI
and method, but not, for example, the message body or other request
headers.
This is an intentional design decision to keep DPoP simple to use,
but as described, makes DPoP potentially susceptible to replay
attacks where an attacker is able to modify message contents and
headers.In many setups, the message integrity and confidentiality
provided by TLS is sufficient to provide a good level of protection.
DPoP alone or DPoP used in conjunction with TLS does not provide any
protection in case of collusion attacks
between collaborative clients.
Collaborative attacks between clients cannot be countered using
software-only implementations.
It should also be noticed that the use of secure elements to only
protect private keys is insufficient,
since a collaborative client can still perform all the cryptographic
computations needed by the other client.
These considerations aboutcollaborative clients should be added into the
security considerations section.
Denis
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