Hi Chris, Yes, that’s correct. That’s the basic idea of the browser-swapping attack, and that’s the reason why neither PKCE, nor DPoP, nor PAR (or even JAR) will mitigate this attack. The reason why these protection mechanisms fail is that the authorization code sent back to the user in the redirect URI is bound to the client-session initiated by the attacker, but with the identity of the user. So the attacker only needs to resolve the authorization code within their own session to be logged in to the client as the user.
The only thing that can stop the attacker from doing that is preventing the attacker from getting this valid authorization code. In my opinion, the most secure way is to prefer response_mode=form_post for backend clients because it is very unlikely that attackers can read the post body parameters, or using response_mode=fragment for user-side clients because fragment parameters will not be sent to the backend, which at least reduces the attack surface. In addition, I recommend that the client invalidates the authorization code, just in case a CSRF attack is being detected, because then there is no valid authorization code that can be stolen by the attacker anymore. > Am 06.11.2025 um 17:53 schrieb Chris Keogh <[email protected]>: > > Hi Jonas, so just to be clear: > The attacker generates the private key for DPoP during their session/browser > The attacker is able to insert the DPoP proof into the auth code flow started > by the malicious javascript in the target's session/browser > auth flow happens in the target session/browser, is broken by malicious js > once the code is returned > auth code exfiltrated to the attacker by malicious js > attacker injects the code into their session and uses their private key > created in step 1 to generate the correctly bound proof > Have I got this correct? > > On Fri, 7 Nov 2025 at 11:17, <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Send OAuth mailing list submissions to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via email, send a message with subject or >> body 'help' to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of OAuth digest..." >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC Security Best >> Practices >> (Primbs, Jonas) >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> Message: 1 >> Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2025 22:15:54 +0000 >> From: "Primbs, Jonas" <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in >> OAuth/OIDC Security Best Practices >> To: Chris Keogh <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Cc: "[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>" <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Message-ID: <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Content-Type: multipart/signed; >> boundary="Apple-Mail=_B3DF460A-2551-4E22-8927-37A61004E7BB"; >> protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha-256 >> >> Hi Chris, >> >> a DPoP-bound authorization code will mitigate the CSRF attack. >> >> However, it will not mitigate a Browser-Swapping attack, because the private >> key will be generated within the attacker’s session, the user authenticates, >> calling the redirect URI fails, and the critical request will be done >> afterwards within the attacker's session. >> >> Greetings, >> Jonas >> >> >> > Am 06.11.2025 um 16:38 schrieb Chris Keogh <[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>: >> > >> > Hi there, >> > >> > Trying to get my head around this attack, very likely I am missing >> > something. >> > >> > Would not binding the auth code to a DPoP key help prevent this attack >> > when the stolen code was injected by the attacker? Even if the attacker >> > generates their own key material using malicious javascript within the >> > target's session and exfiltrates that alongside the code, when the >> > attacker attempts to inject the stolen code the BFF will try and redeem >> > the code with its own DPoP proof. >> > >> > Regards, >> > Chris >> > >> > On Fri, 7 Nov 2025 at 00:26, <[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: >> >> Send OAuth mailing list submissions to >> >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via email, send a message with subject or >> >> body 'help' to >> >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> >> than "Re: Contents of OAuth digest..." >> >> >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> >> >> 1. Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC Security Best >> >> Practices >> >> (Andrey Kuznetsov) >> >> 2. Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC Security Best >> >> Practices >> >> (Warren Parad) >> >> >> >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> >> Message: 1 >> >> Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2025 14:06:43 +0300 >> >> From: Andrey Kuznetsov <[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in >> >> OAuth/OIDC Security Best Practices >> >> To: Warren Parad <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Cc: "[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>>" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Message-ID: <[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 >> >> >> >> A message part incompatible with plain text digests has been removed ... >> >> Name: not available >> >> Type: text/html >> >> Size: 18752 bytes >> >> Desc: not available >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> Message: 2 >> >> Date: Thu, 6 Nov 2025 12:24:46 +0100 >> >> From: Warren Parad <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in >> >> OAuth/OIDC Security Best Practices >> >> To: Andrey Kuznetsov <[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Cc: "[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>>" <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> Message-ID: >> >> >> >> <cajot-l3lmzpxuububh7bqfcxmcpwwocrncb6xxuvqt9qwmr...