Hi Rifaat,

apologies for the delay.

We published a new draft addressing your comments.

We changed Section 2.4, paragraph 3 to:

If clients interact with both authorization servers supporting this
    specification and authorization servers not supporting this
    specification, clients MUST store the information which authorization
    server supports the iss parameter.  Clients*MUST*  reject authorization
    responses without the iss parameter from authorization servers which
    do support the parameter according to the client's configuration.
*Clients SHOULD discard authorization responses with the iss parameter from authorization servers which do not indicate their support for the parameter. However, there might be legitimate authorization servers that provide the iss parameter without indicating their support in their metadata. The decision of whether to accept such responses is individual for every scenario and it is not in the scope of this specification.*


Let us know if there is anything else we should work on.


Best regards,
Karsten

On 26.09.2021 00:04, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
Karsten, Daniel,

Can you please address my comments in a new version of the draft to allow me to progress it?

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Mon, Sep 6, 2021 at 6:50 AM Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen <karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de <mailto:karsten.meyerzuselhau...@hackmanit.de>> wrote:

    Hi Rifaat,

    thank you for the shepherd's review.

    Those are valid comments. We will have a second look on this
    paragraph.

    Best regards,
    Karsten

    On 04.09.2021 16:20, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
    Hi Karsten, Daniel,

    As the document shepherd, I have reviewed the document and I have
    the following comments on draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-01 version:


    Section 2.4, paragraph 3, first sentence:

    "If clients interact with both authorization servers supporting this
       specification and authorization servers not supporting this
       specification, clients SHOULD store the information which
       authorization server supports the "iss" parameter."

    Why is this a SHOULD?


    "Clients MUST
       reject authorization responses without the "iss" parameter from
       authorization servers which do support the parameter according
    to the
       client's configuration."

    What should the client do when it receives a response with "iss"
    parameter
    from an authorization server that did not indicate its support
    for this parameter?


    Section 7

    RFC6479 should be replaced with *RFC6749*


    Regards,
      Rifaat

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--
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Senior IT Security Consultant
Phone:  +49 (0)234 / 54456499
Web:    https://hackmanit.de | IT Security Consulting, Penetration Testing, 
Security Training

Is your OAuth or OpenID Connect application vulnerable to mix-up attacks? Find 
out more on our blog:
https://www.hackmanit.de/en/blog-en/132-how-to-protect-your-oauth-client-against-mix-up-attacks

Hackmanit GmbH
Universitätsstraße 60 (Exzenterhaus)
44789 Bochum

Registergericht: Amtsgericht Bochum, HRB 14896
Geschäftsführer: Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk, Prof. Dr. Juraj Somorovsky, Dr. 
Christian Mainka, Prof. Dr. Marcus Niemietz

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