This can potentially occur. If JARM is used "iss" becomes redundant. To
me JARM is an "enhanced" iss.

If both are included a sensible client should make sure the iss and the
JARM iss match.

My suggestion is to not require iss when a JARM is present, but in case
both do occur to have the client check both.

Vladimir

On 02/11/2020 22:34, Takahiko Kawasaki wrote:
> Hi Karsten,
>
> The specification mentions JARM. Does this specification require the
> iss response parameter even when JARM is used? That is, should an
> authorization response look like below?
>
> HTTP/1.1 302 Found
> Location: https://client.example.com/cb?response={JWT}&iss={ISSUER}
>
> Or, can the iss response parameter be omitted when JARM is used?
>
> A small feedback for the 3rd paragraph in Section 4:
> s/identifes/identifies/
>
> Best Regards,
> Taka
>  
>
> On Tue, Nov 3, 2020 at 3:13 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov
> <vladi...@connect2id.com <mailto:vladi...@connect2id.com>> wrote:
>
>     Thanks Karsten, looks good to me now, no further comments.
>
>     Vladimir
>
>     On 02/11/2020 09:54, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen wrote:
>>
>>     Hi all,
>>
>>     Daniel and I published a new version of the "iss" response
>>     parameter draft to address the feedback from the WG.
>>
>>     Changes in -01:
>>
>>       * Incorporated first WG feedback
>>       * Clarifications for use with OIDC
>>       * Added note that clients supporting just one AS are not vulnerable
>>       * Renamed metadata parameter
>>       * Various editorial changes
>>
>>
>>     We would like to ask you for further feedback and comments on the
>>     new draft version.
>>
>>     Best regards,
>>     Karsten
>>
>>     -------- Forwarded Message --------
>>     Subject:         New Version Notification for
>>     draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt
>>     Date:    Sun, 01 Nov 2020 23:31:42 -0800
>>     From:    internet-dra...@ietf.org <mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>
>>     To:      Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>     <karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de>
>>     <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de>, Karsten zu
>>     Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de>
>>     <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de>, Daniel Fett
>>     <m...@danielfett.de> <mailto:m...@danielfett.de>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>     A new version of I-D,
>>     draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt
>>     has been successfully submitted by Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen and
>>     posted to the
>>     IETF repository.
>>
>>     Name: draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp
>>     Revision: 01
>>     Title: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identifier in
>>     Authorization Response
>>     Document date: 2020-11-01
>>     Group: Individual Submission
>>     Pages: 10
>>     URL:
>>     
>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.txt
>>     Status:
>>     
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp/
>>     Html:
>>     
>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01.html
>>     Htmlized:
>>     https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01
>>     Diff:
>>     
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-meyerzuselhausen-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01
>>
>>     Abstract:
>>     This document specifies a new parameter "iss" that is used to
>>     explicitly include the issuer identifier of the authorization server
>>     in the authorization response of an OAuth authorization flow. If
>>     implemented correctly, the "iss" parameter serves as an effective
>>     countermeasure to "mix-up attacks".
>>
>>
>>
>>     Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>>     submission
>>     until the htmlized version and diff are available at
>>     tools.ietf.org <http://tools.ietf.org>.
>>
>>     The IETF Secretariat
>>
>>
>>     -- 
>>     Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
>>     IT Security Consultant
>>     Phone:   +49 (0)234 / 54456499
>>     Web:     https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration 
>> Testing, Security Training
>>
>>     Does your OAuth or OpenID Connect implementation use PKCE to strengthen 
>> the security? Learn more about the procetion PKCE provides and its 
>> limitations in our new blog post:
>>     
>> https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/123-when-pkce-cannot-protect-your-confidential-oauth-client
>>
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