@mail.gmail.com >> >> <mailto:cajot-l3lmzpxuububh7bqfcxmcpwwocrncb6xxuvqt9qwmr...@mail.gmail.com> >> >> >> >> <mailto:cajot-l3lmzpxuububh7bqfcxmcpwwocrncb6xxuvqt9qwmr...@mail.gmail.com >> >> >> >> <mailto:cajot-l3lmzpxuububh7bqfcxmcpwwocrncb6xxuvqt9qwmr...@mail.gmail.com>>> >> >> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; >> >> boundary="00000000000097d2c10642eb50fa" >> >> >> >> If an attacker can compromise the application running in the user agent, >> >> then from an OAuth2 standpoint there is no way to distinguish or protect >> >> the user from malicious requests made on the user's behalf. I think the >> >> problem here is that one assumption that's been made is that HTTP Only >> >> Cookies secure against your PreCondition #1 (XSS or compromised >> >> dependency). But that was never the case, an attacker could always make >> >> requests on the user's behalf from inside the application. The theoretical >> >> value was preventing the exfiltration of the generated access tokens. >> >> You've proven that's not the case, but realistically that's irrelevant, >> >> because it was never the requirement that HTTP Only Cookies could protect >> >> against XSS or a compromised dependency. >> >> >> >> If we want to protect against XSS and a compromised dependency, then both >> >> the generation of the access token and the access token itself have to be >> >> obscured from the application. Today, only the access token can be >> >> controlled to be blocked, but the current state of the browsers is that >> >> there is no way to initiate and secure the token generation from a >> >> compromised user agent application when the only technology available is >> >> the user agent. >> >> >> >> To solve there are two different solutions: >> >> >> >> 1. User Agents must support an OAuth2 first mechanism for the secure >> >> generation of PKCE. Right now, since the application is responsible for >> >> generation, this process can be compromised. >> >> 2. The alternative would be to protect the flow, by restricting the use >> >> of the /authorize endpoint to Push Authorization Requests. By limiting >> >> to a >> >> Pushed Authorization Request (PAR) and not allowing the use of >> >> authorize >> >> endpoint to generate auth requests via the redirect, we can be sure >> >> that an >> >> credentialled client can roundtrip a secure client secret or even with >> >> the >> >> PKCE. >> >> >> >> With that regard, rather than client *response_modes* to limit >> >> configuration, it feels more appropriate to add >> >> *require_pushed_authorization_requests >> >> *to the client metadata of the authorization server. >> >> >> >> By doing so we are moving the security out of the user agent into the >> >> credentialed client. >> >> >> >> BUT! What good does this actually do? If we assume there could be an XSS >> >> or >> >> a compromised dependency in the application running in the browser, then >> >> it >> >> is trivially true that we should also expect a transferrable XSS request >> >> or >> >> compromised dependency in the credentialed client as well. Which means >> >> that >> >> all secrets and mechanisms available are vulnerable there. >> >> >> >> Which leads us back to the only way to secure the flow with these >> >> assumptions would be to have a root of trust. That is, the >> >> pre-registration >> >> of public keys associated with the client. With that we are back to DPoP: >> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9449 >> >> >> >> While DPoP still cannot prevent the XSS or compromised dependency from >> >> allowing an attacker to utilize the tokens generated for the browser, it >> >> will absolutely prevent the type of attack since those tokens would be >> >> bound to the user agent. >> >> >> >> The conclusion here, is that we are back to the same two solutions: >> >> >> >> 1. User agents must support an OAuth2 first mechanism for the sucer >> >> generation of PKCE, preferably, DPoP. Right now since the application >> >> is >> >> responsible for the generation, this process can be compromised. >> >> 2. If we can assume there are vulnerabilities somewhere, then we should >> >> also assume there are vulnerabilities everywhere, and that means >> >> secrecy of >> >> tokens in the browser is worthless because if a credentialed client is >> >> compromised, then so is the ability to secure HTTP communication from >> >> that >> >> client. >> >> >> >> I'm 100% for having a browser supported DPoP mechanism for the bound >> >> generation of access tokens. That for me is the only viable path forward >> >> for this issue and has been brought up multiple times in the DBSC >> >> implementation concerns. But I just don't see how any changes to the >> >> OAuth2 >> >> protocol can help here. >> >> >> >> I hope I'm making at least a little sense. >> >> - Warren >> >> >> >> On Thu, Nov 6, 2025 at 12:06 PM Andrey Kuznetsov >> >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> > Sure. The preconditions are: >> >> > >> >> > 1. Execution of malicious JavaScript code within the