India's Goldilocks Globalization
By Arvind Subramanian | NEWSWEEK
Published Jun 6, 2009
>From the magazine issue dated Jun 15, 2009

The Congress Party's big win in the recent Indian election was a double 
surprise. Recent Indian politics have featured a strong strain of 
anti-incumbency, and the global financial crisis has spelled trouble at the 
polls for many other governments worldwide. True, before the trouble hit, India 
had enjoyed five years of the fastest economic growth in its history, reaching 
9 percent—almost the same pace as China. But the global crisis could easily 
have erased all the happy memories. Yet that didn't happen, and for one big 
reason: India has not been a gung-ho globalizer.

The crisis that began in the United States spread abroad through two channels: 
finance and trade. Countries that sucked in a lot of foreign capital—like those 
in Eastern Europe—suffered huge disruptions to their exchange rates, asset 
prices and financial systems when this capital fled to safety. Meanwhile, 
countries that relied heavily on exports—like Singapore, Taiwan and China—also 
suffered when foreign demand collapsed.

India managed to avoid both extremes. That's because it followed a strategy 
that can be called "Goldilocks globalization," relying neither too much on 
foreign finance nor too much on exports. On the financial side, unlike the 
Eastern European countries that ran a current-account deficit of more than 10 
percent of GDP, India kept its own at about 2 to 3 percent of GDP. India also 
cannily insured itself against turmoil by building a healthy cushion of 
foreign-exchange reserves: about $315 billion worth, among the highest in the 
world. As a result, when the crisis hit, India was able to provide dollars to 
investors that were selling rupee assets and demanding dollars in return. This 
reassured investors, leading many to keep their money in India.

On the trade side, India's exports of goods and services never accounted for 
more than about 20 percent of its economy, compared with about 45 percent for 
China and up to 100 percent elsewhere in Asia. Thus when foreign demand for 
products collapsed, this hurt India far less. Indeed, between March 2008 and 
March 2009, India managed to grow at 6.7 percent, well above the rate of most 
industrial countries.

It's worth asking whether all this was a result of a conscious strategy—whether 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deserves credit for following this middle road on 
globalization. Determining intent or purpose is always tricky when dealing with 
a weak and decentralized polity such as India. Yet there's no question that New 
Delhi did deliberately choose to follow a steady and gradual approach to 
reforms in general and globalization in particular. As Montek Ahluwalia, one of 
India's leading economic policymakers, has put it: in Indian politics, there is 
a strong consensus for weak reforms.

Such an approach wasn't an unalloyed good. It meant that India never enjoyed 
the kind of benefits—such as greater efficiency and productivity leading to 
even higher growth—that big-bang reforms can deliver. But it did have the huge 
advantage of ensuring stability when conditions got rough. Perhaps the most 
telling example of how this worked can be found in the Indian banking system, 
which is still three-quarters owned by the government. During the crisis, the 
only bank that was seriously endangered with exposure to toxic assets was a 
private one. India's cautious government-owned banks had nothing to do with 
these dangerous assets, and were thus able to provide a safe haven to 
depositors fleeing the private system.

Now that the election has delivered Singh a big win, many observers expect him 
to abandon his caution and press forward with dramatic changes. Indeed, he will 
probably will try to push for bolder reforms, such as greater infrastructure 
development and foreign investment in key sectors. Yet India's political system 
features numerous checks and balances, making rapid progress unlikely. The 
country's political system is often said to have the wheels of an ox cart and 
the brakes of a Rolls-Royce. No matter how much change Singh manages to 
accomplish, he'll never make the rest of the machine resemble a Rolls. Yet the 
country would happily settle for a Nano: India's revolutionary $2,000 car 
that's far from fancy but a good metaphor for the country's modest, and 
successful, approach.

Subramanian is a senior fellow at The Peterson Institute for International 
Economics.


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