> On 7. Oct 2020, at 19:45, Seán Kelleher <s...@trustap.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> Long time lurker, first time poster, glad to be finally getting involved!
> 
> In terms of weighing in on the revocation practice, I don't think this 
> document needs to address it as JWT ATs don't seem to require special 
> handling in this case. I think a general coverage of approaches to token 
> revocation would be more appropriate in a BCP.
> 
> One thing I'm unsure of when reading this is how a RS can depend on an AS to 
> give it a JWT AT. Due to the opaque nature of ATs, it seems natural that an 
> AS can change the AT profile it uses at its own discretion, but there's no 
> negotiation or parameter that can force an AS to return a JWT AT, with the 
> potential for breakages. Do the RS and AS agree on the profile ahead of time? 
>  

yes, they do. Basically, the AS is acting on behalf of the RS and centralises 
the authorization work. 

> Perhaps this is specified in a separate document, but I think the topic of 
> profile negotiation should be covered in this document, even at a high level, 
> or reference to more detailed coverage.

Good point. I think this is a general assumption in OAuth. Should probably go 
into OAuth 2.1.

> 
> A few other notes on the document itself:
>       • Section 2.1: Is there precedence of "application/at+jwt" being used 
> in the wild that prevents the SHOULD from being a MUST?
>       • Figure 1: Nitpick: An `&` that looks like it should prefix `state` is 
> on the preceding line.
>       • Figure 2: The example `typ` is `at+JWT`, should this be `at+jwt`?
>       • Section 4: This is a personal opinion, but I'd recommend moving the 
> step concerning `aud` validation to the top of the list, for focus. This is 
> because, having personally taken more than a little while to figure out the 
> difference between access tokens and ID tokens, I see the risk of cross-JWT 
> confusion as very relevant. I think the necessity of the other steps are a 
> bit more obvious.
> Thanks!
> 
> Kind regards,
> 
> Seán.
> 
> On Tue, 6 Oct 2020 at 22:53, <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org> 
> wrote:
> Hi Andrii,
> 
> Thanks for the thoughtful comments! Here’s my 2 c.
> 
>  
> 
> On the proposed language: given that the JWT AT profile is just providing 
> more details on the content of an AT, making JWT ATs a proper subset of all 
> ATs, readers should have no reason to believe that introspection or any other 
> existing spec discussing AT behavior should operate differently. That 
> assumption holds for everything across the board, hence it would be a bit odd 
> to call out this particular case. On the userinfo case, I would find it even 
> more left field to say anything about it.
> If we do reach a consensus on specific revocation practices that apply to JWT 
> ATs specifically, and we conclude that they should live in this document, I 
> will be happy to add language accordingly.
> 
>  
> 
> On the AJWT: I hear you on the dissonance that JWT AT carries, but I am very 
> hesitant to introduce new acronyms to an already crowded/impenetrable domain.
> JWT access token might not roll off the tongue, but at this point ‘JWT’ is 
> nearly a proprietary eponym and the expression “JWT token” is extraordinarily 
> common in literature, a quick google query will give you the full measure of 
> the phenomenon, hence I think we’ll be OK with the current form.
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> V.
> 
>  
> 
> From: Andrii Deinega <andrii.dein...@gmail.com> 
> Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2020 2:25 PM
> To: vittorio.berto...@auth0.com; oauth@ietf.org
> Cc: Jim Manico <j...@manicode.com>; Nicolas Mora <nico...@babelouest.org>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint
> 
>  
> 
> Vittorio and WG,
> 
>  
> 
> Would it be possible to include something like the following to 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-10
> 
> 
> In case the authorization server exposes the introspection, revocation, and 
> OpenID Connect userinfo endpoints they MUST act in the same way as it happens 
> with a regular access token. That allows the AS to change the type of an 
> access token on the fly and that won’t lead to interoperate issues. Plus, the 
> consumers of these endpoints use them regardless of the type of access token.
> 
>  
> 
> The way how the AS can notify RSs that the token revocation event happened 
> (if it decides to do so) is completely left to implementers.
> 
>  
> 
> ?
> 
>  
> 
> Another minor editorial thing from me is it would possible to change and 
> refer to "JWT access tokens" as AJWT. Thus, this document won't repeat the 
> token word twice.
> 
>  
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Andrii
> 
>  
> 
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2020 at 2:22 PM <vittorio.bertocci=40auth0....@dmarc.ietf.org> 
> wrote:
> 
> Hey Jim, regarding
> > Every logout event should trigger token revocation
> That isn’t necessarily the case. An access token represents the ability of a 
> client to access a given resource; the fact that it requires an 
> authentication transaction/session establishment to be issued to the client 
> does not mean that the AT lifetime is tied to the lifetime of that session. 
> Say that I allow LinkedIn to tweet on my behalf. Once I have done that, it 
> doesn’t matter whether I stay logged in their web app or otherwise. Even if I 
> log out of the session in which context I got my twitter AT, I can still post 
> on LinkedIn from my native LinkedIn app and the corresponding post will show 
> up on twitter as well.
> Now, one might choose to *explicitly* tie tokens lifetime to originating 
> sessions lifetime, see the discussion on the OpenID Connect group about a 
> possible online_access scope for influencing RTs and Ats (in particular, in 
> the context of SPAs) but that's additional semantic that isn’t defined today.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Jim Manico
> Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2020 5:17 PM
> To: Nicolas Mora <nico...@babelouest.org>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT access tokens and the revocation endpoint
> 
> > In this model, considering that token revocations don't happen a lot...
> 
> Just a brief note, a secure piece of software makes the logout feature 
> prominent. Every logout event should trigger token revocation.
> 
> I’m mentioning this because a lot of OAuth solutions in the mobile space 
> literally ignore the logout event, such as Facebook’s mobile OAuth solution. 
> 
> - Jim
> 
> > On Oct 4, 2020, at 6:55 AM, Nicolas Mora <nico...@babelouest.org> wrote:
> > 
> > Hello,
> > 
> >> Le 20-10-04 à 11 h 27, Thomas Broyer a écrit :
> >> 
> >>    There might be some kind of pushed events between the AS and the RS when
> >>    a JWT AT is revoked, to allow the RS not to introspect a JWT AT at all.
> >>    Like this, the RS knows if a JWT AT has been revoked or not.
> >> 
> >> 
> >> If there are some kind of pushed events between the AS and the RS, 
> >> then it could push the revoked (and/or expired) opaque AT too, giving 
> >> almost no advantage to JWT ATs.
> >> 
> > Not necessarily, let's say the AS informs the RS only of the revoked 
> > ATs, when a RS checks an AT, it verifies the signature first, then the 
> > claims, then checks if the AT has been revoked by checking its 
> > internal list filled by the AS pushed events.
> > 
> > In this model, considering that token revocations don't happen a lot, 
> > the ratio revoked AT/valid AT is very low, so the advantage of a JWT 
> > is important, because it means not so much communication between the 
> > AS and the RSs, and a very reliable AT.
> > 
> > But this means a communication mechanism that isn't standardized yet.
> > 
> > /Nicolas
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
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> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> 
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