context of one of >> >> > the >> >> > application’s pages with the same origin. Such as >> >> > - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) >> >> > - A vulnerable or compromised dependency, or third-party script >> >> > 2. The ability to obtain the parameters of the authorization response: >> >> > - Using the web message response mode and setting up one’s own event >> >> > listener >> >> > - Injecting an invisible iframe and obtaining the authorization >> >> > response >> >> > from the location object + *breaking the OAuth flow* >> >> > - Briefly opening a new window and obtaining the authorization >> >> > response >> >> > from the location object + *breaking the OAuth flow* >> >> > 3. Breaking the OAuth flow. To break the OAuth flow means to prevent the >> >> > authorization response parameters (such as the authorization code) from >> >> > being received and consumed by the application itself. This can be >> >> > achieved >> >> > by >> >> > - Passing an invalid state value >> >> > - Changing the response type/response mode for the authorization >> >> > request >> >> > - Case-shifting the redirect URI value >> >> > - Path extension for the redirect URI value >> >> > - Adding query parameters to the redirect URI value >> >> > - Using previously added, but forgotten valid values for the redirect >> >> > URI >> >> > 4. SSO mechanism and seamless user authorization. The user must have an >> >> > active session on the authorization server, so that the authentication >> >> > form >> >> > is not returned in response to the authorization request. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > ---------------- >> >> > Кому: Andrey Kuznetsov ([email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>); >> >> > Копия: Philippe De Ryck ([email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>), >> >> > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>; >> >> > Тема: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC >> >> > Security Best Practices; >> >> > 06.11.2025, 13:41, "Warren Parad" <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>>: >> >> > >> >> > I'm using the word "assumption", and you've used the word >> >> > "precondition", >> >> > that's fine, but it doesn't clarify the situation. Can you state what >> >> > "preconditions" you are expecting here? >> >> > >> >> > On Thu, Nov 6, 2025 at 11:30 AM Andrey Kuznetsov < >> >> > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > Philippe, >> >> > Yes, i suppose, i do. >> >> > I have a short video demonstration <https://youtu.be/AFsrm02tC6c> for >> >> > the >> >> > described attack. Also there is another demo >> >> > <https://youtu.be/asEBPOs9ys8> for the same attack but done manually for >> >> > clarity. >> >> > The source code for applications used in those examples is available on >> >> > GitHub <https://github.com/anador/oauth-demo-poc>. The app may take some >> >> > setup but can be used with any OAuth/OIDC-compatible authorization >> >> > server. >> >> > >> >> > Warren, >> >> > Perhaps, i may misunderstand your questions, but with the necessary >> >> > preconditions met it's not an assumption, but a statement. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > ---------------- >> >> > Кому: Philippe De Ryck ([email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>); >> >> > Копия: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>; >> >> > Тема: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC >> >> > Security Best Practices; >> >> > 06.11.2025, 12:46, "Warren Parad" <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>>: >> >> > >> >> > Would someone be able to state the obvious for me? >> >> > >> >> > Is the assumption that there is a code injection attack present where an >> >> > attacker has access to javascript running in the application's >> >> > interface? >> >> > Is that the core assumption or is it something else? >> >> > >> >> > On Thu, Nov 6, 2025 at 8:18 AM Philippe De Ryck < >> >> > [email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote: >> >> > >> >> > Hi Andrey, >> >> > >> >> > It seems that with this high degree of control, the attacker would >> >> > indeed >> >> > be able to manipulate the flows. >> >> > >> >> > However, I’m curious to know if you have an actual working demo of step >> >> > 9-10-11. I remember from a private discussion a while ago that someone >> >> > pointed out that intermediate redirects are not observable in the >> >> > browser. >> >> > So if response 9 triggers a redirect to the backend (10), and the >> >> > backend >> >> > handles it and then redirects back to the main application (as a BFF >> >> > would >> >> > do), then the request in 10 is not observable from JS, and would >> >> > prevent an >> >> > attacker from stealing the authz code. >> >> > >> >> > Kind regards >> >> > >> >> > Philippe >> >> > >> >> > — >> >> > *Pragmatic Web Security* >> >> > *Security for developers* >> >> > https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com/ >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On 6 Nov 2025, at 06:33, Andrey Kuznetsov <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>> >> >> > wrote: >> >> > >> >> > I'm sorry for the delayed response. >> >> > >> >> > *Filip*, i agree with your statements and you provided reasonable >> >> > examples of cookie that might be needed on the request to the redirect >> >> > URI. >> >> > >> >> > There is also a reply from *Dick *with the similar reasoning: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > *As Filip stated, cookies are the main reason. There is almost always >> >> > some session state that the app wants to maintain between making the >> >> > authorization request and getting the authorization response. It can be >> >> > as >> >> > simple as where the user was in the app so they are redirected to the >> >> > original place, to what is already in the shopping cart, or even >> >> > existing >> >> > authentication context as the user is linking another account. With the >> >> > use >> >> > of PKCE, the threats of intercepted query parameters are reduced.If we >> >> > were >> >> > to make a recommendation, it would be the redirect and not form post as >> >> > session hijacking is the larger threat now from my understanding.