To capture my comment from the interim meeting call, I would like to see some explicit text in this draft (as well as the Security BCP section that will reference this draft) that clarifies this parameter is not needed and this attack is not relevant if a client only interacts with one authorization server.
More broadly, I would like to make sure the scope of the attacks that this prevents is clarified so that people may better understand when they do not need to worry about this and don't need to use this new parameter. --- Aaron Parecki https://aaronparecki.com On Mon, Oct 26, 2020 at 7:33 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen < karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de> wrote: > Hello WG, > > adding the issuer identifier to the authorization response as a > countermeasure to mix-up attacks is well-known on this list and already > part of the security BCP (see 4.4.2 > <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-16#section-4.4.2> > ). > However, the "iss" parameter is currently not properly specified. Daniel > and I wrote an ID to solve this issue. > > We would like to ask the working group to give us feedback on our first > draft version: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-00 > > Abstract > > This document specifies a new parameter "iss" that is used to > explicitly include the issuer identifier of the authorization server > in the authorization response of an OAuth authorization grant. If > implemented correctly, the "iss" parameter serves as an effective > countermeasure to "mix-up" attacks. > > > The need for a proper specification of the "iss" parameter was discussed > in this thread: > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/DQR2ZXtGKfa-8UGtuPYyZoAaBIc/ > > Best regards, > Karsten > > > -- > Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen > IT Security Consultant > Phone: +49 (0)234 / 54456499 > Web: https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, > Security Training > > Does your OAuth or OpenID Connect implementation use PKCE to strengthen the > security? Learn more about the procetion PKCE provides and its limitations in > our new blog > post:https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/123-when-pkce-cannot-protect-your-confidential-oauth-client > > Hackmanit GmbH > Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus) > 44789 Bochum > > Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896 > Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. > Christian Mainka, Dr. Marcus Niemietz > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
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