http://www.newsweek.com/id/208486

The Monster of Wall Street Lives
Markets are recovering. But the systemic risk problem that nearly ate New York 
is still out there.
By Michael Hirsh | Newsweek Web Exclusive 
Jul 24, 2009
Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase have reported huge profits, the Dow has made 
it past 9000, and Barack Obama has moved on to health care. The horror show 
seems to be over. But as in one of those clichéd Hollywood endings, the monster 
in this story isn't really dead, even if most people think he is. Lost amid all 
the premature self-congratulation is the fact that the deepest underlying 
problem that caused the financial disaster is not being solved. 
The problem: how to control and keep tabs on the market activities of giant 
firms that cause such a disruption to the system they can't be allowed to fail. 
Put simply, six months into the Obama administration there is as yet no 
coherent proposal for solving this issue, and serious differences remain 
between Tim Geithner's Treasury and Ben Bernanke's Fed. At hearings this week, 
Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) told Bernanke bluntly that he didn't think anyone was 
up to that immense and vastly complex job. As Corker told me afterward in an 
interview: "Today there's a whole lot more questions about what systemic risk 
is and which powers a regulator should have than there are answers. And the 
last week has brought that to light." 
  
Indeed. On Friday, Geithner reiterated a position he first laid out in June: 
the administration, he said, wants to hand the job of systemic risk regulator 
to the Fed. "We propose evolving the Federal Reserve's authority to create a 
single point of accountability for the consolidated supervision of all large, 
interconnected firms," he said in testimony. He said again that the 
administration seeks to create a new Financial Services Oversight Council to 
monitor systemic risk. But Geithner made clear the council "will not have the 
responsibility for supervising the largest, most complex, interconnected 
institutions." Geithner said there's no way such a council would have the 
"tremendous institutional capacity and organizational accountability" needed 
for that task, or to respond in a financial emergency. "You cannot convene a 
committee to put out a fire," Geithner summed things up piquantly in June. "The 
Federal Reserve is in the best position to play that
 role."     
  
But Bernanke, in contending testimony this week, shied away from being cast as 
the über-regulator. Instead, as he saw it, the Fed ought to be restricted to 
being supervisor of bank holding companies--apparently the same 19 giant firms 
that went through "stress tests" last spring. "We don't have the resources or 
the authority" to take "a holistic view of the whole system," he said, "though, 
of course, in general terms we obviously are watching the economy, but not in 
that kind of detail." Bernanke also expressed a lot more enthusiasm than 
Geithner about the council, urging Congress to debate "what powers it should 
have." He added: "There may be situations where the council can have authority 
to harmonize different practices or to identify problems and to take action."  
  
When Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) pressed Bernanke on this point, he demurred 
again. Warner asked: "Are you comfortable that the Fed is the de facto 
systemic-risk overseer at this point; is aggregating enough information 
upstream from all the day-to-day prudential regulators, not just on the banking 
side, but from securities, commodities and others--that this aggregation of 
information is taking place?" Bernanke responded: "Well, no, we're not being 
the super-regulator at all." Federal Reserve governor Dan Tarullo, an Obama 
appointee, emphasized the same point in testimony on Thursday. While a new 
financial regulatory framework "would involve some expansion of Federal Reserve 
responsibilities, that expansion would be an incremental and natural extension 
of the Federal Reserve's existing supervisory and regulatory responsibilities," 
he said.  
  
Both Bernanke and Geithner argued that other planned measures will ameliorate 
systemic risk. Under the administration's proposals, big firms will have to 
"bear the cost of their size through extra capital, liquidity and 
risk-management requirements," Bernanke said. In other words, there will be an 
additional cost to bigness that wasn't there before, making M&A enthusiasts 
think twice. Second, a new resolution authority will be able to take over big 
firms the way the Federal Depository Insurance Corp. does to banks, raising the 
prospect "that creditors could lose money if the company fails," Bernanke said. 
"Both of those things would tend to make being big less attractive." The Fed 
chief added that under the new regime, "supervisors would choose to tell firms 
that they needed to limit certain activities if they thought it was a danger to 
the broad system." 
  
All this helps. But it may be a triumph of hope over experience that Wall 
Street will decide to get smaller when competing against other global giants, 
just because of the extra cost of doing business. And it is similarly wishful 
thinking to believe that the hazy job of systemic-risk regulator that no one 
seems to want--however it ends up being structured--is going to decide that a 
future AIG shouldn't get into a certain kind of credit default swap, or that a 
JPMorgan Chase can't develop some new kind of collateralized debt obligation. 
The administration and the Fed have ignored more fundamental calls for change. 
For example, they have swatted aside a proposal by former Federal Reserve 
chairman Paul Volcker, the head of Obama's Economic Recovery Board, to bar 
commercial banks that enjoy federal guarantees from proprietary trading of 
risky instruments like derivatives. 
For the most part, the current measures will make it easier to clean up after 
the next mess. But they won't prevent another mess from happening.
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