* >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Also there's been another thread started about Browser Swapping attack >> >> > which discusses the related topic. However, i would like to clear >> >> > things up. >> >> > 1. There is a real attack scenario in which the attacker can steal the >> >> > authorization code from the user's browser and use it even if the client >> >> > implements confidential client, PKCE, state and nonce (please, consult >> >> > the >> >> > diagram 1.png attached) >> >> > 2. The ways of authorization code stealing are not hypothetical or >> >> > ephemeral: basically it can be done if the attacker is able to execute >> >> > JS >> >> > on any page of the legitimate application that has an origin matching >> >> > the >> >> > origin of the redirect URI . Full preconditions are listed here >> >> > <https://medium.com/@anador/attacks-via-a-new-oauth-flow-authorization-code-injection-and-whether-httponly-pkce-and-bff-3db1624b4fa7#cd2e> >> >> > . >> >> > 3. The only complete mitigation for the attack is form post response >> >> > mode >> >> > (please, consult the diagram 2.png attached). Other additional >> >> > mitigations >> >> > are listed here >> >> > <https://medium.com/@anador/attacks-via-a-new-oauth-flow-authorization-code-injection-and-whether-httponly-pkce-and-bff-3db1624b4fa7#6da0> >> >> > . >> >> > 4. The attack is possible because of the nature of OAuth flows (please, >> >> > consult the diagram 3.png attached). All additional protection measures >> >> > such as PAR/JAR/JARM don’t prevent the attack. >> >> > 4. When we use query/fragment/web message response modes we cannot >> >> > prevent >> >> > the attacker that executes JS on the app's origin from accessing the >> >> > authorization response. However, form post response mode does not allow >> >> > access to the authorization response from the origin of the application >> >> > itself. But the authorization server must be able to limit the available >> >> > response modes at some level. >> >> > >> >> > On the other hand we have downsides of using form post response mode: if >> >> > we need cookies to be received on the redirect URI page, those cookies >> >> > (not >> >> > actual session cookies!) must have SameSite=None attribute. I agree that >> >> > for some cases it can be crucial, but for some it can add no risks. >> >> > Also close attention should be paid to the values of the redirect URI >> >> > that >> >> > the authorization server considers valid to prevent XSS at the AS side. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > I suggest we should point out that form post response mode protects from >> >> > the stated attack, while it should be considered if CSRF at client's >> >> > side >> >> > is going to be possible because of marking some cookies with >> >> > SameSite=None. >> >> > >> >> > ---------------- >> >> > Кому: Andrey Kuznetsov ([email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>); >> >> > Копия: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>; >> >> > Тема: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC >> >> > Security Best Practices; >> >> > 26.10.2025, 10:54, "Filip Skokan" <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>>: >> >> > >> >> > > That is why I emphasized "significant". >> >> > >> >> > Are they not significant? >> >> > >> >> > I may not have read your blog post but i did read and quote the >> >> > question I >> >> > was answering to. While these may appear as insignificant reasons at >> >> > first >> >> > glance they are both blockers encountered at one point in time in my >> >> > past >> >> > experience. >> >> > >> >> > > sameSite >> >> > >> >> > Account Linking, Step-up, re-auth, site preferences, shopping carts are >> >> > all scenarios where you want/need an existing session loaded (regardless >> >> > whether it's preauth or not). >> >> > >> >> > > FOUC >> >> > >> >> > User agent that's processing a 30x response with a location header and a >> >> > 200 that contains a JS self-submitting form is different when it comes >> >> > to >> >> > FOUC. Of course this problem is exaggerated on unstable or slow >> >> > connections >> >> > such as mobile. >> >> > >> >> > - Filip >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > 25. 10. 