On Sun, 19 Jan 2003 21:19, forrest whitcher wrote:
> I've been working on OpenAFS client < selinux kernel for awhile now, and
> have got a first-draft policy working and currently under test. I'm not to
> sure of complete/correct-ness at this point but at least it seems to be
> working, and now I want to go in and make changes to either the kernel, the
> libafs kernel module or afsd to move the data in /afs/* into its own
> domain.
Doesn't genfs work with afs? If not how does it fail?
> tmpfs_t:* allow statements are specific because for the moment the afs
> cache dir is being created in /tmp -- that's only a kludge because I
> hadn't created any other ext2fs and afsd won't run the cache on aything
> else. Longterm the cachedir should probably have it's own type.
I suspect that you have a mis-labelled startup script if you need to add any
permissions for run_init_t.
> /afs/* is labeled of course as unlabeled_t, currently I'm using a
> policy which allows user_r unrestricted access to this type. Better
> solutions could involve having type enforcemnt check for valid afs
> tickets and/or assigning a type to this data, however I'm not too
> sure what method might be appropriate for that.
Assigning a type to all of /afs or several types to different sub-directories
should be easy enough with genfs.
However for full functionality it might be better to have the enforcement done
on the server and to have the protocol support sending the SE security
context for the client process over the network to allow the server to make
SE Linux policy decisions on file access.
> Where can I consider generating / enforcing an afs_t type for data
> in /afs? This mostly is implemented over UDP port 7001. I think
> most things needed for the server parts are done, but I'm not certain
> how much implementation could to be done mostly in the policy config,
> and what things I need to modify to establish the type in either
> the kernel module or the afsd process.
In genfs_contexts something like the following would be needed:
genfscon afs / system_u:object_r:afs_t
> SELinux will create a directory in every mounted filesystem named
> '...security' in the root of every filesystem which stores persistent
> SID:inode data. I'm not certain whether the creation of ...security will
> cause problems with a fs used as an afs partition.
It can only be done at the server. The client can't create it on a network
share and expect it to work. There are currently some problems if a machine
crashes while files are being created and deleted whereby files can get the
wrong security context. If SE Linux is changed to use xattr's for the PSID
then this issue will be solved and some issues related to networking may be
easier to address.
> domains/program/initrc.te added:
>
> allow run_init_t tmpfs_t:file { read write };
I don't think that is right. I would like to see the dmesg logs that lead you
to create that.
> # however this is not sufficient to allow afsd to startup in enforcing mode
> # so for now I'm starting afsd before toggling into enforcing
Please show me some more logs and I'll make some suggestions.
> domains/program/mount.te added:
>
> allow mount_t kernel_t:process { sigkill };
>
> # when /afs is unmounted I assume VFS is providing the magic for the kill
> to # be sent to afsd. Would it be better (possible?) to limit this to only
> killing # the afsd_t process?
I'm not sure what is happening here, please show some logs to make it clear.
> Most of the work is in:
>
> domains/program/afsd.te (also attached to this email)
I've made a few changes below. Using the daemon_domain() macro makes things a
bit simpler and easier to read, and also makes sure that you get all the
common things. EG the policy you had only appeared to support starting the
daemon after running newrole, but not when logging in at the console directly
into sysadm_r...
The unlabeled_t:tcp_socket is an indication of a problem too.
> # Domain for afsd executable
>
> #
> # make afsd_exec_t
>
daemon_domain(afsd)
> allow afsd_t root_t:dir mounton;
>
> allow kernel_t afsd_t:udp_socket { read write };
>
> allow afsd_t afsd_t:capability { sys_admin sys_nice };
> allow afsd_t afsd_t:process setsched;
> allow afsd_t afsd_t:udp_socket { create ioctl write };
> allow afsd_t any_socket_t:udp_socket { sendto };
> allow afsd_t etc_runtime_t:file { append getattr read };
# do you REALLY want to allow it to write most files in /etc?
> allow afsd_t etc_t:file { getattr read write };
> allow afsd_t netif_eth0_t:netif { udp_send };
> allow afsd_t netmsg_eth0_t:udp_socket { recvfrom };
> allow afsd_t node_t:node { udp_send };
> allow afsd_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl read write };
> allow afsd_t sysadm_tmp_t:dir { create setattr getattr read search };
> allow afsd_t sysadm_tmp_t:file { create };
>
tmp_domain(afsd)
> allow afsd_t unlabeled_t:filesystem { mount };
> allow afsd_t usr_t:dir { search };
>
>
> #
> # required to give any access to users
> #
>
> allow sysadm_t afsd_t:udp_socket { write };
> allow user_t afsd_t:udp_socket { write };
>
>
> #
> # required for full client access
> #
>
> allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:udp_socket { read write };
>
> allow unlabeled_t any_socket_t:udp_socket { sendto };
> allow unlabeled_t netif_eth0_t:netif { udp_send };
> allow unlabeled_t node_t:node { udp_send };
> allow unlabeled_t netmsg_eth0_t:udp_socket { recvfrom };
>
> allow user_t unlabeled_t:dir { getattr search read write};
> allow user_t unlabeled_t:file { read write setattr getattr execute
execute_no_trans }; allow user_t unlabeled_t:lnk_file { read write setattr
> getattr };
>
> allow user_t unlabeled_t:udp_socket { read write };
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
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http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
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