Thanks for the review Benjamin! Specific replies are inline below.

On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 2:20 PM Benjamin Schwartz via Datatracker <
nore...@ietf.org> wrote:

> Reviewer: Benjamin Schwartz
> Review result: Ready
>
> This is a very mature, carefully drafted specification.
>

Appreciate that. Thank you.




> Question: Under Dynamic Client Registration, do we need a mechanism for the
> client learn the required signature algorithms?  In general, there is no
> discussion of how mutually acceptable signature algorithms might be
> negotiated.
>

There is not a lot of discussion on it but a client can learn the supported
signature algorithms of a an authorization server though the
dpop_signing_alg_values_supported metadata parameter introduced in
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-13.html#name-authorization-server-metada
and a protected resource can signal to the client the algorithms it
supports in the WWW-Authenticate challenge
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-13.html#section-7.1-10.6



>    Unlike cryptographic
>    nonces, it is acceptable for clients to use the same nonce multiple
>    times, and for the server to accept the same nonce multiple times.
>
> This suggests that there may be another term that is better than "nonce",
> such
> as "epoch", "session ID", or "tag".
>

I tend to agree that a term other than "nonce" might have been better. And
there was indeed some discussion and disagreement about it in the WG when
the mechanism was introduced. But we were unable to settle on a
different/better term and ultimately the rough consensus was to use nonce.



> Section 11.4:
>
>    This grant needs to be "silent", i.e., not require interaction with
>    the user.
>
> Why? Surely an occasional user authentication refresh is not such a red
> flag to
> ordinary users.
>


Unsurprisingly there are differing opinions on that.  And there is at least
some use of the iframe based silent refresh mechanism out there (though
it's becoming less viable with increasing restrictions on 3rd party cookies
in the major browsers). But the text in Section 11.4 isn't recommending its
use - it's only saying that it's one of the preconditions with that
particular security consideration.

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