2025 v 17:50, Andrey Kuznetsov <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>>: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > That is why I emphasized "significant". >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > UX - FOUC or briefly displayed submit page at the AS when it's sending >> >> > responses >> >> > >> >> > - The returning page with the autosubmitted form usually does not >> >> > contain >> >> > any explicit content. In fact, I'm not sure how it's different from any >> >> > redirect URI page that might appear briefly, as you mentioned, when >> >> > other >> >> > response modes are in use >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > sameSite - the client is required to use sameSite=none for the cookies >> >> > they expect to load at the redirect_uri, that may include session >> >> > related >> >> > cookies for which sameSite=none is the exact opposite of what they >> >> > should >> >> > strive for. >> >> > >> >> > - I agree with the first part of your statement, that's true. However, >> >> > we >> >> > should define what we mean by a "session" here and determine if it's a >> >> > problem. Usually, this applies only to certain cookies that are used to >> >> > maintain a "pre-auth session" and for such a case I'm not sure if it's a >> >> > significant issue. I considered this nuance in the research i mentioned >> >> > previously and explicitly stated that constraint. Could you share your >> >> > example, If you have another case where we do need a cookie to be sent >> >> > to >> >> > the redirect URI endpoint? >> >> > ---------------- >> >> > Кому: Andrey Kuznetsov ([email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>); >> >> > Копия: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>; >> >> > Тема: [OAUTH-WG] Re: Question: Form Post Response Mode in OAuth/OIDC >> >> > Security Best Practices; >> >> > 25.10.2025, 16:40, "Filip Skokan" <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>>: >> >> > >> >> > On the other hand, i cannot identify any significant drawbacks to using >> >> > this response mode, aside from inconsistent support across >> >> > implementations. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > What about >> >> > - UX - FOUC or briefly displayed submit page at the AS when it's sending >> >> > responses >> >> > - sameSite - the client is required to use sameSite=none for the cookies >> >> > they expect to load at the redirect_uri, that may include session >> >> > related >> >> > cookies for which sameSite=none is the exact opposite of what they >> >> > should >> >> > strive for. >> >> > >> >> > - Filip >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > 25. 10. 2025 v 15:21, Andrey Kuznetsov <[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>>>: >> >> > >> >> > On the other hand, i cannot identify any significant drawbacks to using >> >> > this response mode, aside from inconsistent support across >> >> > implementations. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> >> > OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > Best regards, >> >> > Andrey Kuznetsov >> >> > Software Architect >> >> > Identity & Access Management >> >> > Yandex Cloud >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > , >> >> > >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> >> > OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > Best regards, >> >> > Andrey Kuznetsov >> >> > Software Architect >> >> > Identity & Access Management >> >> > Yandex Cloud >> >> > >> >> > <1.png><2.png><3.png>_______________________________________________ >> >> > OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > >> >> > _______________________________________________ >> >> > OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> > <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> > <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > С уважением, >> >> > Андрей Кузнецов >> >> > Архитектор, YC IAM & Resource Management >> >> > TG: @andreukuznetsov_work <https://t.me/andreukuznetsov_work> >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > С уважением, >> >> > Андрей Кузнецов >> >> > Архитектор, YC IAM & Resource Management >> >> > TG: @andreukuznetsov_work <https://t.me/andreukuznetsov_work> >> >> > >> >> > >> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> >> A message part incompatible with plain text digests has been removed ... >> >> Name: not available >> >> Type: text/html >> >> Size: 23783 bytes >> >> Desc: not available >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> Subject: Digest Footer >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> <mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected] >> >> <mailto:[email protected]>> >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> >> End of OAuth Digest, Vol 205, Issue 29 >> >> ************************************** >> > >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Chris Keogh >> > Ph 021 1616692 >> > _______________________________________________ >> > OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> > <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A message part incompatible with plain text digests has been removed ... >> Name: not available >> Type: text/html >> Size: 27498 bytes >> Desc: not available >> -------------- next part -------------- >> A message part incompatible with plain text digests has been removed ... >> Name: smime.p7s >> Type: application/pkcs7-signature >> Size: 6195 bytes >> Desc: not available >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> Subject: Digest Footer >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> End of OAuth Digest, Vol 205, Issue 43 >> ************************************** > > > > -- > Chris Keogh > Ph 021 1616692 > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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