Hi Neil, > On 8. Jul 2020, at 16:40, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote: > > The two-phase approach is exactly what OBUK does, where you get one access > token using client credentials before getting a more specific one in context > of the user’s consent. This ends up being awkward to implement at best, since > OAuth involves the user too early in the process to allow for this kind of > thing. PAR might help address this dichotomy, but RAR can provide places for > this to fill in. > > With XYZ, I tried to design for that kind of multi-stage transaction pattern > more explicitly, with the idea that you could continue your request in > context and vary it over time, or even start a new request in the context of > an existing one. This is something that I intend to continue with the > soon-to-be-formed GNAP working group, if you want to bring this use case > there. > > — Justin > >> On Jul 6, 2020, at 12:32 PM, Neil Madden <neil.mad...@forgerock.com> wrote: >> >> I’m reading draft-ietf-oauth-rar-01 in a bit more detail now I have some >> time, and I have a few comments. >> >> An assumption in the draft appears to be that the client knows ahead of time >> what it wants to gain access to and can describe it in detail. For example, >> the last example in section 2.1 is a client requesting access to particular >> files, which assumes that the client already knows the paths of the files it >> wants to access. This in turn seems to imply that the client already has >> some level of access to be able to determine this, e.g. to list directories, >> which may not be desirable. In many cases like this I think it’s more >> natural for the client to not know exactly what it is asking for but instead >> to want access to *some* file, chosen by the user. An example of this is the >> Dropbox Chooser [1] and Saver [2] APIs, which notably are not built on top >> of OAuth. In these cases it would be more natural for the client to send a >> more generic request and for the details to be filled in by the user as part >> of the consent process.
That’s a very good point. There are scenarios where the client knows the resources it wants to interact with in advance, potentially from another transaction (e.g. first access to account list, payment initiation afterwards). The scenario you are describing is viable as well. In such a case, the request would be fairly generic but the AS (or the RS) would need to make transparent to the client what resources it just obtained access for. Interestingly, this might also happen if the client wants to access accounts. It could just request access to accounts and the user, in the consent, selects the accounts to disclose to the client. In our design at yes, we reflect this in an augmented authorization_details object in the token response (an addition for the spec I have on my list). >> >> Another issue is that as far as I can see in the current draft, any client >> can initiate a rich authorization request at any time without any kind of >> prior approval. This seems problematic for the main example in the draft, >> i.e. payment initiation. As an attacker, if I can get a consent screen up on >> a user’s device requesting to move money around then it seems like half my >> job is already done - some fraction of users will probably approve such a >> transaction without properly checking it. It feels like the ability to ask >> for transaction approval should already be a privileged operation that >> should require consent and approval. I think RAR will almost always be used in conjunction with PAR. This means the client is authenticated before the user interaction starts preventing the attack you mentioned. I think we should at least recommend this in the draft. >> >> A related issue is that each approval is in effect a completely isolated >> incident. In a normal OAuth2 interaction I would grant an app some >> longish-term access to data and it would get an access token and optionally >> a refresh token. At some later point I can go to the AS and see that I have >> granted this access and revoke it if I choose. With RAR there is no >> representation of a long-term relationship between the RO and the client and >> each transaction starts from fresh. Again, this seems potentially >> problematic and not quite in keeping with how OAuth currently operates. Each >> grant of access is ephemeral. (Do refresh tokens make sense in the context >> of RAR?) Some of the use cases initially causing the development of RAR are transactional (as pointed out by Vladimir) others are not. RAR is about a richer vocabulary for describing the scope of access. In the beforementioned account information scenario, the client would, for example, ask for read access to several accounts. Access to balance for one and access to balance & transaction history for another account. This could easily be expressed using RAR and would be a long term grant. If the client for the same user asks for access to another account (and the user approves), the AS should add this to the same underlying grant. This effectively means, the client could use the same token (refresh and access token) to access all accounts. >> >> I think a better approach would be a two-phase authorization process: >> >> 1. In step 1 an app gets a normal long-lived access and/or refresh token >> that grants it permissions to ask to initial transactions (RARs) - e.g. with >> scope initiate_payments I agree. This is PAR. PAR + RAR is in the end a generalised version of the UK OB consent pattern. >> 2. In step 2 the app requests authorization for individual RARs/transactions >> using some proof of its grant from step 1 >> >> I have ideas for how this could be achieved, but I’d prefer to see what >> others think of this general idea rather than getting bogged down in >> specific details. best regards, Torsten. >> >> [1]: https://www.dropbox.com/developers/chooser >> [2]: https://www.dropbox.com/developers/saver >> >> — Neil >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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