That is one of option I discussed with Arndt and raised as an AOB point in the 
last OAuth WG meeting at IETF 124.

Jean-François “Jeff” Lombardo | Amazon Web Services

Architecte Principal de Solutions, Spécialiste de Sécurité
Principal Solution Architect, Security Specialist
Montréal, Canada

Commentaires à propos de notre échange? Exprimez-vous 
ici<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/feedback.aws.amazon.com/?ea=jeffsec&fn=Jean*20Francois&ln=Lombardo__;JQ!!Pe07N362zA!0k9CkAV8Djpw_8EfIAKrbhP3TQrJr0oMnznlUgBJ3V3NoEk6hihx7dNHnQuejn6SSH2CP8Iow3G-tTzppHeg$>.

Thoughts on our interaction? Provide feedback 
here<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/feedback.aws.amazon.com/?ea=jeffsec&fn=Jean*20Francois&ln=Lombardo__;JQ!!Pe07N362zA!0k9CkAV8Djpw_8EfIAKrbhP3TQrJr0oMnznlUgBJ3V3NoEk6hihx7dNHnQuejn6SSH2CP8Iow3G-tTzppHeg$>.

From: Pieter Kasselman <[email protected]>
Sent: February 20, 2026 12:06 PM
To: Takahiko Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Cc: oauth <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXT] [OAUTH-WG] Re: Client ID for Client Authentication using 
X509-SVID


CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click 
links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the 
content is safe.


AVERTISSEMENT: Ce courrier électronique provient d’un expéditeur externe. Ne 
cliquez sur aucun lien et n’ouvrez aucune pièce jointe si vous ne pouvez pas 
confirmer l’identité de l’expéditeur et si vous n’êtes pas certain que le 
contenu ne présente aucun risque.

Thanks for raising this Takahiko.

I want to confirm I understand the use case.

From what you describe, I think you're suggesting that the desired state is for 
a client to authenticate with a SPIFFE credential, while using a different 
client_id (potentially an https:// or other identifier), and that this could 
potentially be addressed by including additional metadata in CIMD?

Cheers

Pieter

On Fri, Feb 20, 2026 at 4:33 PM Takahiko Kawasaki 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi Emilia,

Thank you for your response.

Client IDs and client authentication methods should be orthogonal.

A CIMD client can have a client ID of "https://example.com/client.json";, and 
the client metadata document may contain the following metadata to indicate 
that the client uses OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication with JWT-SVIDs 
(assuming that spiffe_jwt represents the client authentication method):
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "spiffe_jwt"

This is how CIMD and SPIFFE Client Authentication coexist. If we avoid 
introducing the requirement that the client ID must start with spiffe://, we 
would not need to take the extra step of replacing spiffe:// with https:// 
inside the client ID.

Individual deployments are free to decide to use client IDs that start with 
spiffe://, but it is undesirable for a client authentication method to impose 
constraints on the format of client IDs. If a mechanism functions correctly 
without such a restriction, it is better for a standard not to impose one.

Implementer of OpenID Federation, CIMD, various client authentication methods
Taka @ Authlete
OpenID Federation - https://www.authlete.com/developers/oidcfed/
CIMD - https://www.authlete.com/developers/cimd/
OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication - 
https://medium.com/@darutk/oauth-2-0-client-authentication-4b5f929305d4


On Sat, Feb 21, 2026 at 12:33 AM Emelia S. 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi all,

So OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication does not conflict with OAuth Client ID 
Metadata or OpenID Federation 1.0, since different protocols are used https:// 
vs spiffe://

That allows both to co-exist in an authorization server. It's OAuth Client ID 
Metadata and OpenID Federation 1.0 that conflict (but you almost certainly 
wouldn't deploy them together due to different security/trust models), as they 
both use https:// URIs, so you can't differentiate between them without trying 
to fetch, but they have different fetch semantics (iirc).

I'm basing this response on the example in 
https://arndt-s.github.io/oauth-spiffe-client-authentication/draft-ietf-oauth-spiffe-client-auth-00/draft-ietf-oauth-spiffe-client-auth.html#section-3.2.1

An AS can look at the client_id and go "this starts with https:// therefore 
I'll use CIMD" or "this starts with spiffe:// so I'll use OAuth SPIFFE Client 
Authentication", just like how you can deploy CIMD and DCR/Static Registration 
on the same AS, as long as DCR would never generate a client_id starting with 
https:// (which should never happen for most id generation schemes)

If SPIFFE Client Authentication does not require the spiffe:// protocol scheme, 
and uses https:// then yes, they would be incompatible. I'd recommend keeping 
the spiffe:// scheme — perhaps a resolution step is "replace spiffe:// with 
https:// in the client_id"

Yours,
Emelia Smith

CIMD Co-author


On 20 Feb 2026, at 16:04, Takahiko Kawasaki 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

Hello,

It appears that issues posted to the issue trackers under the management of 
https://github.com/oauth-wg/ are automatically shared with the OAuth WG mailing 
list. However, since it is unclear whether issues posted to the OAuth SPIFFE 
Client Authentication issue tracker under arndt-s's account are also 
automatically shared with the OAuth WG, I am posting the same content here as 
well.

SPIFFE-CLIENT-AUTH ISSUE 29: Client ID for Client Authentication using X509-SVID
https://github.com/arndt-s/oauth-spiffe-client-authentication/issues/29

In draft 00 of OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication, when using Client 
Authentication with X509-SVID, it requires that the value of the client_id 
request parameter be the SPIFFE ID. However, I believe this requirement should 
be removed. The reasons are as follows:

- Systems that use the OpenID Federation 1.0 specification cannot use OAuth 
SPIFFE Client Authentication.
- Systems that use the OAuth Client ID Metadata Document specification cannot 
use OAuth SPIFFE Client Authentication.
- Systems in which client IDs cannot be flexibly changed cannot use OAuth 
SPIFFE Client Authentication.

The client authentication method defined in RFC 8705 Section 2.1 works 
correctly even if the value of the tls_client_auth_san_uri client metadata 
differs from the client ID.

Best Regards,
Taka @ Authlete


_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
To unsubscribe send an email to 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>



--
Takahiko Kawasaki
Co-Founder
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
[Authlete]
authlete.com<https://www.authlete.com/> 
|Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/company/authlete/>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
To unsubscribe send an email to 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to